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Multi-Party Computation (MPC) protocols allow a set of mutually distrustful parties tosecurely compute on their joint private inputs, maintaining the privacy of those. Sinceits early conception in the eighties, a plethora of research as well as some real world
deployments have taken place, demonstrating the relevance of such an interesting mathematical
problem. Nevertheless, most of the research and all deployments have focused on scenarios where
both the number of parties and network latency are very low. This thesis lays out the first steps
towards practical deployments of large-scale MPC, where many parties may be involved and they
might only be connected through a high-latency network such as the Internet.
Both theoretical and empirical evidence shows that non-constant-round protocols cannot
perform well on slow networks for many functions. In order to overcome this issue, all the works
in this thesis include concretely efficient constant-round protocols based on multi-party garbled
circuits. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 deal with the very strong setting where an active adversary
corrupts all but one parties. The former achieves such goal by using homomorphic encryption for
low-depth circuits. The latter, based on subsequent work, improves the theoretical understanding
of the problem and utilises oblivious transfer to improve efficiency.
In Chapter 5 we provide both constant and non-constant round protocols that can handle
large numbers of parties more efficiently. We leverage our performance improvements by relaxing
the setting where all but one parties are corrupted to one where a small minority of honest
participants can be assumed. Concretely, such change allows to distribute secret key material
so that each party only holds a ‘short’ part of the key. Security is then based on the concatena-
tion of all honest parties’ keys rather than on each party’s individual key, improving both the
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‘Knowledge is power’. Even though there are previous documented occurrences of thesentence [5, 115], the disputed aphorism is usually miss-attributed to Sir FrancisBacon, one of the main figures in the empiricist tradition. Following Bacon’s views
[13], knowledge comes through observation, formulation of hypothesis and amassing data. Once
such data is analysed, hypothesis are then confirmed, refined or rejected. More evolved forms of
Bacon’s method have been applied to verify the truthfulness of the ‘knowledge is power’ saying –
as for example in the asymmetry of information concept of economics [2] – but if we conversely
examine the methodology through the proverb’s lenses, we can conclude that data gathering and
processing are sources of power.
The contents of this thesis are related to the field of Cryptography and not (directly, at least)
to Epistemology or Political Science. Nevertheless, as it was simply put in Philip Rogaway’s
distinguished lecture in Asiacrypt 2015 [119], cryptography rearranges power: It determines
who can gather which data, and how such data can be processed. Rogaway was not the first
one to notice this fact. Whitfield Diffie, broadly considered a pioneer in the modern science of
cryptography, recalled during a trial [102, 119] a conversation with his wife in 1973:
‘I told her that we were headed into a world where people would have important,
intimate, long-term relationships with people they had never met face to face. I was
worried about privacy in that world, and that’s why I was working on cryptography’.
Thanks to Diffie’s foundational work together with Hellman [52] (as well as that of many other
authors in the subsequent decades), citizens, businesses and organizations can now enjoy secure
storage and communication systems. When those are properly deployed, they address the issue
of who can collect which data, i.e. the desired sender and recipient(s) of the information. But is
this always enough? What about how is that data used?
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It is now part of the folklore that businesses, states and others collect and hold vast amounts
of information about people and their surroundings. Such data creates infrastructures which
mediate or even lead, with varying degrees of fairness, numerous aspects of our daily lives:
Whether we have access to a loan or insurance, what we get to see in social media or search
engines, what healthcare treatments we need, etc. The list could go on for pages. On the other
hand, there is a rising concern about the unintended use – from the perspective of the affected
individual, or society more broadly – of collected data by the intended recipients. This worry
seems to be strengthened by the former routine of amassing data, which a lot of times happens
with little transparency about why different pieces are gathered, or in the worst cases without
any consent at all.
Proof that the debate around privacy and data mistreatment has become a very important
one is the introduction of laws such as the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) [55]. The new legislation, which started being enforced as recently as May 2018, takes
a tiered approach to the different levels of negligence or misuse. Notoriously and for the most
serious infringements, organizations can be fined up to twenty million euros or 4% of their total
worldwide turnover, whichever is higher [55, Art. 83(5)].
Notwithstanding that policy is part of the solution here, on the purely technical side there
seems to remain an insurmountable dilemma. Can we really control how our information is used?
Computing on data from multiple sources intuitively requires to see their data. Thus, once sources
contribute their information, they have to give up on all privacy and control over it. Surprisingly
as it may seem to outsiders of the field, cryptography has also a solution to this issue, which is
the topic of this thesis: Multi-Party Computation (MPC).
1.1 A Brief History of Practical Multi-Party Computation
Multi-Party Computation allows a set of parties to jointly compute a mutually agreed function on
their data, while keeping their inputs private. Security of MPC guarantees that only the intended
result becomes known, even when a coalition of the participants try to attack the system. Thus,
using cryptography we can, in fact, control who computes on information of our choice and how,
being even able to keep that departing information secret!
Diffie and Hellman foresaw that the development of cheap hardware and the reduction in
cost of cryptographic devices would lead to applications requiring new (in their case, public-key)
cryptographic systems [52]. No such prediction is known to have been stated by them about
Multi-Party Computation, but for the same reasons, as well as a due to a vast body of research in
the area, MPC is also recently becoming an important system deployed in the real world.
The first such deployment was secure computation of auctions, in order to determine the
market clearing price for sugar beet production contracts in Denmark [31]. The scenario included
on the one hand Danisco, holding a monopoly on the sugar beet processing in the country and, on
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the other hand, 1,229 farmers supplying the sugar beets to Danisco. Whereas auctions are easy
to solve when a trusted third party can be found to handle the bids and, in some cases as this one,
keeping them secret, no such entity could be agreed upon by all participants due to conflicting
interests. Back in January 2008, the nation-wide computation was carried out by three parties
and took around half an hour.
Other applications that have been either proposed or successfully carried out in real scenarios
include tax fraud detection [29], sociological and medical studies [30, 77] and network analysis [7].
An additional general application of MPC is that of distributing trust by decentralization. Storing
or processing information in the clear in a single place constitutes a single point of failure for
adversaries trying to break a system. Data breaches and ransomware are frequent in the news,
sometimes with terrible consequences. By substituting such single points of failure with a set of
multiple servers or entities running MPC, the resulting system becomes more robust: Attackers
require to take and hold control over different parties running MPC before being detected and
repelled.
There is something all the proposals above have in common: Few parties are assumed to be
involved in the computation, and a very low latency network connects them. Notably and for the
first deployment of MPC [31], even though the figure of a trusted auctioneer was removed, each
of the 1,229 bidders had to trust at least two of the three parties carrying out the computation to
be honest. Moreover, they still had to be confident that the parties they considered untrustworthy
would follow the protocol instructions. Finally, all of these assumptions had to be combined
with the fact that all computing parties were very closely located: They were, in fact, connected
through an Ethernet LAN [31].
A huge progress in protocol design has taken place since the first secure auction was run in
Denmark a decade ago. MPC can now run significantly faster even against active adversaries
(i.e., those who arbitrarily deviate from the protocol description) that can be assumed to control a
majority of the computing parties. Still, most of multi-party protocols do not scale so well with
respect to neither network latency nor the number of participants. For the former issue, the
primary cause is the round complexity of protocols, specially when the function to compute is
represented by deep circuits [25]. This thesis lays out the first steps in the long road towards
practical deployments of large-scale MPC, where many parties may be involved and they might
only be connected through a high-latency network such as the internet.
1.2 Outline of this Thesis
The rest of this dissertation will be structured as follows. In Chapter 2 we review some basic
notions related to Multi-Party Computation and cryptography more in general. Within those
pages, we also focus our attention on the more advanced notions of Universally Composable
security (UC) [35] and garbled circuits. The former concept, which has become the standard
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framework for proving security in MPC, will be a very useful tool during the rest of the thesis.
The UC model not only provides strong security guarantees, but it also helps to simplify the
description of multi-party protocols by dividing them into more intuitive, smaller building blocks.
Such divisions will be needed when presenting the latter garbled circuits technique, which we
first describe in the simpler, two-party case. The subsequently introduced multi-party scenario,
following the work [18] of Beaver, Micali and Rogaway (BMR), is the most important concept for
the comprehension of Chapters 3 and 4, as well as an important part of Chapter 5.
Chapter 3 describes how to perform the garbling phase of BMR – one of the simpler building
blocks we can describe on the UC framework – using the notion of homomorphic encryption,
which became a significant improvement on the state of the art efficiency for this step over
previous works. The following Chapter 4 gives a general transformation from any MPC protocol
for boolean circuits to BMR, as well as a concrete, more efficient instantiation using the TinyOT
protocol. The contents presented there have become especially relevant not only in terms of
efficiency, but also conceptually, as several other works now use it in order to build and prove
their protocols secure.
While the two precedent chapters consider a setting where an adversary controls all but one
of the parties, Chapter 5 explores how efficiency can be improved when an arbitrary number
of parties are free from such control. Whereas previous works in MPC consider mostly very
particular thresholds of parties corrupted by the adversary (e.g. less or more than a half, or a
third), we parametrize protocols within the dishonest majority setting in the number of honest
parties. Such parametrization is specially relevant in scenarios where many parties (tens, or even
hundreds) are running MPC, as it is not too realistic to consider, for example, that nine hundred
ninety nine parties are colluding against a single honest party. We leverage this parametrization
to increase the efficiency of both secret-sharing based and garbled circuit-based protocols, in which
we shorten the length of honest parties’ symmetric keys below the usual computational security
parameter. Whereas looking at those keys individually would result in insecure protocols, security
in our case relies on the concatenation of all parties’ keys, hence leading to secure computation
on the whole.
We conclude in Chapter 6, where we synthesize the impact of our results in the areas described
above, as well as we point to interesting open questions and directions towards MPC for the
masses.
1.3 Contributions of the Author
The contents of this thesis are based on the following publications during my doctoral studies:
[96] Y. LINDELL, N. P. SMART, AND E. SORIA-VAZQUEZ, More efficient constant-round multi-
party computation from BMR and SHE, in TCC 2016-B, Part I, M. Hirt and A. D. Smith,
eds., vol. 9985 of LNCS, Springer, Heidelberg, Oct. / Nov. 2016, pp. 554–581.
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[70] C. HAZAY, P. SCHOLL, AND E. SORIA-VAZQUEZ, Low cost constant round MPC combining
BMR and oblivious transfer, in ASIACRYPT 2017, Part I, T. Takagi and T. Peyrin, eds.,
vol. 10624 of LNCS, Springer, Heidelberg, Dec. 2017, pp. 598–628.
[69] , TinyKeys: A new approach to efficient multi-party computation, in CRYPTO 2018,
Part III, H. Shacham and A. Boldyreva, eds., vol. 10993 of LNCS, Springer, Aug. 2018,
pp. 3–33.
Unless otherwise specified in the relevant parts of the document, the results presented are
due to equal collaboration by all co-authors. During the same period, I have also published the
following works, not included here:
[79] M. KELLER, E. ORSINI, D. ROTARU, P. SCHOLL, E. SORIA-VAZQUEZ, AND S. VIVEK,
Faster secure multi-party computation of AES and DES using lookup tables, in ACNS 17,
D. Gollmann, A. Miyaji, and H. Kikuchi, eds., vol. 10355 of LNCS, Springer, Heidelberg,
July 2017, pp. 229–249.
[68] C. HAZAY, E. ORSINI, P. SCHOLL, AND E. SORIA-VAZQUEZ, Concretely efficient large-scale
MPC with active security (or, TinyKeys for TinyOT), in ASIACRYPT 2018, Part III, T. Peyrin
and S. D. Galbraith, eds., vol. 11274 of LNCS, Springer, Dec. 2018, pp. 86–117.
An obvious but understated truth is that ideas that do not succeed are also part of a PhD. As
everyone else, I have had my share of those, as well as having other unpublished works in the












The goal of this chapter is to cover the technical background that will be needed forthe understanding of the following chapters. We start by refreshing some basic notionsand cryptographic primitives, after which we discuss the diverse goals of Multi-Party
Computation (MPC) protocols and the different ways of measuring their efficiency. Following
this presentation, we delve into the details of proving security of cryptographic primitives and
protocols according to the Universal Composability (UC) framework, which has become the
standard model of security in the area of MPC.
We conclude the chapter by giving more details about garbled circuits and their role in
both Two-Party and Multi-Party Computation. We start by focusing on the two-party case,
where garbled circuits constitute the most efficient solution at the moment. This serves as an
introduction to the more complex MPC scenario, for which we describe the protocol of [18] by
Beaver, Micali and Rogaway (BMR). Their seminal construction spurred a line of work which is
also the starting point for the contents of Chapters 3 and 4, as well as Section 5.4 in Chapter 5.
2.1 Prerequisites
Throughout this thesis, we assume familiarity with some basic linear algebra and probability
concepts. In this section we give a quick recap of some of them, as well as other essential
cryptographic notions. The first notion we want to refresh is that of negligibility:
Definition 2.1. A function f :N→R is negligible if for every positive polynomial p there exists





This puts us in a good position to define the different notions of indistinguishability between
distribution ensembles, i.e. countable sets of probability distributions. These rely on the concept
of a distinguisher D which, given a string, outputs ‘0’ if it believes it has been sampled according
to distribution X or, otherwise, it outputs ‘1’ believing it comes from distribution Y .
Informally, computationally indistinguishable constructions are secure against distinguishers
whose computation and storage resources are bounded – to, say, not exceeding the total amount
of those that are estimated to be available on Earth at the moment. Statistical security removes
that constraint from the distinguisher and reduces security to a negligible advantage in lucky
guessing, whereas perfect or unconditional security is the strongest notion, which means that the
random variables are identically distributed. More formally, we have the following definitions:
Definition 2.2. Let X = {X (a,κ)}a∈{0,1}∗,κ∈N and Y = {Y (a,κ)}a∈{0,1}∗,κ∈N be two distribution en-
sembles. We say that X and Y are computationally indistinguishable, denoted X
c≈ Y , if for
every probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher D and every a ∈ {0,1}∗, there exists a negligible
function negl such that:
∣∣Prx←X (a,κ) [D(x,a,1κ)= 1]−Pry←Y (a,κ) [D(y,a,1κ)= 1]∣∣< negl(κ),
where κ is denoted the computational security parameter and D is given the unary input 1κ so it
can always run in time polynomial in κ.
Definition 2.3. Let X = {X (a, s)}a∈{0,1}∗,s∈N and Y = {Y (a, s)}a∈{0,1}∗,s∈N be two distribution en-
sembles. We say that X and Y are statistically indistinguishable, denoted X
s≈ Y , if for every
distinguisher D and every a ∈ {0,1}∗, there exists a negligible function negl such that:
∣∣Prx←X (a,s) [D(x,a)= 1]−Pry←Y (a,s) [D(y,a)= 1] ∣∣< negl(s),
where s is denoted the statistical security parameter.
Definition 2.4. Let X = {X (a)}a∈{0,1}∗ and Y = {Y (a)}a∈{0,1}∗ be two distribution ensembles. We
say that X and Y are perfectly or unconditionally indistinguishable, denoted X ≡Y , if for every
distinguisher D and every a ∈ {0,1}∗:
∣∣Prx←X (a) [D(x,a)= 1]−Pry←Y (a) [D(y,a)= 1] ∣∣= 0.
2.2 Primitives
We turn to describe several cryptographic primitives that will be useful across the different




Secret sharing was introduced by Shamir in 1979 [122] as a way of securely dividing secret data X
within a set of mutually distrusting parties. The trusted dealer distributes pieces (called shares)
of the data in such a way that only authorised subsets of parties can reconstruct the original
secret, while the unauthorised subsets cannot learn anything about X . Imagine a situation where
someone wants to leave a will and testament without resorting to a public notary. That person
could then, for example, secret share the document between her loved ones in such a way that
the only way they could learn anything about what was written is by putting together all of their
shares.
In this thesis we are only concerned about secret sharing schemes for which the determining
factor about whether a subset of parties is authorised or not is its size. More concretely, a subset
of parties is authorised if it is consist of at least t of them, which in the previous example would
be t = n where n is the number of legatees.
Shamir’s construction [122] is probably the most famous scheme. First, the dealer chooses
a random degree t−1 polynomial in such a way that the constant term is equal to the secret
X . Afterwards, each party is privately distributed an evaluation of the polynomial on a publicly
known point in a finite field. Hence, X can be recovered if and only if any subset of at least t
parties pools together their evaluations of the original polynomial, so they can reconstruct it via
interpolation and learn the constant term.
Additive secret sharing has a fixed threshold of t = n and is the most efficient scheme for that
value. To share a secret X ∈ Zm, the dealer randomly samples xi ∈ Zm, i ∈ [n−1] uniformly at
random, and sets xn = X −∑n−1i=1 xi. Security follows as up to any n−1 shares of X its value is
hidden by the missing, uniformly random share which acts as a one-time-pad.
2.2.2 Pseudorandom Functions
Pseudorandom functions (PRFs) are one of the most important objects in modern cryptography.
They efficiently and deterministically stretch finite-length keys into arbitrary length strings that
are computationally indistinguishable from uniform. Whereas generating actual random bits is a
difficult and costly process, the use of PRFs allows cryptographers to assume that parties have
access to an unlimited pool of random data, as that problem is reduced to that of sampling the
PRF key. We will make extensive use of PRFs in the following chapters, for which we provide the
precise definition below:
Definition 2.5. Let F : {0,1}n × {0,1}n 7→ {0,1}n be an efficient, length preserving, keyed function.
F is a pseudorandom function if for all probabilistic polynomial-time distinguishers D, there
exists a negligible function negl such that:
∣∣Pr[DFk(·)(1κ)= 1]−Pr[D f (·)(1κ)= 1]∣∣≤ negl(κ),
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where the first probability is taken over the randomness of D and the key k ∈ {0,1}n and the
second one is over the choice of f from all functions mapping {0,1}n 7→ {0,1}n, as well as the
randomness of D.
2.2.3 Oblivious Transfer
Oblivious Transfer (OT) protocols were introduced by Rabin [113] and Wiesner [130] and run
between two mutually distrusting parties – sender and receiver. OT guarantees that the sender
can transmit part of their input while remaining oblivious to which one and in such a way that
the receiver learns no information on the rest of said input. In its most basic form, denoted
1-out-of-2 OT, the sender has inputs m0,m1, while the receiver has an input bit b. At the end
of the protocol the receiver learns mb, but nothing about m1−b, and the sender learns nothing
about b.
From a theoretical perspective, OT is known to be both necessary and sufficient to realize
general MPC [82]. On the practical side, although Oblivious Transfer requires the use of public-
key cryptography [73], it is possible to ‘extend’ a initial batch of OTs computed in such way to
produce many more OTs using just symmetric-key cryptography [10, 17, 51, 74]. This can be
interpreted as the OT equivalent of hybrid encryption, where parties encrypt a large amount
of data using symmetric cryptography and the symmetric key is encapsulated in a public-key
cryptosystem. These extension techniques lead to highly efficient MPC protocols as the ones we
will describe in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.
2.3 Multi-Party Computation
Picture a set of parties P1, . . . ,Pn each of which has a secret input x1, . . . , xn. The parties want to
compute some function of their joint inputs y= f (x1, . . . , xn), however, they do not trust each other
and they want to keep their inputs private. If the parties could agree on some trusted third party
F , then they would just have to hand their data to F , who would compute the function on their
behalf and send them their prescribed part of the result y. A Multi-Party Computation (MPC)
protocol is said to securely compute f if running it achieves exactly the same guarantees this
ideal entity F would provide.
How should one then choose an MPC protocol amongst those providing the same set of
guarantees? The practical answer would be just picking the most efficient one, but the choice is
not as straightforward as it could first seem. The most important aspects to consider when making
this decision are what can be assumed about both the behaviour of the parties involved in the
computation, and the channels over which they communicate. For all the possible combinations
of the concepts we are about to enumerate, the protocol to pick would be a different one. A
non-exhaustive but more complete overview of these can be found in [109], as well as how these
assumptions relate to each other and the feasibility of MPC.
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All misbehaving parties are considered to be colluding and we treat them as a single entity
called the adversary. Passive adversaries (also referred to as semi-honest adversaries) follow
all the steps as prescribed by the MPC protocol, whereas active (or malicious) adversaries may
arbitrarily deviate from it in an attempt to breach security. The rest of the parties in the protocol
are referred to as honest. A static adversary chooses which parties to corrupt before the start of
the protocol, whereas an adaptive adversary can do so over the course of the execution, taking
advantage of the information obtained from already corrupted parties. Finally, the adversary
is also bound not to corrupt more parties than a given threshold, for example a minority of the
parties or all but one of them.
A majority of the MPC literature assumes that the communication network is synchronous,
i.e. that all messages sent during the protocol execution arrive timely and in an expected order.
When this cannot be assumed we say the protocol is secure in asynchronous networks that the
adversary can tamper with. In this thesis we focus on synchronous networks, within which there
are still relevant distinctions to be made in practice: Does the network have a high latency? What
is its bandwidth?
Modern, practical MPC protocols typically fall into two main categories: those based on
secret-sharing [28, 45, 47, 64, 76, 114], and those based on garbled circuits [18, 41, 86, 90–
92, 101, 132]. Secret-sharing based protocols tend to have lower communication requirements in
terms of bandwidth, but require a large number of rounds of communication, which increases
with the complexity of the function. In this approach the parties first secret-share their inputs and
then evaluate the circuit gate by gate while preserving privacy and correctness. In low-latency
networks, they can have an extremely fast online evaluation phase, but the round complexity
makes them much less suited to high-latency networks (e.g., when the participating parties are
on opposite sides of the world), where protocols with many rounds perform very poorly [25, 121].
Most of the research effort on making secure computation practically efficient has focused
on the case of two parties [104, 111, 131]. Protocols based on Yao’s garbled circuits [131] have
achieved extraordinary efficiency both against passive [10, 20] and active adversaries [71, 88,
90, 92, 94, 95, 123]. In contrast, secure computation protocols for an arbitrary number of parties
are way behind. When considering the secret-sharing based approach, variants of GMW can be
used against passive adversaries [39, 64], whereas active adversaries can be countered using the
protocols of SPDZ and TinyOT [44, 47, 87]. However, as mentioned above, these protocols have
inherent inefficiency based on the fact that the number of rounds in the protocol is linear in the
depth of the circuit that the parties compute.
In contrast to the impressive progress made in garbled circuits for two-party computation,
very little was achieved for their operation in the multi-party setting. We will review the basics of
Yao’s garbled circuits in Section 2.5, which will serve as a baseline to compare them with their
multi-party counterpart in Section 2.6. Before doing so, we next turn our attention to the details
of meaningfully defining security for the more advanced cryptographic constructions to come.
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2.4 Universally Composable Security
Throughout the thesis we will prove the security of our protocols following the Universal Compos-
ability (UC) framework [35] or, better said, a simplified variant thereof [36]. We do not attempt to
formally define the whole framework in all details, for which we refer the reader to the original
paper [35], but to give an overview of the main concepts, properties and definitions.
The core idea is that of comparing any execution of a given protocol π to an execution where
the task is performed instead by a third party F , called the functionality, which is trusted by
everyone. We call the former scenario the real world and the latter the ideal world, reflecting
that it represents what we wish for the protocol to achieve. The comparison duty is assigned to
the environment, Z , which epitomises everything else happening besides the protocol execution.
Finally, the original protocol is deemed secure if no environment – read, no situation under which
the protocol is run – can distinguish between both worlds.
Dealing as we are with security, the framework would not be complete without a real-world
adversary A attacking the protocol, or what is the same, trying to ease the environment’s job of
telling apart the real execution from the ideal functionality. Any such adversary has a counterpart
in the ideal world, which we call the simulator S .
More formally, all entities introduced above – parties, adversary, simulator, functionality
and environment – are modelled as Interactive Turing Machines (ITM) running in probabilistic,
polynomial time (PPT). Precise details on what it means for a Turing machine to be interactive
can be found in [35, 36], but the basic intuition is that two new types of tapes are added to
the machine: read-only incoming communication tapes, and write-only outgoing communication
tapes.
The real world is conformed by n ITMs P1, . . . ,Pn running the protocol π on behalf of the
parties. We denote by A the subset of them corrupted by the adversary, A . When a party Pi is
corrupted by a passive adversary, A gets to read the internal status of that party, including the
content on all its tapes. If the protocol is instead run in the presence of an active adversary, then
corruption means that A additionally takes over the execution of Pi.
The ideal world consists of the ideal functionality F , dummy parties P̃1, . . . , P̃n and the
simulator S . F is an ITM performing the desired task of the real world protocol π. When a party
has been corrupted, F may treat it differently from an honest one by sending it some additional
information. Dummy parties just relay inputs from the environment Z to the functionality F
and, conversely, outputs from F to Z . The simulator is an ITM interacting with F which tries
to produce a transcript of the communication between parties that matches up the real world
execution with the adversary A .
As it has been hinted before, the environment Z , also an ITM, is the fundamental component
of the UC framework. It has total control over the adversary, it can choose the inputs and read the
outputs of all parties, and it further sees everything sent between the parties in the real world.
Notably, all of this means that Z is an ‘interactive distinguisher’. This arises from the fact that
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Z can exchange information with the adversary at any point during the execution, in particular
after any message is sent. For this reason, the simulator’s task of generating a transcript of the
communications is specially hard, as it has to do so while interacting with the environment.
Finally, in order to argue about indistinguishability, let REALπ,A ,Z denote the distribution
ensemble representing the output of the environment Z when interacting with an adversary
A and parties P1, . . . ,Pn running protocol π. In a similar way, let IDEALF ,S ,Z represent the
output of Z when interacting with the simulator S and the ideal functionality F . Security of a
protocol in the UC framework is then defined as follows.
Definition 2.6 (UC security). A protocol π realizes an ideal functionality F with perfect, statis-
tical or computational security if for any adversary A , there exists a simulator S such that for
any environment Z , it holds that
REALπ,A ,Z ≈ IDEALF ,S ,Z ,
where ≈ represents the relevant notion between perfect, statistical and computational security
(see Section 2.1).
The most important feature of UC security, as its name states, is composability. Intuitively,
this means that if we have proved that protocol ρ securely realizes a functionality G , both can be
mutually interchanged for the purpose of building a protocol π realizing some more advanced
functionality F . When the protocol π is defined using functionality G , we say that we are in the
G -hybrid model. This hybrid is similar to the real world, except in addition to standard messages
amongst themselves, parties may also interact with any number of local copies of G throughout
the course of π.
Theorem 2.4.1 (Universal Composition Theorem [35]). Let ρ be a protocol securely realizing a
functionality G . Next, let π be a protocol securely realizing another functionality F in the G -hybrid
model. Then for every real world adversary A there exists a hybrid model adversary ˜A such that
for every environment Z
REALπρ ,A ,Z ≈HYBGπ, ˜A ,Z ,
where πρ is the protocol π modified so that calls to G are replaced with a subroutine call to protocol
ρ.
As it was mentioned earlier, we do not need the full power and flexibility of the UC framework
for the work exposed in this thesis. Common assumptions across all our protocols, which simplifies
their proofs, are the following. First, we only deal with static adversaries, which means that the
set A of corrupted parties is fixed at the start of execution. Second, all communication is done
over authenticated channels, meaning that the adversary cannot change the messages sent by
honest parties. Finally, we assume synchronous communication between all parties, which means
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The General MPC Functionality: FMPC
The functionality is parametrized by a function f (x1, . . . , xn), which is input as a binary circuit C f . It
consists of three externally exposed commands Initialize, InputData, and Output and one internal
subroutine Wait.
Initialize: On input (init, C f ) from all parties, where C f is a Boolean circuit, the functionality
activates and stores C f .
Wait: The functionality waits on the adversary for a reply. If A returns ⊥ then the functionality
aborts, otherwise it continues.
InputData: On input (input, Pi, varid, xi) from Pi and (input, Pi, varid, ?) from all other parties, with
varid a fresh identifier, the functionality stores (varid, xi). The functionality then calls Wait.
Output: On input (output) from all parties, if (varid, xi) is stored for each Pi, the functionality
computes y= f (x1, . . . , xn) and outputs y to the adversary. The functionality then calls Wait. If
Wait does not result in an abort, the functionality outputs y to all parties.
Figure 2.1: The MPC Functionality: FMPC
that the protocol proceeds in rounds. During each round, every party may send one message to
each of the other parties, which will be delivered by the end of the round.
There have been different proposals about how to model synchronous networks in the UC
model. Canetti [35] advocates for the use of a FSyn functionality which acts as an ideal syn-
chronous delivery system. Using this method, parties explicitly send and receive all their (syn-
chronized) messages by command requests to FSyn. In [78] the authors found an error in the
original description of FSyn, later fixed again by Canetti as described in the current full version
of [35]. On the constructive side, [78] proposes to give parties access to a global clock functionality,
FClock, instead. This functionality can be queried any time by any party in order to learn which
is the present round. Assuming some predictability in the pattern of activation of parties (ITMs)
in the protocol, then FClock is enough for synchronous communication and parties can handle the
message delivery themselves, in contrast with FSyn.
Whether FSyn [35] or FClock [78] is used, both functionalities keep track of a round number.
This value is increased when, and only when, all honest parties indicate that they are done with
their corresponding actions in a given round. This captures the issue of rushing adversaries, who
wait to receive all honest messages in a given round before choosing, adaptively, what is going to
be sent by malicious parties in that same round. As this is a possible behaviour in the real world,
so it has to be in the ideal world.
Even though in the most strict formality we should use a functionality to model synchronous
networks, this detail is skipped in the proofs presented in this thesis. We do so mostly to simplify
their readability, as the intuitive notion of such communication model is not hard to grasp. We
firmly believe that this is positive in terms of easing the job of reviewing the work here included.
This is likely also the reason why an overwhelming majority of the MPC literature takes the
same approach.
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Finally and in conclusion to the presentation of the UC model, we can state the goal of the
upcoming Chapters 3 and 4 to be that of securely realising the functionality FMPC given in
Figure 2.1. Chapter 5 has a very similar goal, the only difference with Figure 2.1 being that, as
the protocols are designed to deal only with passive adversaries, the Wait command should be
removed from it.
2.5 Garbled Circuits: The Two-Party Setting
Garbled circuits are the core behind all practical, constant round protocols for secure computation.
Intuitively, they are a suitably encrypted version of the circuit’s gates and wires that allows for its
evaluation on a concrete set of inputs. Garbled circuit-based protocols have recently become much
more efficient, and currently give the most practical approach for actively secure computation of
binary circuits [107, 118] in the two-party scenario.
In this section we will focus on describing a particular variant of Yao’s garbled circuits [132].
This will serve as an introduction to the more complex situation where more than two parties are
involved in the protocol, which we will describe in Section 2.6.
2.5.1 Garbling in the Two-Party Setting
In Yao’s protocol one party, the Garbler, constructs a garbled version of a mutually agreed Boolean
circuit C while the other party, the Evaluator, evaluates it on an ‘encrypted’ version of both parties’
inputs to get the final result. Stated more formally, the garbling process, which is computed
entirely by the Garbler, goes as follows:
1. For each wire w ∈ C, sample a random wire mask λw ∈ {0,1}. Wire masks are used to encrypt
the actual value xw on the wire. We will call the value Λw = xw ⊕λw either the colour bit or
the external or public value. We colour xw either in red or blue to represent its associated
colour bit Λw. More precisely, if λw = 0 then xw ∈ {0,1}, whereas if λw = 1 then xw ∈ {0,1}.
2. For each wire w ∈ C, two random keys kw,•, kw,• ∈ {0,1}κ are sampled.
3. Finally, let Enc be a Double Encryption scheme [91]. The garbled version g̃ of every g ∈ C
consists of the four following ciphertexts, which we call rows:
g̃Λu,Λv =Encku,Λu ,kv,Λv (Λw||kw,Λw ), (Λu,Λv) ∈ {•,•}2
where Λw = fg(λu ⊕Λu,λv ⊕Λv)⊕λw ∈ {•,•} and fg is the function computed by g, i.e.,
fg(x, y)= x · y if g is an AND gate, or fg(x, y)= x⊕ y if g is a XOR gate.
As mentioned before, this is just one possible way of implementing Yao’s garbled circuits,





















Figure 2.2: Point-and-permute garbling for an AND gate. Wire masks: λu = 1,λv = 0,λw = 1.
garbling process for an AND gate can be found in Figure 2.2, which we describe in more detail
below.
Denote the left (resp. right) input wire u (resp. v) and let its wire mask be λu = 1 (resp. λv = 0).
Consider now the first entry of an AND’s gate truth table, i.e. 0∧0 = 0. By applying the wire
masks, we obtain corresponding external values (Λu,Λv)= (1,0) which in the colour notation are
(•,•) and thus match the third row of the garbled gate. As the wire mask on the output wire is
λw = 1, the plaintext to encrypt in that entry would then be •||kw,•. The remaining first, second
and fourth entries of the garbled gate can be derived by the Garbler in the same way.
One of the most celebrated optimizations in garbled circuits is the Free-XOR technique [86],
where the garbler samples a global random string ∆ ∈ {0,1}κ and the garbling algorithm is
modified so that all the wire keys sampled on Step 2 of the garbling algorithm above are
correlated:
kw,•⊕kw,• =∆, ∀w ∈ C
By introducing this correlation there is no more need to produce ciphertexts when garbling XOR
gates, which can further be evaluated ‘for free’ just by XORing the keys and the external values
of their input wires, i.e. Λw =Λu ⊕Λv and kw,Λw = ku,Λu ⊕kv,Λv .
2.5.2 Example Garbled Circuit
Before turning to the whole protocol description, we give an example garbled circuit in Figure 2.3.
The function to compute is f (w1,w2,w3,w4)= (w1∧w2)⊕ (w3∨w4), where in our case the Garbler
has inputs w1,w3 and the Evaluator has inputs w2,w4. In this example, the wire masks are:
λw1 =λw3 =λw4 =λw5 =λw7 = 1, λw2 =λw6 = 0
If we look at them, the wire masks related to the AND gate w1 ∧w2 = w5 are exactly the same
as those in Figure 2.2, for which a description of the garbling has already been provided. As
the same procedure applies for the rest of the gates in the circuit, we proceed to show how a
garbled circuit is evaluated. Assume that the Evaluator has obtained in some way the colour
bits associated with the actual inputs of the circuit, as well as the keys corresponding to those.
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Input Garbled row
(•,•) Enckw3 ,• ,kw4 ,• (•||kw6 ,•)
(•,•) Enckw3 ,• ,kw4 ,• (•||kw6 ,•)
(•,•) Enckw3 ,• ,kw4 ,• (•||kw6 ,•)






(•,•) Enckw1 ,• ,kw2 ,• (•||kw5 ,•)
(•,•) Enckw1 ,• ,kw2 ,• (•||kw5 ,•)
(•,•) Enckw1 ,• ,kw2 ,• (•||kw5 ,•)












(•,•) Enckw5 ,• ,kw6 ,• (•||kw7 ,•)
(•,•) Enckw5 ,• ,kw6 ,• (•||kw7 ,•)
(•,•) Enckw5 ,• ,kw6 ,• (•||kw7 ,•)
(•,•) Enckw5 ,• ,kw6 ,• (•||kw7 ,•)
Figure 2.3: Evaluation of a garbled circuit. We mark in bold the rows that are decrypted by the
parties when evaluating the circuit on the inputs displayed under the wires.
In Figure 2.3, for actual inputs xw1 = 0, xw3 = 1 from the Garbler, their corresponding colour
bits are respectively •,• and for inputs xw2 = 0, xw4 = 0 from the Evaluator, they translate to •,•.
Therefore, their associated keys are kw1,•,kw2,•,kw3,•,kw4,•. We recall that the Evaluator does not
know the value of the wire masks.
For the AND gate, the Evaluator has inputs (•,•), so he has to decrypt that row of the garbled
gate using keys kw1,•,kw2,•. By doing so, he learns that the colour bit on wire w5 is •, for which
the key kw5,• relates. Analogously, using the colour bits and keys he has for wires w3,w4, he
obtains colour bit • and key kw6,• for wire w6. Finally, using the newly obtained keys, he can
decrypt entry (•,•) of the XOR gate and learn that the output wire colour is •. Using the wire
mask λw7 = 1 from the Garbler, this can be translated to an actual value of 1, which as expected
corresponds to f (0,0,1,0).
If the Free-XOR technique had been applied to the garbling scheme, there would be no garbled
rows for the final XOR gate, so the table on the right of the picture should be ignored. From the
Evaluator’s perspective, the only difference would be that in order to compute w7 = w5 ⊕w6, he
would simply have to compute kw7,• = kw5,•⊕ kw6,•, where he could compute the output wire’s
colour bit by XORing those of w5 and w6 – blue for both of them, which encodes an external value
of one and so 1⊕1= 0= •.
2.5.3 The Two-Party Computation Protocol
We can finally fully describe how to perform passively secure two party computation using Yao’s
garbled circuits:
1. The Garbler and the Evaluator agree on the boolean circuit C(xG , xE)= y that they want to
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compute, where xG , xE are the Garbler’s and the Evaluator’s private inputs, respectively.
2. The Garbler transforms C into a garbled circuit C̃ as described above. She also garbles her
input xG using the masks of the wires where she provides input. The result is x̃G , consisting
of a colour bit and its associated key for each of those wires.
3. For every bit of his input xE, the Evaluator uses 1-out-of-2 OT to receive from the Garbler
its garbled version x̃E, suitable for evaluating C̃.
4. The Garbler sends the garbled input C̃ and her encoded input x̃G to the Evaluator, so he
can now evaluate C̃. She also sends him the wire masks λw for every output wire w of the
circuit, so he can decode the output of the computation.
5. The Evaluator computes C̃(x̃G , x̃E) and obtains the colour bits associated with all output
wires. Using the wire masks he received by the Garbler on the previous step, he computes
the actual output and sends it back to the Garbler.
The overall efficiency of the protocol – irrespective of the nature of the adversary – is mostly
related with the size of the garbled circuit, as the encoding of the inputs on Step 3 can be
efficiently computed using OT extension [74, 83]. This realization led to a series of works on
reducing the number of garbled rows in a gate [103, 111, 133] as well as variants of the previously
described Free-XOR technique [84, 86].
In the following section we describe how to extend garbled circuits to be used by an arbitrary
number of parties. As we will see, this requires the garbling step to be computed obliviously and,
hence, the metrics for efficiency become not so tied to the size of the circuit as in the 2PC setting.
Apart from the new difficulty when garbling, this different goal for optimization adds further
interest to the field of concretely efficient, constant-round multi-party computation.
2.6 Multi-Party Garbled Circuits: BMR
The main challenge for the use of garbled circuits in the multi-party setting, when compared to
Yao’s protocol (cf. Section 2.5), is that no single party can be trusted to garble the circuit. Thus,
this preprocessing step has to be performed jointly and obliviously using another MPC protocol. If
that was not the case and the Adversary knew all the randomness used to garble the circuit, then
the corrupted parties would be able to break security as long as one of them was also evaluating
the circuit. In more detail, this arises from the fact that the XOR of the wire masks (which would
be known by the Garbler) and the external values (known by the Evaluator) reveal the actual
values on every wire in the circuit, as we described in Section 2.5.1.
Facing such a situation, one could think of implementing garbled circuits in the multi-party
case by emulating the figure of the Garbler using an MPC protocol and then picking one party –
or all of them! – to be the Evaluator. This is, in fact, the main idea behind the garbling technique
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of Beaver, Micali and Rogaway (BMR) introduced in 1990 [18]. While such a method may initially
sound as highly theoretical, which it was at the time, it has now become the core idea behind the
most practical protocols based on garbled circuits, even in the two party setting [128].
The other fundamental observation in BMR is that all gates can be garbled in parallel.
Hence, the depth of the circuit computing the garbling of a boolean circuit C equals that of
the deepest circuit required to garble any single gate of C, denote that number by d. Recall
that this ‘garbling circuit’ is the one we have to evaluate in order to obliviously distribute the
figure of the Garbler. As most practical MPC protocols have a round complexity that depends
linearly on the circuit depth, and this ‘gabling’ circuit has constant depth d, the garbling step
becomes constant-round. This, when put together with the fact that the garbled circuit can also
be evaluated in a constant number of rounds (as we will describe in Section 2.6.1) leads to the
conclusion that BMR is a constant-round MPC protocol. This was the main contribution of BMR
at a time where the only known mechanisms for constant-round MPC required an exponential
blow-up in communication [14, 18].
Let’s now look at the BMR construction in more detail. Similarly to Yao’s garbled circuits
(Section 2.5) denote by fg be the function computed by each gate g ∈ C. The garbled version g̃ of
that gate is defined in BMR as:
g̃Λu,Λv =Encku,Λu ,kv,Λv (kw,Λw ), (Λu,Λv) ∈ {0,1}2(2.1)
where Λw = fg(λu ⊕Λu,λv ⊕Λv)⊕λw and Encku,Λu ,kv,Λv is a ‘vector double encryption’ scheme that
operates using two vectors of keys ku,Λu = (k1u,Λu , . . . ,knu,Λu ),kv,Λv = (k
1
v,Λv
, . . . ,knv,Λv ) and can be
instantiated under different assumptions. In Chapter 3 we implement it using PRFs, in Chapter
4 we use circular 2-correlation robust PRFs to enable Free-XOR, and in Chapter 5 we rely on a
Syndrome Decoding problem in order for parties to use shorter encryption keys.
In the garbling phase, and for every wire u ∈ C, wire masks λu ∈ {0,1} are randomly chosen
and unknown to all parties. For wire keys, on the other hand and for each b ∈ {0,1}, every P j
knows a key k ju,b from the vector of keys ku,b associated with that wire. Importantly, these two
statements imply that the vector of keys kw,Λw encrypted on any given row (Λu,Λv) is unknown
to all parties. This is due to the fact that MPC is used to compute Λw = fg(λu ⊕Λu,λv ⊕Λv)⊕λw
while keeping the wire masks secret, and Λw chooses between kw,0 and kw,1.
Whereas in Yao’s garbled circuits the size of the garbled circuit was the metric most represen-
tative of efficiency, that turns out to be secondary now that garbling has to be performed using
MPC. The dominant cost, hence, becomes the number of oblivious operations and their cost on
the underlying protocol used to implement them. This opens up an interesting area of research
for increasingly efficient constant-round MPC, where both the protocol used for garbling and the
multi-party ‘double encryption’ scheme Encku,Λu ,kv,Λv that it has to evaluate have to be adapted to
each other. A time line for this area of work can be found in Section 2.6.2, but before that and for
completeness, we will now turn to describing the evaluation phase of BMR.
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Protocol Adversary Free-XOR Other Remarks
BMR [18] Active 7 Honest majority, error in the proof.
TX03 [126] Active 7 Honest majority, splitter gates.
FairplayMP [23] Passive 7 Implementation paper.
BMR-SPDZ [93] Active 7 -
BMR-SHE [96] (§3) Active 7 -
BLO16 [25] Passive 3 -
BMR-OT [70] (§4) Active 3 -
Authenticated Garbling [129] Active 3 -
BLO17 [26] Passive 7 Constant gate size.
Arithmetic Garbling [24] Passive (3) Honest majority, arithmetic circuits.
BO17 [27] Pass/Act 3 Honest majority.
TinyKeys [69] (§5) Passive 7 FleXOR, splitter gates.
Table 2.1: Comparison of efficient protocols based on garbled circuits which can support any
number of parties. Works are listed in chronological order.
2.6.1 Evaluating BMR Garbled Circuits
Given the description of the garbling phase above, the evaluation phase of BMR is almost identical
to the one described in Section 2.5. Only two more conditions are missing from the description of
the preprocessing protocol in the previous section:
1. Wire masks for the circuit output wires have been revealed to all parties.
2. For every input wire in the circuit, its corresponding wire mask has been revealed to the
party providing input on it, and only to that party.
Taking the previous points into account, another advantage of BMR is that each party can
now play the role of the Evaluator. This saves the last round in Yao, where the Evaluator
communicates the output to the Garbler. Evaluation goes as follows: First, parties broadcast
the colour bits associated with their respective actual inputs to the circuit. Once this is done,
everyone broadcasts their keys corresponding to those wires and colour bits. As parties hold
now the vectors of keys corresponding to input wires, they can decrypt the relevant row in each
garbled gate attached to them. Upon completion, the parties compute the actual output using the
output wire masks.
2.6.2 A Brief History of Efficient Multi-Party Garbled Circuits
The use of garbled circuits for secure computation between an arbitrary number of parties was
first introduced by Beaver, Micali and Rogaway in 1990 [18]. Their paper, whereas foundational,
presented an insecure construction. This flaw in their result was not discovered until 2003, when
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Tate and Xu [126] remarked that the ‘vector double encryption’ used in [18] is not secure when
multiple gates share a common input wire. The error can be easily described: In order to garble
the gates, wire ‘keys’ were used as seeds for a pseudo-random generator, so encryption looked
like:






Hence, when multiple plaintexts are ‘encrypted’ under one of the two key vectors, the resulting
‘ciphertext’ does not use independent pseudorandom masks. Such correlation is not only a
theoretical concern, as it can be exploited even by passive adversaries to break the security of
the protocol. A good example of the attack can be found in [126]. The solution proposed by Tate
and Xu was the introduction of splitter gates, which take as input one wire and output two new
ones, carrying the same value. By placing trees of splitter gates in the original circuit to garble,
the resulting one can be made such that no wire is ever input to two different gates. This, plus
a method for garbling splitter gates, fixes the issue in [18]. Even though their proposal works,
it is frequently not the most efficient solution, with notable exceptions [69]. Almost every other
protocol building on BMR solves the same problem by using pseudo-random functions instead of
pseudo-random generators. By adding a unique identifier to each gate which is then used as an
input to the PRF, independent pseudo-random masks can be produced.
While two-party computation based on Yao’s garbled circuits started booming [1, 57, 88, 111,
124] after its first full-fledged implementation in the 2004 Fairplay paper [97], BMR remained
almost forgotten, with two exceptions: The FairplayMP implementation in 2008 [23] and, seven
years after that, the BMR-SPDZ protocol by Lindell et al [93]. Apart from bringing the commu-
nity’s attention back to the problem, one of their biggest achievements was that of getting rid of
the zero-knowledge proofs required in [18] to ensure that parties provide the right evaluations of
PRGs/PRFs when garbling the gates. The efficiency of their approach was then improved in [96],
which constitutes Chapter 3 in this thesis.
Many techniques used in two-party garbled circuits do not translate well to BMR. Improve-
ments reducing the circuit size such as row reduction [103, 111, 133] turn out to be counter-
productive when all parties have to obliviously garble the circuit together. Nevertheless, the
highly celebrated Free-XOR technique [86] can also be easily applied to BMR, as it was first
noticed in [25]. Although the authors only provide a passively secure protocol, their paper also in-
cludes interesting experimental results where BMR is confirmed to be faster than secret-sharing
based protocols for deep circuits in slow networks.
Later on, Free-XOR was also extended to the active setting in concurrent works [70, 129].
Both show how to leverage information-theoretic MACs from the TinyOT protocol [58, 104] to act
as Free-XOR correlations, which makes TinyOT a natural choice for BMR garbling. Additionally,
[70] provides an efficient and general transformation for non-constant round protocols to Free-
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XOR-enabled BMR. More differences between both works exists, which are further described
during the presentation of [70] in Chapter 4.
A common feature of all the BMR constructions above is that garbled gates have a size of
around 4 ·n ·κ bits, where n is the number of parties and κ the security parameter. This is due to
the fact that each row in the garbled gate consists, basically, of one ciphertext per party. At the
time of writing, two works look at how to reduce this size, which can be particularly problematic
for large-scale scenarios. As it is not an easy task, they both deal with passive adversaries
only. The first one is [26], which uses key-homomorphic PRFs to add all the n ciphertexts in
a row together, obtaining garbled gates whose size does not depend in the number of parties.
TinyKeys [69], presented in Chapter 5, takes a different approach from the heavy public key
machinery of [26]. The solution we present involves making the individual keys for the ‘vector
double encryption’ of a small size `¿ κ and make security rely on the concatenation of all honest
parties’ short keys. This reduces not only communication, but also the computational cost of
evaluating each gate when compared with [25].
Finally, other works in the area include [27], which looks at efficiency improvements for BMR
in the honest majority setting and [24], which garbles arithmetic circuits rather than boolean
ones. A chronological synthesis of our overview can be found in Table 2.1.
2.7 A Note on Actively Secure Garbled Circuits
The exposition of both Yao’s and Beaver, Micali and Rogaway’s protocols in the previous sections
are limited to security against passive adversaries. Whereas this is a relevant setting and a good
starting point when figuring out the core ideas and limitations of MPC protocols, we ideally want
security to hold against active adversaries too. In this section we review some of the methods
used to achieve this more difficult goal
One of the most explored directions for enabling active security in Yao’s protocol is the cut-and-
choose technique. Simplifying, this consists in the Garbler constructing many garbled circuits for
the commonly agreed function and then sending all of them to the Evaluator. Next, the Evaluator
asks the Garbler to reveal the randomness used to produce e.g. half of the circuits, in order to
check that they were constructed correctly. If that is the case, the Evaluator can then evaluate
the other half and obtain the result. Otherwise, the Evaluator has detected malicious behaviour
from the Garbler and aborts.
More subtleties are part of cut-and-choose and the technique has evolved through a long line
of work that applies it either at the circuit level (as described in [1, 57, 88, 90, 92, 124]), the gate
level [105, 108, 134] or sub-circuits in between [85]. While such method notoriously improved the
efficiency of actively secure 2PC in the last decade, it has been implicitly proved as unattractive
for BMR so far. This is due to the fact that, as garbling has to be computed obliviously, there are
more efficient techniques for ensuring active security of the underlying MPC gadgets constructing
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the garbled circuit.
Another very efficient approach for active security in 2PC relies on the dual execution
paradigm [99, 100, 118]. In this framework, parties run two instances of Yao’s protocol, taking
a different role (amongst Garbler and Evaluator) in each one. Once they have done this, they
securely test for equality the (garbled) outputs received by the Evaluator in each instance, and
reveal them if the test passes. Intuitively, this then means that malicious party computed the
garbled circuit correctly. Nevertheless, the equality test step leaks information on the honest
parties’ input and in order to achieve full security, cut-and-choose techniques are required once
again. Dual execution could be interpreted to have been extended to the multi-party setting
in [66], but their solution only works for a very concrete scenario in terms of number of parties
and corruption threshold.
The conclusion to all the above is that obtaining efficient, actively secure protocols for BMR is
not an easy task and requires to think differently. An evolution of that process of thought can be
observed by reading the papers referenced in Section 2.6.2 or, more accessibly, by reading the two











GARBLING USING SOMEWHAT HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
This chapter is based on joint work with Yehuda Lindell and Nigel Smart [96], which was
presented at TCC 2016-B.
In this chapter we introduce two similar constant round multi-party protocols secure againstan active adversary corrupting up to n−1 out of a total n parties. The work we present sitsphilosophically between Gentry’s MPC protocol using Fully Homomorphic Encryption [60]
and the best previous protocol for generating BMR circuits against the same kind of adversary
[93], which we will dub BMR-SPDZ. Our protocols avoid various inefficiencies of those two results.
Compared to Gentry’s protocol we only require Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE) and
moreover we provide security against malicious adversaries, which [60] does not. In comparison to
BMR-SPDZ we require only a quadratic communication complexity in the number of players (as
opposed to cubic), we have fewer rounds and we require fewer proofs of correctness of ciphertexts.
Our two new protocols follow the BMR paradigm described in Section 2.6 and use homo-
morphic encryption in order to garble the boolean circuit describing the computation. The main
difference between both is how the circuit representing the garbling of the boolean gates is
described. The SHE scheme has to support plaintext spaces of Fp, where p > 2κ. Our first,
conceptually simpler protocol is described in Section 3.4, whereas the second one (given in Sec-
tion 3.5) allows to perform garbling with a lower depth arithmetic circuit and requires more
multiplications in both the garbling and evaluation phases of BMR.
3.1 Introduction
The work presented in this chapter focuses on the construction of concretely efficient MPC
protocols that run in a constant number of rounds. The approach we follow consists of constructing
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a two phase protocol. In the first phase the parties use a generic MPC protocol to construct a
garbled circuit for the function being computed. Then, in a constant round evaluation phase the
garbled function is evaluated. The first garbling phase works in a gate-by-gate manner, and so by
processing all gates in parallel we obtain a circuit of constant depth which can be evaluated in a
constant number of rounds via any MPC protocol.
In [93] an efficient variant of the BMR protocol is used which utilizes the SPDZ [47] generic
MPC protocol in the first garbling phase. In addition, the authors introduce other optimiza-
tions which make the entire protocol actively secure for very little additional overhead. The
SPDZ protocol itself uses a two phase approach, in the first phase, which utilizes Somewhat
Homomorphic Encryption, correlated randomness is produced. Then in the second phase this
correlated randomness is used to evaluate the desired functionality (which in this case is the
BMR garbling). Thus overall this protocol, which we dub BMR-SPDZ, consists of three phases:
A phase using SHE, a phase doing generic MPC via the SPDZ online phase, and the final BMR
circuit evaluation phase.
There is another approach to constant round MPC, which utilizes Fully Homomorphic Encryp-
tion (FHE) [61]. FHE is similar to the notion of public key encryption, with the added property
that given any set of FHE ciphertexts c1 =Enc(m1), . . . , ck =Enc(mk) it allows to compute without
interaction a ciphertext c such that Dec(c)= f (m1, . . . ,mk). The function f can be any circuit, and
the production of c is referred to as the homomorphic evaluation of f on the original ciphertexts.
If the circuits f that are allowed to be evaluated are restricted to a certain maximum depth
we obtain the notion of Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE), where much more efficient
constructions can be obtained.
In Gentry’s FHE-based MPC protocol [60], parties simply input their data using the encryption
of the underlying FHE scheme and then evaluate the function. Finally, in order to obtain the
result, they perform a distributed decryption (which requires ROut = 2 rounds of interaction with
current FHE schemes). This protocol is essentially optimal in terms of the number of rounds
of communication, but it suffers from a number of drawbacks. The major drawback is that it
requires FHE, which is itself a prohibitively expensive operation (and currently not practical). In
addition, it is not immediately clear how to make the protocol actively secure without incurring
significant additional costs. Here we outline how to address this latter problem, as a by-product
of the analysis of our main protocol.
3.1.1 Our Contributions
Returning to the BMR based approach we note that any MPC protocol could be used for the BMR
garbling phase, as long as it can be made actively secure within the specific context of the BMR
protocol. In particular we could utilize Gentry’s FHE-based MPC protocol (using only a SHE
scheme) to perform the first stage of the BMR protocol, a protocol idea which we shall denote by
BMR-SHE. The main observation as to why this is possible is that, as we have mentioned, the
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depth of the circuit computing the BMR garbled circuit is itself constant and equal to the depth
of the circuit required to compute a single garble gate. We therefore conclude that somewhat
homomorphic encryption suffices.
A number of problems arise with this idea, which we will address in the following. First,
can we make the resulting protocol actively secure for little additional cost? Second, is the
required depth of the SHE scheme sufficiently small to make the scheme somewhat practical?
Recall the BMR-SPDZ protocol only requires the underlying SHE scheme to support circuits of
multiplicative depth one, and increasing the depth increases the cost of the SHE itself. Third,
is the resulting round complexity of the scheme significantly less than that of the BMR-SPDZ
protocol? Note that we can only expect a constant factor improvement, but such constants matter
in practice. Fourth, can we save on any additional costs of the BMR-SPDZ protocol?
Since we use Gentry’s FHE-based protocol – more precisely, an SHE version of it – we now
outline two of its key challenges, which also apply to our protocol. When entering data we require
an actively secure protocol to encrypt the FHE data, in particular we need to guarantee to the
receiving parties that each encryption is well formed. The standard technique to do this is to
also transmit a zero-knowledge proof of the correctness of encryption. A method to do this can be
found in [44, Appendix F] or [15, Section 3.2]. This is costly, and in practice rather inefficient. We
call this protocol ID, and the associated round cost by RID. In addition if we need to make further
input dependent inputs, then this round cost will multiply. Thus we also need to introduce a
sub-protocol with round cost RInput+ = 1, which enables us to place all the zero-knowledge proofs
for proving correctness of input into a preprocessing phase.
The second problem with Gentry’s protocol is that we need to ensure, in a concretely efficient
way, that the distributed decryption is also actively secure. We present a sub-protocol Out+
performing this task, which has an associated round complexity of ROut+ = 2 rounds. To the
best of our knowledge such solution did not exist in the literature at the time of writing, but a
similar, less efficient solution based on algebraic manipulation detection codes was introduced
concurrently in [48].
By utilizing the actively secure input and output routines in Gentry’s protocol we obtain an
actively secure variant of Gentry’s FHE based protocol which we denote by Ga. This is in addition
to the original passively secure FHE based protocol of Gentry which we denote by Gp.
In summary, we actually obtain two distinct protocols that we describe below:
DEPTH 4 PROTOCOL ΠDepth−4 (SECTION 3.4). In some sense we can think of our basic BMR-
SHE protocol as the same as the BMR-SPDZ protocol of [93], but cutting out the need of
producing multiplication triples and the interaction needed to evaluate the garbling via the
online phase of SPDZ. Indeed almost all of our basic protocol is identical to that described
in [93]. However, naively applying SHE to the protocol from [93] results in a protocol that
is neither efficient nor secure. For example, naively applying Gentry’s MPC protocol to the
garbling stage would result in needing an SHE scheme which supports a depth logarithmic
27
CHAPTER 3. GARBLING USING SOMEWHAT HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
in the number of parties n, whereas we would rather utilize a SHE scheme with constant
depth. Thus we need to carefully design the FHE based MPC protocol to realise the BMR
garbled circuit.
DEPTH 3 VARIANT ΠDepth−3 (SECTION 3.5). We present a variant of our protocol which reduces
the depth of the required SHE scheme, at the expense of requiring each party to input a
larger amount of data. Interestingly, the main aim of the design in the BMR-SPDZ protocol
was to reduce the number of multiplications needed (since each multiplication required
generating a multiplication tuple for SPDZ, and this is its main cost). In contrast, when
using SHE directly, additional multiplications are not so expensive as long as they are
carried out in parallel. Stated differently, the main concern is the depth of the circuit
computing the BMR garbled circuit, and not necessarily its size. Of course, for concrete
efficiency, one must try to minimize both, as reducing one slightly while greatly increasing
the other would not be beneficial. In order to achieve this reduction in the depth of the
circuit computing the BMR circuit, we utilize an observation that when computing the
garbled circuit it suffices to obtain either the PRF key on the output wire or its additive
inverse. This is due to the fact that we can actually take the PRF key to be the square of
the value obtained in the garbled gate, which is the same whether k or −k is obtained1.
This allows us to combine the generation of the external values and their corresponding
vector of keys together. The additional flexibility of being able to output either the key or
its additive inverse allows us to reduce the required SHE depth from four to three.
3.1.2 Comparison
By way of comparison we outline in Table 3.1 the differences between our two protocol variants
and those of Gentry and BMR-SPDZ. We let n denote the number of parties, W and G denote
the number of wires and gates in the binary circuit respectively, and Win the number of input
wires. To ease counting of rounds we consider a secure broadcast to be a single round operation
(in the case of a dishonest majority, where parties may abort, a simple two-round echo-broadcast
protocol suffices in any case [65]). We will see later that ROut+ = 2, and RID = 3. In the table the
various functions T1,T2,T3 describing the number of executions of ID are
T1 = 16 ·G ·n3 + (8 ·G+4 ·W) ·n2 +9 ·W ·n+156 ·G ·n,
T2 = 4 ·G ·n2 + (3 ·W +1) ·n,
T3 = (4 ·G+2 ·W) ·n2 + (W +1) ·n.
If we compare the BMR-SPDZ protocol with our protocol variants ΠDepth−4 and ΠDepth−3 we
see that the major difference in computational cost is the number of invocations of the protocol ID.
1Note that the resulting PRF key has one bit of entropy less than k, which can be compensated by longer plaintext
spaces in the SHE scheme.
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Protocol Security Rounds of Depth of Number of
Interaction FHE/SHE ID Execs
Gp passive 3= 1+ROut Depth of f 0
Ga active 5= RID+ROut+ 1+Depth of f n+Win
BMR-SPDZ active 16= 13+RID 1 T1
ΠDepth−4 active 9= RID+4+ROut+ 4 T2
ΠDepth−3 active 9= RID+4+ROut+ 3 T3
Table 3.1: Comparison of Gentry’s, the BMR-SPDZ and our protocol.
The difference between BMR-SPDZ and ΠDepth−4 is equal to T1−T2 = 16 ·G ·n3+4 · (G+W) ·n2+
(6 ·W−1) ·n+156 ·G ·n invocations. To be very concrete, for 9 parties, a circuit of size 10,000 gates
and wires, the number of ID invocations equals 141,210,000 in BMR-SPDZ versus 3,510,009 in
BMR-SHE-ΠDepth−4 versus 4,950,009 in BMR-SHE-ΠDepth−3. Thus, ΠDepth−4 is one fortieth of the
cost of BMR-SPDZ, and ΠDepth−3 is one twenty-eighth of the cost of BMR-SPDZ. This gap widens
further as the number of parties grows, with the difference for 25 parties being a factor of 100 for
ΠDepth−4 and 70 for ΠDepth−3. We remark, however, that even for just 3 parties, protocols ΠDepth−4
and ΠDepth−3 are already one twenty-third and one eighteenth of the cost, respectively.
On the downside we require an SHE scheme which will support depth three or four circuits,
as opposed to the depth one circuits of the BMR-SPDZ protocol. The SHE scheme needs to support
message spaces of Fp, where p > 2κ. We use [42], which gives potential parameter sizes for various
SHE schemes supporting depth two and five, and run the experiments there to compare the
parameters required for our specific depths here (depth 1 for SPDZ, depth 4 for protocol ΠDepth−4
and depth 3 for protocol ΠDepth−3). Specifically, assuming ciphertexts live in a ring Rq, then the
dimension needs to go up by approximately a factor of 1.5 for depth-3 and a factor of 2 for depth-4,
and the modulus by a factor of 1.6 for depth-3 and a factor of 2 for depth-4. Assuming standard
DCRT representation of Rq elements, this equates to an increase in the ciphertext size by a factor
of approximately 2.4 for depth-3, and by approximately a factor of 4 for depth-4. Furthermore,
the performance penalty (cost of doing arithmetic) increases by a factor of approximately 3.6
for depth-3, and by a factor of 8 for depth-4. Factoring in this additional cost, we have that
when compared to BMR-SPDZ, the relative improvement in the computational cost in the above
example becomes a factor of 40/8= 5 for ΠDepth−4 and 28/3.6= 7.7 for ΠDepth−3 for 9 parties, and
a factor of 100/8 = 12.5 for ΠDepth−4 and 70/3.6 ≈ 19.4 for ΠDepth−3 for 25 parties. Thus, both
ΠDepth−4 and ΠDepth−3 significantly outperform BMR-SPDZ, and the depth reduction carried out
in ΠDepth−3 provides additional speedup (and reduction in bandwidth).
3.1.3 Additional Related Work
Our work should also be compared to [41] in which a constant round 3PC protocol is given,
based on Yao’s garbled circuits. However, active security in their case is provided by an expensive
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cut-and-choose protocol. In addition, their protocol is specifically designed for the three-party case,
whereas we consider multiparty computation for any number of parties. Another constant-round
multiparty protocol was constructed by [75]. However, although this protocol has good asymptotic
complexity, its concrete efficiency is very unclear and no concretely efficient instantiation has
been found. In [89] the authors propose a concrete instantiation of [75] for the two-party case,
but no analogous proposal exists for the multiparty case.
3.2 Preliminaries
As a warm up to our protocols, we first give an outline of Gentry’s FHE based protocol and to the
previous work by Lindel et all. [93], which uses SPDZ to produce BMR garbled circuits.
3.2.1 A Basic FHE Functionality With Distributed Decryption
We first describe in Figure 3.1 a basic FHE functionality which contains a distributed decryp-
tion functionality. Two points need to be noted about the functionality: Firstly, the distributed
decryption operation in Output can produce an incorrect result, but this is limited to an additive
error which is introduced by the adversary before revealing the output. Secondly, the InputData
routine is actively secure, and so a proof of correctness of its decryption is needed for each input
ciphertext. The need for such an actively secure input routines is because we need to ensure that
parties enter valid FHE/SHE encryptions, and that the simulator can extract the plaintext values.
Within the functionality we denote the depth of a varable x by D(x), and we describe how the
depth is altered with each operation which can affect the depth.
A method to perform the required InputData operation is given in [44, Appendix F], or [15,
Section 3.2]. The basic idea is to check a number of executions of InputData at the same time.
The protocol runs in two phases, in the first phase a set of reference ciphertexts are produced
and via cut-and-choose one subset is checked for correctness, while the other is permuted into
buckets; one bucket for each value entered via InputData. In the second phase the input
ciphertexts are checked for correctness by combining them homomorphically with the reference
ciphertexts and opening the result. We denote the round complexity of the protocol implementing
InputData by RID. An analysis of the protocol from [44] indicates that it requires RID = 3 rounds
of communication: In the first round of the proof one party broadcasts the reference ciphertexts,
in the next round the parties choose which ciphertexts to open, and in the third round the
ciphertexts are combined and opened.2 Thus, overall, three rounds suffice.
In the following, we fix the notation 〈varid〉 to represent the result stored in the variable
varid by the FFHE/FSHE functionalities. In particular, we will use the arithmetic shorthands
〈z〉 = 〈x〉+〈y〉 and 〈z〉 = 〈x〉·〈y〉 to represent the result of calling the Add and Multiply commands
2Choosing at random which ciphertexts to open cannot be carried out in a single round. However, it is possible for
all parties to commit to the randomness in previous rounds and only decrypt in this round.
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The FHE Functionality: FFHE/FSHE
The functionality consists of externally exposed commands Initialize, InputData, Add, Multiply
and Output, and one internal subroutine Wait.
Initialize: On input (init,p) from all parties, the functionality activates and stores p. All additions
and multiplications below will be mod p.
Wait: The functionality waits on the adversary for a reply. If A returns ⊥ then the functionality
aborts, otherwise it continues.
InputData: On input (input,Pi,varid,x) from Pi and (input,Pi,varid,?) from all other parties, with
varid a fresh identifier, the functionality stores (varid,x). The functionality then calls Wait.
Add: On command (add, varid1, varid2, varid3) from all parties (if varid1, varid2 are present in memory
and varid3 is not), the functionality retrieves (varid1, x), (varid2, y) and stores (varid3, x+y mod p).
Add-scalar: On command (add-scalar, a, varid1, varid2) from all parties (if varid1 is present in memory
and varid2 is not), the functionality retrieves (varid1, x) and stores (varid2,a+ x mod p).
Multiply: On command (multiply, varid1, varid2, varid3) from all parties (if varid1, varid2 are present in
memory and varid3 is not), the functionality retrieves (varid1,x), (varid2,y) and stores (varid3,x · y
mod p).
In the case of the FSHE version of this functionality only a limited depth of such commands can
be performed, which is specified for the functionality.
Depth Cost: D(varid3)=max(D(varid1),D(varid2))+1.
Multiply-scalar: On command (multiply-scalar, a, varid1, varid2) from all parties (if varid1 is present
in memory and varid2 is not), the functionality retrieves (varid1, x) and stores (varid2,a·x mod p).
Output: On input (output,varid, i) from all honest parties (if varid is present in memory), and a value
e ∈ Fp from the adversary, the functionality retrieves (varid, x), and if i = 0 it outputs (varid, x) to
the adversary. The functionality then calls Wait. If Wait does not result in an abort, then the
functionality outputs x+ e to all parties if i = 0, or it outputs x+ e only to party i if i 6= 0.
Figure 3.1: The FHE/SHE Functionality: FFHE/FSHE
in the FFHE/FSHE functionality, and we will slightly abuse those shorthands to denote subsequent
additions or multiplications.
The description of Output in the case of a passively secure functionality is identical to the
behaviour of the standard distributed decryption procedure for FHE schemes such as BGV, again
see [44] for how the distributed decryption is performed. The basic protocol is to commit to
the distributed decryption shares, and then open the shares. This gives a round complexity for
Output of ROut = 2. We shall provide a simple mechanism to provide active security for the
Output command in the next section, which comes at the expense of increasing the required
supported depth of the SHE scheme by one.
In the case of a passively secure variant of the FHE functionality, one would always have
e = 0 in the Output routine. Furthermore, we would not need a proof of correctness of the input
ciphertexts and so the number of rounds of interaction in the InputData routine would be
RID = 1.
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3.2.2 Gentry’s FHE-Based MPC Protcol
In [60] Gentry presents an MPC protocol which has optimal round complexity to implement
FMPC. In the FFHE-hybrid model the protocol can be trivially described as follows: The parties
enter their data using the InputData command of the FHE functionality, the required function is
evaluated using the Add and Multiply commands (i.e. each party locally evaluates the function
using the FHE operations). The Add-scalar and Multiply-scalar commands can be computed
by the parties locally encrypting the scalar with a mutually agreed randomness (so that all hold
the same ciphertext) and then using the regular FHE Add or Multiply command, respectively.
Finally, the output is obtained using the Output command of the FHE functionality. For
passively secure adversaries this gives us an ‘efficient’ MPC protocol, assuming the FHE scheme
can actually evaluate the function. For active adversaries we then have to impose complex zero-
knowledge proofs to ensure that the InputData command is performed correctly, and we need a
way of securing the Output command (which we will come to in Section 3.3).
3.2.3 The BMR-SPDZ Protocol
We shall now overview the BMR-SPDZ protocol from [93]. Much of the details we cover here
focus on the offline SHE-part of the SPDZ protocol and how it is used in the BMR-SPDZ protocol.
Recall the SPDZ protocol makes use of two phases: An offline phase which uses an SHE scheme
(which for our purposes we model via the functionality FSHE above restricted to functions of
multiplicative depth one) and an online phase using (essentially) only information theoretic
constructs. These two phases are used to create a shared garbled circuit which is then evaluated
in a third phase in the BMR-SPDZ protocol.
First Phase Costs
The first phase of the BMR-SPDZ protocol requires an upper bound on the total number of parties
n, internal wires W , and gates G of the circuit which will be evaluated. The phase then calls the
offline phase of the SPDZ engine to produce M = (4 ·n+5) ·G multiplication triples, B =W shared
random bits, R = 2 ·W ·n shared random values and I = 8 ·G ·n shared values for entering data
per party.
The main cost of the BMR-SPDZ protocol is actually in computing this initial data, yet the
paper [93] does not address this cost in much detail. Delving into the paper [44] we see that
each of these operations requires parties to encrypt random data under the SHE scheme and to
produce additive sharings of SHE encrypted data. This first operation is identical to our input
command on the functionality FSHE. We delve into the costs of the operations in more detail:
• Encrypting (Input) Data ID: When a party produces a ciphertext we need to ensure that
it has a valid form, so as to protect against active attackers. As remarked above this is done
using a zero-knowledge proof of correctness. Whilst the computational costs of this can be
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amortized due to ‘packing’ in the SHE scheme, it is a non-trivial cost per encryption. We
shall denote the computational and round cost in what follows by CID and RID respectively,
i.e. the computational and round cost of the actively secure EncCommit operation from [44].
• Producing Random Resharings: Given a ciphertext encrypting a value m this procedure
results in an additive sharing of m amongst the n parties. The computational cost of this
procedure is dominated by the invocations of the ID protocol. Since each party needs to
encrypt a random value, the computational cost n ·CID and the round complexity is RID+1.
Again, the computational costs can be amortized due to the packing of the SHE scheme.
• Producing Multiplication Triples: To produce an unchecked triple this requires (per
party) the encryption of two random values (of ai and bi in the triple ([a], [b], [c])), plus
four resharings (three of which can be done in parallel, with the fourth only partially in
parallel). To produce a checked triple, this needs to be done twice (in parallel), followed by
a sacrificing step of one of the triples via a procedure (described in [44]) which requires
another two rounds of interaction. Thus the total computational cost is dominated by
12 ·n ·CID and the round complexity is RID+4.
• Producing Shared Random Bits: To produce an unchecked random bit we require (per
party) the encryption of one random value, one passively secure distributed decryption
(with only one round of interaction), plus two resharings (in parallel). To produce a checked
random bit, the above has to be combined with an unchecked multiplication triple in a
sacrificing step which requires two rounds of interaction. Thus the total computational cost
is dominated by 9 ·n ·CID and the round complexity is RID+4.
• Producing Shared Random Values: This requires (per party) the encryption of one ran-
dom value, and two resharings which can be done in parallel. Thus the total computational
cost is 2 ·n ·CID, and the round complexity is RID+1.
• Producing Input Data: Per data item which needs to be input for each player this
requires the encryption of one random value plus two resharings (which cannot be fully
parallelised), as well as one additional round of interaction. Thus the total computational
cost is dominated by CID+2 ·n ·CID, and the round complexity is RID+3.
A major bottleneck in the protocol, which is also one of the requisites for active security, is the
cost of encrypting the random data described above. If we combine the various formulae, we
obtain a dominant cost of T1 ·CID, where T1 is the number of calls to the ID protocol:
T1 ·CID = 12 ·n ·CID ·M+9 ·n ·CID ·B+2 ·n ·CID ·R+ (1+2 ·n) ·n ·CID · I
= (12 · (4 ·n+5) ·G+9 ·W +4 ·W ·n+ (1+2 ·n) ·n ·8 ·G) ·n ·CID
= (16 ·G ·n3 + (56 ·G+4 ·W) ·n2 +9 ·W ·n+60 ·G ·n) ·CID
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which is cubic in the number of players.
The total round complexity of the SPDZ offline phase is the maximum round complexity of
the various preprocessing operations in the SPDZ offline phase, namely RID+4. This holds since
the transmission of all random encrypted values can occur in one round at the beginning of this
phase. We stress that the depth of the SHE needed for SPDZ is just one, making it very efficient.
Second Phase Costs
A careful analysis of the rest of the garbling phase of BMR-SPDZ implies that it requires six
additional rounds of communication.3
Third Phase Costs
The online phase of the BMR-SPDZ protocol requires three rounds of interaction, one to open the
secret shared values and two to verify the associated MACs.
Summary
In summary, the round complexity of BMR-SPDZ is RID+10 in the offline phase, and 3 in the
online phase.
3.3 Extending the FFHE/FSHE Functionalities
3.3.1 The Extended Functionality Definition
The first step in describing our new offline protocol for constructing the BMR circuit is to extend
the functionalities FFHE/FSHE to new functionalities FFHE+ / FSHE+ . In Figure 3.2 we present
the FFHE+ functionality, from which the definition of the FSHE+ functionality is immediate.
These new functionalities mimic the output possibilities of the SPDZ offline phase, which
were exploited in [93] by allowing the functionality to produce encryptions of random data and
encryptions of random bits. In addition the functionalities provide a version of Output, denoted
by Output+, which does not allow the adversary to introduce an error value. There is also a new
version of InputData called InputData+ which will enable us to reduce the number of rounds
of interaction in our main protocol. Functionally this does nothing different from InputData but
it will be convenient to introduce a different name for a different implementation within our FHE
functionality.
3With reference to [93] this is one round in the preprocessing-I phase and the start of the preprocessing-II phase
due to the Output commands, and three to evaluate the required circuits in step 3 of preprocessing-II (since the
circuits are of depth three, and hence require three rounds of computation), plus two to verify all the associated MAC
values.
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The Extended Functionality FFHE+
This functionality runs the same Initialize, Wait, InputData, Add, Multiply, and Output com-
mands as FFHE of Figure 3.1. It additionally has the four following externally exposed commands:
Output+: On input (output+,varid, i) from all honest parties (if varid is present in memory), the func-
tionality retrieves (varid, x), and if i = 0 it outputs (varid, x) to the adversary. The functionality
then calls Wait, and only if Wait does not abort then outputs x to all parties if i = 0, or outputs
x only to party i if i 6= 0.
InputData+: On input (input+,Pi,varid,x) from Pi and (input+,Pi,varid,?) from all other parties, with
varid a fresh identifier, the functionality stores (varid,x). The functionality then calls Wait.
RandomElement: This command is executed on input (randomelement, varid) from all parties, with
varid a fresh identifier. The functionality then selects uniformly at random x ∈ Fp and stores
(varid,x).
RandomBit: This command is executed on input (randombit, varid) from all parties, with varid a
fresh identifier. The functionality then selects uniformly at random x ∈ {0,1} and stores (varid,x).
Figure 3.2: The Extended Functionality FFHE+
3.3.2 Securely Realising the Extended Functionality
In Figure 3.3 we give the protocol ΠFHE+ for realising the FFHE+ functionality in the FFHE-
hybrid model. Let us start by looking at the Output+ command in more detail (after first
reading Figure 3.3). Suppose the adversary tries to make player P j accept an incorrect value, by
introducing errors into the calls to the weakly secure Output command from FFHE. The honest
player P j will receive varid+ e1 instead of varid and authvarid j + e2 instead of authvarid j, for some
adversarially chosen values of e1 and e2. If player P j is not to abort then these quantities must
satisfy authvarid j + e2 = sk j · (varid+ e1). Now since we know that authvarid j = varid · sk j then this
implies that the adversary needs to select e1 and e2 such that e2 = sk j · e1, which it needs to do
without having any knowledge of sk j. Thus either the adversary needs to select e1 = e2 = 0, or he
needs to guess the correct value of sk j. This will happen with probability at most 1/p, which is
negligible.
We note that in the concurrent independent work of [48] a similar approach to our Output+
command is taken in order to attain active security. Nevertheless, they use a global MAC
key 〈sk〉 = 〈sk1〉+ · · ·+ 〈skn〉 that is revealed to all parties after decryption, which means that
sk needs to be renewed after each call to Output+. Thus, each call to their similar Output+
implementation requires n calls to the expensive InputData protocol, which does not pay off in
terms of concrete efficiency.
The protocol which implements InputData+ works by first running InputData with a
random value, and then later providing the difference between the random value input and the
real input. This enables parallel preprocessing of the InputData procedure, thereby reducing the
overall number of rounds.
The protocol which implements the RandomElement command generates an encrypted
35
CHAPTER 3. GARBLING USING SOMEWHAT HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
Protocol ΠFHE+
This protocol implements the functionality FFHE+ in the FFHE-hybrid model.
Initialize: This performs the initialisation routine just as in the FFHE functionality. However, in
addition, each party executes InputData to obtain an encryption 〈ski〉 of a random MAC value
ski known only to player Pi.
Output+: On input (output+, varid, i) from all honest parties, if varid is present in memory, the
following steps are executed.
1. If i 6= 0, party Pi computes authvaridi = 〈varid〉 · 〈ski〉, else, each party P j computes
authvarid j = 〈varid〉 · 〈sk j〉.
2. Parties call FFHE with the command (output, varid, i).
3. If i 6= 0, parties call FFHE with the command (output, authvaridi, i), else, they use command
(output, authvarid j, j) for every j ∈ [1, . . . ,n]. Any party P j aborts if authvarid j 6= varid · sk j.
Depth Needed: D(varid)+ 1. Round Cost: 2 (since the output calls in steps 2 and 3 can be
performed in parallel).
InputData+: The first step of this command does not depend on the input, and so can be run in a
preprocessing step if the number of values to be input per party are known in advance. Upon
input (input+,Pi,varid, x) with x ∈ Fp for Pi and (input+,Pi,varid,?) for all other parties:
1. Party Pi chooses a random r i ∈ Fp (in the same field as x) and sends (input,Pi,varid-1, r i)
to Functionality FFHE. All parties P j with j 6= i send (input,Pi,varid-1,?) to Functional-
ity FFHE.
2. Party Pi broadcasts ci = xi − r i (mod p) to all parties.
3. Parties send (add-scalar, ci,varid-1,varid) to Functionality FFHE.
Depth Needed: D(xi)= D(c)= 0. Round Cost: RID+1. Although all RID rounds can be performed
in parallel at the start of the protocol.
RandomElement:
1. For i = 1, . . . ,n, each Pi chooses a random xi ∈ Fp, and calls FFHE with the command
(input,Pi,xi) from party Pi and (input,Pi,?) for the others.
2. Call Add as many times as needed to compute 〈x〉 = 〈x1〉+ · · ·+〈xn〉.
Depth Needed: D(xi)=max{D(xi)}= 0. Round Cost: RID.
RandomBit: This command requires a more elaborate implementation:
1. For i = 1, . . . ,n, call FFHE with the command (input,Pi,xi) from party Pi and (input,Pi,?)
for the rest of the parties.
2. Call Add as many times as needed to compute 〈x〉 = 〈x1〉+ · · ·+〈xn〉.
3. Call Multiply to compute 〈s〉 = 〈x〉 · 〈x〉.
4. Call FFHE+ on input (output+, s, 0) so all parties obtain s. If s = 0 then restart the protocol.
5. Parties compute y=ps (mod p). Between the two possible outputs, y is chosen according
to a previously agreed method (e.g. the biggest one when looked as an integer).
6. Call Add-scalar and Multiply-scalar to compute 〈varid〉 = (1+〈x〉/y)/2 .
Depth Needed: D(s)+1= 2. Note the output encrypted bit has depth zero. Round Cost: RID+2.
Figure 3.3: Protocol ΠFHE+ .
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random value 〈x〉, unknown to any party as long as one of the parties honestly chooses his
additional share xi randomly.
The protocol which implements the RandomBit command is more elaborate, and borrows
much from the equivalent operations in the SPDZ offline phase, see [44]. The basic idea is to gen-
erate an encrypted random value 〈x〉, unknown to any party. This value is then squared to obtain
〈s〉. The value of s is then publicly revealed and an arbitrary square root y is taken, according to
any previously agreed rule. As long as s 6= 0 (which happens with negligible probability due to the
size of p) we then have that 〈b〉 = 〈x〉/y is an encryption of a value chosen uniformly from {−1,1}.
Since p is prime, with probability 1/2 the square root taken will be equal to x and with probability
1/2 it will be equal to −x. This encryption of a value in {−1,1} is turned into an encryption of a
value in {0,1} by the final step, by computing (〈b〉+1)/2, which is a linear function and can be thus
computed by calling Add-Scalar and Multiply-Scalar. However, unlike in SPDZ no sacrificing
procedure is required as the Output+ command is actively secure.
Theorem 3.3.1. Protocol ΠFHE+ securely implements FFHE+ in the FFHE-hybrid model in the UC
framework, in the presence of static, active adversaries corrupting up to t ≤ n−1 parties.
Proof (sketch) By [36], it suffices to prove the security of Protocol ΠFHE+ in the SUC (simple
UC) framework. We will sketch the proof for each of the processes in the functionality separately.
In the FFHE-hybrid model the security follows in a straightforward way utilizing the security of
the commands in FFHE.
Output+: The security of Output+ relies on the security of the InputData, Multiply and
Output commands of FFHE. Namely, by the security of InputData we have that all sk j
values are secret, and by the security of Output the only change that A can make to
the output is an additive difference e (fixed before the output is given). Thus, A can only
change the output if it chooses additive differences e1, e2 with e1 6= 0 such that (x+e1)·sk j =
x · sk j + e2 (mod p), where x is the value output. This implies that e1 · sk j = e2 (mod p).
Since sk j is secret, the adversary can cause this equality to hold with probability at most p.
We remark that the MAC key sk j is only used for output values given to P j. Thus, it always
remains secret (even when used for many outputs).
The simulator for Output+ works simply by simulating the Output interaction with
FFHE for all honest Pi. Regarding a corrupt P j, the simulator receives the value x that
is supposed to be output. Furthermore, the simulator receives the value sk j from the
InputData instruction, as well as any errors that are introduced in the Output calls by
corrupted parties. Thus, the simulator can construct the exact value that A would receive
in a real execution.
InputData+: The only difference between InputData+ and InputData is that InputData+
can be run such that the actual input is only known to the party in the last round of
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the protocol. This is done in a straightforward way by using InputData to have a party
input a random string, and then using that result to mask the real data (at the end).
The simulator for this procedure therefore relies directly on the InputData procedure of
FFHE in a straightforward way. Namely, in the FFHE-hybrid model when the party Pi is
corrupted, the simulator receives the value r i that party Pi sends to InputData. Then,
upon receiving ci as broadcast by Pi, the simulator defines xi = ci + r i (mod p) and sends
(input+,Pi,varid, xi) to the ideal functionality as input. In the case that Pi is honest, the
simulator chooses a random ci ∈ Fp and simulates Pi broadcasting that value. Furthermore,
it simulates the (input, ...) and (add-scalar, ...) interaction with FFHE.
The view of the adversary is identical in the simulated and real executions. In addition,
since InputData is secure and ci is broadcast and therefore the same for all parties, the
protocol fully determines the input value xi = ci + r i (mod p), as required.
RandomElement: This is a straightforward coin tossing protocol. The security is derived from
the fact that FFHE provides a secure InputData protocol that reveals no information
about the input values. Thus, no party knows anything about the x-values input by the
others. Formally, a simulator just simulates the message interaction with FFHE for all of
the (input,Pi, xi) and (input,Pi,?) messages. As long as at least one party is honest, the
distribution over the value x defined is uniform, as required.
RandomBit: The first step of this protocol is to essentially run RandomElement in order to
define a random shared value x. Then, the value s = x2 (mod p) is output to all parties,
and each takes the same square-root y of s. Assume that the square root taken is the
one that is between 1 and (p−1)/2. Now, if 1 ≤ x ≤ p−12 , then y = x and so 〈b〉 = 〈1〉, and
we have that 〈varid〉 = 〈1+12 〉 = 〈1〉. Else, if p−12 < x ≤ p−1 then 〈b〉 = 〈−1〉 and we have
〈varid〉 = 〈−1+12 〉 = 〈0〉. The security relies on the fact that the result is fully determined
from the (input, ...) messages sent in the beginning. Relying on the security of InputData
and Add/Multiply in FFHE, and on the security of the Output+ procedure, the value x
is uniformly distributed and the value s that is output to all parties equals x2 and no
other value. All other steps are deterministic and thus this guarantees that the output is a
uniformly distributed bit, as required.
Regarding simulation, the simulator simulates the calls to InputData, Add and Multiply
as in the protocol. For the output, the simulator simply chooses a random s as the value
received from Output+. The view of the parties is clearly identical to in a real execution.
■
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3.4 The First Variant of the BMR-SHE Protocol, ΠDepth−4
In this section we outline our basic protocol, which follows much upon the lines of the BMR-
SPDZ protocol. The modifications needed for a variant using only depth three will be left to
Section 3.5. We divide our discussion into four subsections. In the first one we outline the offline
functionality FPreprocessing required for our specific garbling scheme. The next subsection discuss
how to implement the overall BMR-style protocol assuming said functionality. In the two last
subsections we discuss a protocol to implement FPreprocessing and analyse its efficiency.
3.4.1 Functionality FPreprocessing for the Offline Phase
We first present the offline functionality (see Figure 3.4) for our main MPC protocol. This is almost
identical to the offline functionality for the BMR-SPDZ protocol of [93]. The main difference is
that it is built on top of our FFHE+ functionality from the previous section, as opposed to the
SPDZ MPC protocol. In particular this means we have just a single preprocessing step as opposed
to the two phases in [93], which are in turn inherited from the two phases of the SPDZ protocol.
We recall from Section 2.6 that the functionality also has an additional task: Revealing the
output wire masks towards all parties and the input wire masks towards the relevant input party.
Everything else in the garbled circuit remains encrypted as in FFHE+ .
3.4.2 The BMR-SHE Protocol Specification ΠMPC,4
We can now give our protocol ΠMPC,4, described in Figure 3.5, which securely computes the
functionality FMPC described in Figure 2.1 in the FPreprocessing-hybrid model. The computational
and communication costs of ΠMPC,4 are mainly in the preprocessing step, with the online phase
adding only a depth of one to the SHE scheme and two more rounds of communication, all of
these costs coming from the need for an actively secure Output+. As the online phase follows
the style of the one in SPDZ-BMR [93] or, more broadly the one of BMR which was described in
Section 2.6.1, we do not discuss it in details here.
3.4.3 The ΠPreprocessing,4 Protocol
For completeness, we show how to calculate the output indicators for functions fg = AND and
fg = XOR in Figure 3.7 as shown in [93]. Note that we consume a multiplicative depth of two for
both operations.
• For fg = AND, we compute 〈t〉 = 〈λa〉 · 〈λb〉 and then 〈xA〉 = (〈t〉−〈λc〉)2, 〈xB〉 = (〈λa〉−〈t〉−
〈λc〉)2, 〈xC〉 = (〈λb〉−〈t〉−〈λc〉)2, 〈xD〉 = (1−〈λa〉−〈λb〉+〈t〉−〈λc〉)2.
• For fg = XOR, we first compute 〈t〉 = 〈λa〉 ⊕ 〈λb〉 = 〈λa〉 + 〈λb〉 − 2 · 〈λa〉 · 〈λ2〉, and then
〈xA〉 = (〈t〉−〈λc〉)2, 〈xB〉 = (1−〈λa〉−〈λb〉+2 · 〈t〉−〈λc〉)2, 〈xC〉 = 〈xB〉, 〈xD〉 = 〈xA〉.
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Functionality FPreprocessing
This functionality runs the same commands as FFHE+ . In addition it has the following command:
Preprocessing: On input (Garbling,C f ) from all parties, where C f is a boolean circuit, denote by
W its set of wires and by G its set of AND gates. The functionality performs the following
operations:
• For all wires w ∈ [1, . . . ,W] :
– The functionality stores a random mask λw, where λw ∈ {0,1}.
– For every value β ∈ {0,1}, each party Pi chooses and stores a random key kiw,β ∈ Fp.
• For all input wires w where a party Pi is meant to provide input, the functionality reveals
λw to that party by running Output+ as in FFHE+ .
• For all output wires w the functionality reveals λw to all parties by running Output+ as
in FFHE+ .
• For every gate g with input wires 1≤ a,b ≤W and output wire 1≤ c ≤W .
– Party Pi provides the following inputs for x ∈ {a,b}, g ∈ [1, . . . ,G] by running Input-
Data as in FFHE+ :
Fkix,0 (0||1||g), . . . ,Fkix,0 (0||n||g), Fkix,0 (1||1||g), . . . ,Fkix,0 (1||n||g)
Fkix,1 (0||1||g), . . . ,Fkix,1 (0||n||g), Fkix,1 (1||1||g), . . . ,Fkix,1 (1||n||g)
(In our protocols, the parties actually provide sums of pairs of these values, see
Figure 3.7. This reduces the number of values input from 8 per-party per-gate to only
4 per-party per-gate.)
– Define the selector variables
χ1 = ( fg(λa,λb)−λc)2.
χ2 = ( fg(λa, λ̄b)−λc)2.
χ3 = ( fg(λ̄a,λb)−λc)2.
χ4 = ( fg(λ̄a, λ̄b)−λc)2.
– Set Ag = (A1g, . . . , Ang), Bg = (B1g, . . . ,Bng), Cg = (C1g, . . . ,Cng), Dg = (D1g, . . . ,Dng) where for


























Fkia,1 (1|| j||g)+Fkib,1 (1|| j||g)
)
+k jc,χ4
– The functionality finally stores the values Ag, Bg, Cg, Dg for all g.
Figure 3.4: The Preprocessing Functionality FPreprocessing.
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The MPC Protocol - ΠMPC,4
On input a boolean circuit C f representing the function f , parties execute the following commands in
sequence:
Preprocessing: This sub-task is performed as follows.
• Call Initialize on FPreprocessing to initialize the FHE scheme.
• Call Preprocessing on FPreprocessing with input C f .
Online Computation: This sub-task is performed as follows.
• For all his input wires w, each party computes Λw = ρw ⊕λw, where λw was obtained in
the preprocessing stage, and ρw is his input on that wire. Λw is broadcast to all parties.
• Party Pi calls Output+ on FPreprocessing with all parties as receivers, in order to reveal
them his keys 〈kiw,Λw〉 associated to Λw, for all his input wires w.
• The parties call Output+ on FPreprocessing to decrypt Ag, Bg, Cg and Dg for every gate g.
• Passing through the circuit topologically, the parties can now locally compute the following
operations for each gate g. Let the gates input wires be labelled a and b, and the output
wire be labelled c.
– For j = 1, . . . ,n compute k jc according to the following cases:
(Λa,Λb)= (0,0) : Set k jc = A jg −
(∑n
i=1 Fkia (0|| j||g)+Fkib (0|| j||g)
)
.
(Λa,Λb)= (0,1) : Set k jc = B jg −
(∑n
i=1 Fkia (1|| j||g)+Fkib (0|| j||g)
)
.
(Λa,Λb)= (1,0) : Set k jc = C jg −
(∑n
i=1 Fkia (0|| j||g)+Fkib (1|| j||g)
)
.
(Λa,Λb)= (1,1) : Set k jc = D jg −
(∑n
i=1 Fkia (1|| j||g)+Fkib (1|| j||g)
)
.
– If kic 6∈ {kic,0,kic,1}, then Pi outputs abort. Otherwise, it proceeds. If Pi aborts it
notifies all other parties with that information. If Pi is notified that another party
has aborted it aborts as well.
– If kic = kic,0 then Pi sets Λc = 0 otherwise if kic = kic,1 then Pi sets Λc = 1.
– The output of the gate is defined to be (k1c , . . . ,knc ) and Λc.
• Assuming party Pi does not abort it will obtain Λw for every circuit-output wire w. The
party can then recover the actual output value from ρw =Λw⊕λw, where λw was obtained
in the preprocessing stage.
Depth Needed: D(Output+ ({Ag}, {Bg}, {Cg}, {Dg}))= 3+1= 4.
Round Cost: The round cost of the online stage is that of the first three steps, which can be done
in parallel in two rounds.
Figure 3.5: The MPC Protocol - ΠMPC,4.
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The Offline Protocol – ΠPreprocessing,4
The protocol runs the commands Initialize, InputData, InputData+, Wait, and Output+ by calling
the equivalent commands on FFHE+ . Thus we only need to implement the additional Preprocessing
command of FPreprocessing as follows:
1. Call Initialize on the functionality FFHE+ with input a prime p > 2k.
2. Generate wire masks: For every circuit wire w we need to generate a random and hidden
masking-values λw. Thus for all wires w the parties execute RandomBit of FFHE+ , the output
is denoted by 〈λw〉.
Depth Needed: D(RandomBit)= 2
Round Cost: RID+2.
3. Generate keys: For every wire w, each party i ∈ [1, . . . ,n] and for β ∈ {0,1}, the parties execute
the command InputData of the functionality FFHE+ to obtain output 〈kiw,β〉, where Pi learns





Depth Needed: D(kiw,β)= 0.
Round Cost: RID.
4. Reveal masks for circuit-input-wires: For all input wires w where a party Pi is meant to
provide input, execute the command Output+ in FFHE+ to decrypt 〈λw〉 to that party.
Depth Needed: max(D(RandomBit),D(Output+ (λw)))=max(2,1)= 2.
Round Cost: 2.
5. Reveal masks for circuit-output-wires: In order to reveal the real values of the circuit-
output-wires it is required to reveal their masking values. That is, for every circuit-output-wire
w, the parties execute the command Output+ on the functionality FFHE+ for the stored value
〈λw〉.
Depth Needed: max(D(RandomBit),D(Output+ (λw)))=max(2,1)= 2.
Round Cost: 2.
6. Calculate garbled gates: See Figure 3.7 for the details of this step.
We note that steps two and three can be run in parallel, and that steps four and five also can be run
in parallel, but need to follow step two. We also note that the calls to InputData+ in the last step
(detailed in Figure 3.7) need to be executed after step three. Hence, we have:
Total Depth Needed: 3.
Total Round Cost: max(RID+3,RID+4)= RID+4.
Figure 3.6: The Preprocessing Protocol: ΠPreprocessing,4.
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Calculate Garbled Gates Step of ΠPreprocessing,4
This step is operated for each gate g in the circuit in parallel. Specifically, let g be a gate whose input
wires are a,b and output wire is c. Do as follows:
(a) Calculate external values: This step calculates the external values 〈xA〉,〈xB〉, 〈xC〉,〈xD〉
corresponding to each row of the garbled gate. Each of them is either 〈0〉 or 〈1〉 and is determined
according to some quadratic function fg on 〈λa〉,〈λb〉,〈λc〉, depending on the truth table of the
gate. See Section 3.4.3 for details.
〈xA〉 = ( fg(〈λa〉,〈λb〉)−〈λc〉)2 〈xB〉 = ( fg(〈λa〉, (1−〈λb〉))−〈λc〉)2
〈xC〉 = ( fg((1−〈λa〉),〈λb〉)−〈λc〉)2 〈xD〉 = ( fg((1−〈λa〉), (1−〈λb〉))−〈λc〉)2
Depth Needed: D(x∗)= D(λ∗)+2= 2.
(b) Assign the correct vector: The external values are used to choose, for every row of garbled
gate, either kc,0 or kc,1, for t = A,B,C,D,
〈vc,xt〉 = (1−〈xt〉) · 〈kc,0〉+〈xt〉 · 〈kc,1〉.
Depth Needed: D(vc,x∗ )=max(D(x∗),D(kc,∗))+1= 3.
(c) Calculate garbled gate rows: Party i can now compute the 2 · n PRF values
Fkiw,β
(0||1||g), . . . ,Fkiw,β (0||n||g) and Fkiw,β (1||1||g), . . . ,Fkiw,β (1||n||g), for each input wire w of gate













(1||1||g), . . . ,Fkiw,β (1||n||g)
)
.
Then, they call 4 ·n ·G times the command InputData+ on the functionality FFHE, so all the


















All the parties now compute the four rows 〈Ag〉,〈Bg〉,〈Cg〉,〈Dg〉 for every garbled gate g via






























Round Cost: RID = RID +1, but the RID can be done in parallel before. Depth Needed: D(Ag)=
D(Bg)= D(Cg)= D(Dg)= D(vc,x∗ )= 3.
Figure 3.7: Calculate Garbled Gates Step of ΠPreprocessing,4.
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Claim 3.4.1. ProtocolΠPreprocessing,4 securely implements FPreprocessing in the FFHE+ -hybrid model
in the UC framework, in the presence of static, active adversaries corrupting t ≤ n−1 parties.
Proof (sketch) We have modelled FPreprocessing in almost the same way as in [93]. The security
of our protocol follows from the proof of the security of the BMR-SPDZ protocol there: We use
our extension of Gentry’s MPC protocol as opposed to the SPDZ protocol, which is purely an
implementation change. ■
3.4.4 Analysis of Efficiency
Just as in our analysis of the BMR-SPDZ protocol in Section 3.2.3, we wish to estimate the cost of
the most expensive operations, which are the encryptions of (random or not) input data.
• Each party calls InputData once during the Initialize phase of the extended FHE func-
tionality.
• We perform W RandomBit operations, each of which consumes a CID per party.
• To create the encrypted PRF keys we require an additional 2 ·W invocations of CID per
party.
• Finally, in order to compute the rows of the garbled gate we require 4 ·n2 ·G invocations of
InputData, which correspond to 4 ·n ·G invocations of per party.
Thus, we conclude that the cost of encrypting the data for the depth-4 BMR-SHE protocol is given
by the expression
(
4 ·n2 ·G+ (3 ·W +1) ·n
)
·CID, which is quadratic in n as opposed to the cubic
complexity in the number of parties of the BMR-SPDZ protocol.
3.5 A Lower Depth Variant of the BMR-SHE Protocol, ΠDepth−3
In this section we give a description of the protocol ΠDepth−3 (see Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9 for
the offline and online modifications respectively) which requires only a multiplicative depth of
three rather than four as in ΠDepth−4. This reduction on the depth of the SHE scheme comes
directly from the reduction of the depth of the circuit used for garbling the actual circuit to
evaluate. On the downside, we require additional 2 ·W ·n · (n−1) calls to InputData and some
more multiplications in the offline and online phases. The new protocol ΠDepth−3 is, in fact, just a
variant of ΠDepth−4. It remains to be empirically tested for which set of parameters one would be
preferred in practice one over the other.
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3.5.1 Protocol ΠDepth−3 Description
Our earlier protocol ΠDepth−4 securely computes the BMR garbled gates as follows: For every gate
the parties first compute the shares 〈xA〉,〈xB〉,〈xC〉,〈xD〉 and then use these shares to compute
the shares 〈vc,xA 〉,〈vc,xB〉,〈vc,xC 〉,〈vc,xD 〉 of the keys kc,0 or kc,1 on the output wire of the gate.
Finally, these are masked by the pseudorandom values provided by all parties, see Figure 3.7.
Observing how these equations are computed, we can verify that obtaining the 〈x∗〉 values
require two multiplications and computing 〈vc,x∗〉 requires an additional multiplication. The final
multiplication, making the overall protocol depth-4, is needed for computing Output+. The goal
of the variant here presented is to produce the 〈vc,x∗〉 values directly, with just two multiplications
instead of three.
In order to achieve this, we limit our considerations to AND and XOR gates, for which we
provide formulae computing directly 〈vc,x∗〉. The main idea is that it actually suffices to store in
that vector either the key kc,∗ or its opposite −kc,∗ modulo p. The reason that this suffices is that
the square of these values is the same. Thus, we have two versions of each key, which we denote
the basic-key and the squared-key. This introduces two main modifications in the offline protocol:
1. Parties call RandomElement in order to generate each basic-key. They jointly and obliv-
iously square the result, obtaining a squared-key which is revealed to the appropriate
party.
2. Afterwards, parties can compute 〈vc,x∗〉, which equals the basic-key (or its opposite) on wire
c. The result is masked with the outputs of the PRFs, which are keyed under the revealed
squared-keys.
Observe that then, in the online phase, the basic-key or its opposite is revealed when evaluat-
ing the garbled circuit. The parties then square it in order to get the square-key and compute
the PRF values enabling the decryption of the next garbled gate. Since the basic-key is random
and was never revealed, the parties have no idea of whether they received the basic-key or it’s
opposite. Otherwise this would leak information about the values on the wires, as the ‘sign choice’
in 〈vc,x∗〉 depends on the wire masks, which we show in the next paragraphs.
Note that these modifications add 2 ·W ·n · (n−1) calls to InputData, in order to generate the
basic-keys via calls to RandomElement.
3.5.1.1 The AND Gate
We now present the equations for computing an AND gate with input wires a,b and output wire
c. We denote the basic-keys (i.e not squared) on the output wire c by k̃c,0, k̃c,1.
In order to motivate these equations, we explain in details the first of them, Equation 3.1,
which computes 〈vc,xA 〉 and corresponds to the first ciphertext in the garbled gate. We know
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The Lower Depth Offline Protocol – ΠPreprocessing,3
This protocol is identical to the ΠPreprocessing,4 protocol given in Figure 3.6, except for the following
changes:
3 Generate keys in Figure 3.6 is changed as follows:
a) For every wire w, bit value β ∈ {0,1} and party i ∈ [1, . . . ,n], the parties execute the
command RandomElement of the functionality FFHE+ to obtain output 〈k̃iw,β〉. We stress
that nobody learns k̃iw,β. Let varid be the identifier of 〈k̃iw,β〉. In the following, we shall
abuse the notation to denote 〈k̃w,β〉 =
(
〈k̃1w,β〉, . . . ,〈k̃nw,β〉
)
.
b) The parties call (multiply,varid,varid,varid2) where varid2 is a new identifier, in order to
share a ciphertext 〈kiw,β〉 = 〈k̃iw,β〉
2.
c) The parties call FFHE+ on input (output+,varid2, i) for party Pi to obtain k
i
w,β.
Depth Needed: D(Output+ (kiw,β))= 2.
Round Cost: RID+2.
4 Calculate garbled gates in Figure 3.7 is changed as follows:
a) The calculate external values and assign the correct vector phases are replaced by
the following functions, that choose, for every row in the garbled gate, either k̃c,0, −k̃c,0,
k̃c,1 or −k̃c,1.
• For an AND gate, the parties compute shares of the keys on the output wires according
to Equations (3.1)–(3.4).
• For a XOR gate, the parties compute shares of the keys on the output wires according
to Equations (3.5)–(3.7).
Depth Needed: D(vc,xA )= D(vc,xB )= D(vc,xC )= D(vc,xD )= 2.
Total Round Cost: max(RID+3,RID+4)= RID+4.
Total Depth Needed: 2.
Figure 3.8: The Modified Preprocessing Protocol ΠPreprocessing,3.
The modified MPC Protocol - ΠMPC,3
This protocol is identical to the ΠMPC,4 protocol described in Figure 3.5, except for the four cases of the
Online Computation sub-task, in which for j = 1, . . . ,n, the values k jc are now computed as follows:
Case (Λa,Λb)= (0,0) : Compute k jc =
(
A jg − (
∑n
i=1 Fkia (0|| j||g)+Fkib (0|| j||g))
)2
.
Case (Λa,Λb)= (0,1) : Compute k jc =
(
B jg − (
∑n
i=1 Fkia (1|| j||g)+Fkib (0|| j||g))
)2
.
Case (Λa,Λb)= (1,0) : Compute k jc =
(
C jg − (
∑n
i=1 Fkia (0|| j||g)+Fkib (1|| j||g))
)2
.
Case (Λa,Λb)= (1,1) : Compute k jc =
(
D jg − (
∑n
i=1 Fkia (1|| j||g)+Fkib (1|| j||g))
)2
.
Depth Needed: DOut++D({Ag}, {Bg}, {Cg}, {Dg})= 2+1= 3.
Figure 3.9: The Modified Protocol ΠMPC,3.
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from Sections 2.5 and 2.6 that those correspond to external values (Λa,Λb)= (0,0). We break our
explanation in two cases below.
First, if the actual value on wire a equals 0, then 〈λa〉 =Λa +0= 0, and so 〈vc,xA 〉 is a function
of the first row of the equation. Knowing that the actual value on a is 0, then the actual output
equals 0 irrespective of b, since this is an AND gate. Thus, if the wire mask on c equals 0 then
the output has to be 〈k̃c,0〉 and otherwise it should be 〈k̃c,1〉, as the equation ensures.
In the opposite case, when the actual value on wire a equals 1, then the value of 〈vc,xA 〉
depends only on the second row of the equation (since 1−〈λa〉 = 0). More precisely, it depends
on the actual value on wire b (which equals λb, as Λb = 0) and the wire mask λc on the output
wire. If b = 1 and λc = 0 or if b = 0 and λc = 1 then it should be that 〈vc,xA 〉 =±〈k̃c,1〉 (since in the
first case a = b = 1 and the actual output is 1, whereas in the second case the actual output is 0
but λc = 1, so Λc = 1). We achieve this goal by multiplying 〈k̃c,1〉 by 〈λb〉−〈λc〉 which equals ±1 in
both of these cases (and 0 otherwise). We then multiply 〈k̃c,0〉 by 1−〈λb〉−〈λc〉, which equals 0
in both of these cases b = 0,λc = 1 and b = 1,λc = 0. In contrast, if b = λc = 0 or b = λc = 1 then
the output should be ±〈k̃c,0〉 (as above, because if b = λc = 0 then the actual output is 0, and if
b =λc = 1 then the actual output is 1 but the external value is 0). Finally we obtain next equation:
〈vc,xA 〉 = (1−〈λa〉) ·
(





(〈λb〉−〈λc〉) · 〈k̃c,1〉+ (1−〈λb〉−〈λc〉) · 〈k̃c,0〉
)
.
The remaining three equations are computed similarly, as follows:
〈vc,xB〉 = (1−〈λa〉) ·
(





(〈λb〉−〈λc〉) · 〈k̃c,0〉+ (1−〈λb〉−〈λc〉) · 〈k̃c,1〉
)
〈vc,xC 〉 = 〈λa〉 ·
(





(〈λb〉−〈λc〉) · 〈k̃c,1〉+ (1−〈λb〉−〈λc〉) · 〈k̃c,0〉
)
〈vc,xD 〉 = 〈λa〉 ·
(





(〈λb〉−〈λc〉) · 〈k̃c,0〉+ (1−〈λb〉−〈λc〉) · 〈k̃c,1〉
)
In order to prove correctness of these equations, we present the truth table of the outputs in
Figure 3.10. Observe that all values are correct, as we allow to obtain the negative value of a
basic-key.
3.5.1.2 The XOR Gate
We use a similar idea as above to compute the XOR gate. Intuitively, in a XOR gate, there
are two cases: λa = λb and λa 6= λb. Multiplying by λa −λb gives ±1 if λa 6= λb and 0 if λa = λb.
Furthermore, multiplying by 1−λa −λb gives the exact reverse case, it equals 0 if λa 6= λb
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λa λb λc 〈vc,xA 〉 〈vc,xB〉 〈vc,xC 〉 〈vc,xD 〉
0 0 0 〈k̃c,0〉 〈k̃c,0〉 〈k̃c,0〉 〈k̃c,1〉
0 0 1 〈k̃c,1〉 〈k̃c,1〉 〈−k̃c,1〉 〈−k̃c,0〉
0 1 0 〈k̃c,0〉 〈k̃c,0〉 〈k̃c,1〉 〈k̃c,0〉
0 1 1 〈k̃c,1〉 〈k̃c,1〉 〈−k̃c,0〉 〈−k̃c,1〉
1 0 0 〈k̃c,0〉 〈k̃c,1〉 〈k̃c,0〉 〈k̃c,0〉
1 0 1 〈−k̃c,1〉 〈−k̃c,0〉 〈k̃c,1〉 〈k̃c,1〉
1 1 0 〈k̃c,1〉 〈k̃c,0〉 〈k̃c,0〉 〈k̃c,0〉
1 1 1 〈−k̃c,0〉 〈−k̃c,1〉 〈k̃c,1〉 〈k̃c,1〉
Figure 3.10: The truth table of the vectors for an AND gate computed in Figure 3.8.
and equals ±1 if λa = λb. Observe that 〈vc,xC 〉 and 〈vc,xD 〉 need not be computed at all since
(1−a)⊕ b = a⊕ (1− b) and (1−a)⊕ (1− b)= a⊕ b. This yields the following equations, where as
above, we prove correctness via the truth table given in Figure 3.11.
〈vc,xA 〉 = 〈vc,xD 〉 = (〈λa〉−〈λb〉) ·
(〈λc〉 · 〈k̃c,0〉+ (1−〈λc〉) · 〈k̃c,1〉)(3.5)
+(1−〈λa〉−〈λb〉) ·
(〈λc〉 · 〈k̃c,1〉+ (1−〈λc〉) · 〈k̃c,0〉)
〈vc,xB〉 = 〈vc,xC 〉 = (〈λa〉−〈λb〉) ·
(〈λc〉 · 〈k̃c,1〉+ (1−〈λc〉) · 〈k̃c,0〉)(3.6)
+(1−〈λa〉−〈λb〉) ·
(〈λc〉 · 〈k̃c,0〉+ (1−〈λc〉) · 〈k̃c,1〉)
λa λb λc 〈vc,xA 〉 〈vc,xB〉 〈vc,xC 〉 〈vc,xD 〉
0 0 0 〈k̃c,0〉 〈k̃c,1〉 〈k̃c,1〉 〈k̃c,0〉
0 0 1 〈k̃c,1〉 〈k̃c,0〉 〈k̃c,0〉 〈k̃c,1〉
0 1 0 〈−k̃c,1〉 〈−k̃c,0〉 〈−k̃c,0〉 〈−k̃c,1〉
0 1 1 〈−k̃c,0〉 〈−k̃c,1〉 〈−k̃c,1〉 〈−k̃c,0〉
1 0 0 〈k̃c,1〉 〈k̃c,0〉 〈k̃c,0〉 〈k̃c,1〉
1 0 1 〈k̃c,0〉 〈k̃c,1〉 〈k̃c,1〉 〈k̃c,0〉
1 1 0 〈−k̃c,0〉 〈−k̃c,1〉 〈−k̃c,1〉 〈−k̃c,0〉
1 1 1 〈−k̃c,1〉 〈−k̃c,0〉 〈−k̃c,0〉 〈−k̃c,1〉
Figure 3.11: The truth table of the vectors for a XOR gate computed in Figure 3.8.
3.5.2 Security Of the Modified Protocol
Observe that the only difference in the garbled gates with respect to the depth-4 variant is that
the 〈vc,x∗〉 values contain the ‘tilde’ version of the keys. More formally, the 〈vc,x∗〉 ciphertexts
encrypt the square root of the keys, and not the keys themselves. Thus, in the online phase,
parties receive the square roots of the keys and need to square them before proceeding. The
only issue that needs to be explained here is that the specific square root provided reveals no
information. This needs to be justified because if an adversary could know whether −k̃ or k̃ is
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computed, then it would know some information about the masks λa,λb,λc. However, since the k̃
values are uniformly distributed in Fp, and the keys themselves revealed in the offline phase are
k = k̃2, it follows that each of the two square roots of k are equally probable. Stated differently,
given k, the distribution over k̃ and −k̃ is identical.
3.5.3 Analysis of Efficiency of the Modified Protocol
As we noted at the beginning of the chapter, the two main sources of overhead that concern the
MPC protocols presented are the number of rounds and the number of calls to the ID protocol.
The former is not changed by our ΠDepth−3 variant, but the latter does. To generate the keys in
ΠPreprocessing,3, we now perform 2 ·W ·n2 calls to InputData, via calls to RandomElement. In
ΠDepth−4 we performed 2 ·W ·n calls to generate the keys, so overall we add 2 ·W ·n · (n−1) calls
to InputData. To analyse the number of homomorphic multiplications we go through each step
of the protocol:
• Generate keys step: We perform 4 ·W ·n more multiplications (half of them to square the
keys, the other half to Output+ them).
• Calculate garbled gates step:
1. For every AND gate, we used 8 · n+5 multiplications in the first variant. Now, by
careful rewriting of the equations, we can do this in 12 ·n+8.
2. For every XOR gate, we used 6 ·n+3 multiplications in the first variant. Now we use
8 ·n+4.
3. So, on average, we pass from 7 ·n+4 to 10 ·n+6 multiplications per gate.
Thus, overall on average we perform 4 ·W ·n+ (3 ·n+2) ·G more homomorphic multiplications.
However, in practice each homomorphic multiplication will be more efficient since the overall











GARBLING USING OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER
This chapter is based on joint work with Carmit Hazay and Peter Scholl [70], which was presented
at ASIACRYPT 2017.
In this chapter, we present a practical, actively secure, constant round multi-party protocolfor generating BMR garbled circuits with Free-XOR in the presence of up to n−1 out of ncorruptions. As in prior constructions, our approach has two phases: a preprocessing phase
where the garbled circuit is mutually generated by all parties, and an online phase where the
parties obtain the output of the computation. While the online phase is efficient and incurs no
extra costs to achieve active security, the focus of this chapter, as well as that of the previous one
and other recent works is on optimizing the preprocessing complexity. There, the main bottleneck
is with respect to garbling AND gates. In this context, we present two new constant-round
protocols for securely generating the garbled circuit:
1. A generic approach using any secret-sharing based MPC protocol for binary circuits, and a
correlated oblivious transfer functionality (Section 4.3).
2. A specialized protocol which uses secret-sharing based MPC with information-theoretic
MACs, such as TinyOT [58, 104] (Section 4.4). This approach is less general, but requires
no additional correlated OTs to compute the garbled circuit.
In both approaches, the cost for garbling an AND gate is essentially one secure multiplication
on the underlying secret-sharing based protocol, which shows that the gap between constant and
non-constant round MPC for boolean circuits is very little in practice.
51
CHAPTER 4. GARBLING USING OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER
4.1 Introduction
At the time this work was published, most previous constructions (including the one given in
Chapter 3) expressed the garbling function as an arithmetic circuit over a large finite field.
For those protocols, garbling even a single AND gate requires computing O(n) multiplications
over a large field using Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE) or MPC. This means they
scale at least cubically in the number of parties. In constrast, our protocol only requires one F2
multiplication per AND gate, so scales with O(n2). Previous SHE-based protocols also require
zero-knowledge proofs of plaintext knowledge of SHE ciphertexts, which in practice are very
costly. The MASCOT protocol [80] for secure computation of arithmetic circuits could also be
used in [93] instead of SHE, but this still has very high communication costs. We denote by
MASCOT-BMR-FX an optimized variant of [93], modified to use Free-XOR as in our protocol, with
multiplications in F2κ done using MASCOT. Finally, a work by Katz et al. [129], concurrent to the
one this chapter is based on, relies on an optimized variant of TinyOT and achieves comparable
performance results. Table 4.1 shows how the communication complexity of our work compares
with other actively secure, constant-round protocols.
Whereas later on [129] also reported implementation results, at the time the work here
presented was submitted [70], none of the previous results did so. Our implementation of the
TinyOT-based protocol improves upon the best times that would be achievable with SPDZ-BMR
and MASCOT by up to sixty times. This is because our protocol has lower communication costs
than [93] (by at least two orders of magnitude) and the main computational costs are from
standard symmetric primitives, so far cheaper than using SHE.
Overall, our protocols significantly narrow the gap between the cost of constant-round and
many-round MPC protocols for binary circuits. More specifically, this implies that, with current
techniques, constant round MPC for binary circuits is not much more expensive than practical,
non-constant round protocols. Additionally, both of our protocols have potential for future im-
provement by optimizing existing non-constant round protocols: a practical implementation of
MiniMAC [49] would lead to a very efficient approach with our generic protocol, whilst any future
improvements to multi-party TinyOT would directly give a similar improvement to our second
protocol.
4.1.1 Our Contributions
Our constructions employ several very appealing features. For a start, we embed into the
modelling of the preprocessing functionality, which computes the garbled circuit, an additive
error introduced into the garbling by the adversary. Concretely, we extend the functionality from
[93] so that it obtains a vector of additive errors from the adversary to be applied to each garbled
gate, which captures the fact that the adversary may submit inconsistent keys and pseudorandom
function (PRF) values. We further strengthen this by allowing the adversary to pick the error
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Protocol Based on Free XOR Comms. per Garbled Gate
SPDZ-BMR [93] SHE + ZKPoPK 7 O(n4κ)
SHE-BMR §3 SHE (depth 4) + ZKPoPK 7 O(n3κ)
MASCOT-BMR-FX OT 3 O(n3κ2)
This work §4.3 OT + [75] 3 O(n2κ+poly(n))
This work §4.4 TinyOT 3 O(n2B2κ)
[129] (concurrent) Optimized TinyOT 3 O(n2Bκ)
Table 4.1: Comparison of actively secure, constant round MPC protocols. B = O(1+ s/ log |C|) is
a cut-and-choose parameter, which in practice is between 3–5. Our second protocol can also be
based upon optimized TinyOT to obtain the same complexity as [129].
adaptively after seeing the garbled circuit (in prior constructions this error is independent of the
garbling) and allowing corrupt parties to choose their own PRF keys, possibly not at random.
This requires a new analysis and proof of the online phase.
Secondly, we devise a new consistency check to enforce correctness of inputs to correlated OT,
which is based on very efficient linear operations similar to recent advances in homomorphic
commitments [37]. This check, combined with our improved error analysis for the online phase,
allows the garbled circuit to be created without authenticating any of the parties’ keys or PRF
values, which removes a significant cost from previous works (saving a factor of Ω(n)).
GENERIC CONSTRUCTION (SECTION 4.3). In the first, more general method, every pair of par-
ties needs to run one correlated OT per AND gate, which costs O(κ) communication for
security parameter κ. Combining this with the overhead induced by the correlated OTs in
our protocol, we obtain total complexity O(|C|κn2), assuming only symmetric primitives
and O(κ) seed OTs between every pair of parties. This gives an overall communication cost
of O(M+|C|κn2) to evaluate a circuit C, where M is the cost of evaluating |C| AND gates
in the secret-sharing based protocol, Π. To realize Π, we can define a functionality with
multiplication depth 1 that computes all the AND gates in parallel (these multiplications
can be computed in parallel as they are independent of the parties’ inputs). Furthermore,
the [75] compiler can be instantiated with semi-honest [64] as the inner protocol and [43] as
the outer protocol. By Theorem 2, Section 5 from [75], for some constant number of parties
m ≥ 2, the functionality can be computed with communication complexity O(|C|) plus low
order terms that depend on a statistical parameter s, the circuit’s depth and log |C|. As
in [75], this extends to the case of a non-constant number of parties n, in which case the
communication complexity grows by an additional factor of |C|poly(n).
Another candidate for instantiating Π would be to use an MPC protocol optimized for SIMD
binary circuits such as MiniMAC [49]. This is because in our construction, all the AND
gates can be computed in parallel. Currently, the only known preprocessing methods [58]
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for MiniMAC are not practical, but this seems to be an interesting direction to explore.
TINYOT-BASED CONSTRUCTION (SECTION 4.4). TinyOT is currently the most practical ap-
proach to secret-sharing based MPC on binary circuits, so the second method leads to
a highly practical protocol for constant-round secure computation. The complexity is es-
sentially the same as TinyOT, as here we do not require any additional OTs. However, the
protocol is less general and has worse asymptotic communication complexity, since TinyOT
costs either O(|C|Bκn2) (with 2 parties or the recent protocol of [128]), or O(|C|B2κn2)
(with [58]), where B =O(1+ s/ log |C|) (and in practice is between 3–5), and s is the statisti-
cal security parameter.
The results of our work, particularly regarding our modelling of circuit-garbling, have already
proved to be useful for other authors as explicitly mentioned in [27, 67]. Remarkably, those works
had very different goals: Whereas [27] improves the efficiency of BMR-style protocols in the
honest majority setting, [67] provides the first round-optimal actively secure MPC protocol under
standard assumptions.
4.1.1.1 Implementation.
We demonstrate the practicality of our TinyOT-based protocol with an implementation, and
perform experiments with up to 9 parties securely computing the AES and SHA-256 circuits. In a
1Gbps LAN setting, we can securely compute the AES circuit with 9 parties in just 620ms. This
improves upon the best possible performance that would be attainable using [93] by around 60
times. The details of our implementation can be found in Section 4.6.
4.1.1.2 Concurrent work
Two works by Wang, Ranellucci and Katz, concurrent to the one described in this chapter,
introduced constant round two-party [128] and multi-party [129] protocols based on authenticated
garbling, in which the preprocessing phase is based on TinyOT. The less general part of our work
is conceptually quite similar, since both involve generating a garbled circuit in a distributed
manner using TinyOT. The main difference seems to be that our protocol is symmetric, since
all parties evaluate the same garbled circuit. With authenticated garbling, the garbled circuit
is only evaluated by one party. This makes the garbled circuit slightly smaller, since there
are n−1 sets of keys instead of n, but the online phase requires at least one more round of
interaction (if all parties learn the output). The works of Wang et al. also contain concrete and
asymptotic improvements to the two-party and multi-party TinyOT protocols, which improve
upon our protocol in Section 4.7 by a factor of O(s/ log |C|) where s is a statistical parameter. These
improvements can be directly plugged into our second garbling protocol. We remark that the two-
party protocol in [128] inspired our use of TinyOT MACs to perform the bit/string multiplications
in our protocol from Section 4.4. The rest of our work is independent. Another difference is that
54
4.1. INTRODUCTION
our protocol from Section 4.3 is more generic, since FBit×Bit can be implemented with any secret-
sharing based bit-MPC protocol, rather than just TinyOT. This can be instantiated with [75] to
obtain a constant-round protocol with complexity O(|C|(κn2 +poly(n))) in the OT-hybrid model.
The multi-party paper [129] does not have an analogous generic result.
4.1.2 Technical Overview
Our protocol is based on the recent Free-XOR variant of BMR garbling used for semi-honest MPC
in [25]. In that scheme, a garbling of the g-th AND gate with input wires u,v and output wire w,










r j((λu ⊕a)(λv ⊕b)⊕λw)
)
, (a,b) ∈ {0,1}2, j ∈ [n]
Here, F is a double-key PRF1, r j ∈ {0,1}κ is a fixed correlation string for Free-XOR known to




v,b ∈ {0,1}κ are also known to P j. Furthermore, the wire masks
λu,λv,λw ∈ {0,1} are random, additively secret-shared bits known by no single party.
Let us give an overview of BMR, as described in Section 2.6, when the ‘vector double en-
cryption’ is instantiated using PRFs as in equation (4.1). The main idea behind BMR in this
case is to compute the garbling, except for the PRF values, with a general MPC protocol. The
analysis of [93] showed that it is not necessary to prove in zero-knowledge that every party inputs
the correct PRF values to the MPC protocol that computes the garbling. This is because when
evaluating the garbled circuit, each party P j can check that the decryption of the j-th entry in
every garbled gate gives one of the keys k jw,0, k
j
w,1 and this check would overwhelmingly fail if any
PRF value was incorrect. It further implies that the adversary cannot flip the value transmitted
through some wire as that would require from it to guess a key.
Our garbling protocol proceeds by computing a random, unauthenticated, additive secret
sharing of the garbled circuit. This differs from previous works which obtain authenticated shar-
ings of the entire garbled circuit (e.g. [93] uses MACs and Chapter 3 employs SHE ciphertexts).
Our protocol greatly reduces this complexity, since the PRF values and keys (on the first line
of equation (4.1)) do not need to be authenticated. The main challenge, therefore, is to compute
shares of the products on the second line of (4.1). Similarly to [25], an important observation that
improves efficiency is the fact that these multiplications are either between two secret-shared
bits, or a secret-shared bit and a fixed, secret string. Thus, we do not need the full power of an
1Actually, as enabling Free-XOR causes all the keys pairs for any wire to be correlated, we need a more advanced
notion which we present in Section 4.2.2.
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MPC protocol for arithmetic circuit evaluation over F2κ or Fp (for large p), as used in previous
works.
To compute the bit product λu ·λv, we can use any actively secure GMW-style MPC protocol
for binary circuits. This protocol is only needed for computing one secure AND per garbled AND
gate, since all bit products in g̃ ja,b can be computed as linear combinations of λu ·λv, λu and λv.
We then need to multiply the resulting secret-shared bits by the string r j, known to P j. We give
two variants for computing this product, the first one being more general and the second more
concretely efficient. In more details,
1. The first solution performs the multiplication by running actively secure correlated OT
between P j and every other party, where P j inputs r j as the fixed OT correlation. The
parties then run a consistency check by applying a universal linear hash function to the
outputs and sacrificing a few OTs, ensuring the correct inputs were provided to the OT.
This protocol is presented in Section 4.3.
2. The second method requires using a ‘TinyOT’-style protocol [34, 58] based on information-
theoretic MACs, and allows us to compute the bit/string products directly from the MACs,
provided each party’s MAC key is chosen to be the same string r j used in the garbling. This
saves interaction since we do not need any additional OTs. This protocol is presented in
Section 4.4.
After creating shares of all these products, the parties can compute shares of the whole
garbled circuit. These shares must then be rerandomized, before they can be broadcast. Opening
the garbled circuit in this way allows a corrupt party to introduce further errors into the garbling
by changing their share, even after learning the correct garbled circuit, since we may have a
rushing adversary. Nevertheless, we prove that the BMR online phase remains secure when this
type of error is allowed, as it would only lead to an abort. This significantly strengthens the
result from [93], which only allowed corrupt parties to provide incorrect PRF values, and is an
important factor that allows our preprocessing protocol to be so efficient.
4.2 Preliminaries
For vectors x= (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Fn2 and y ∈ Fm2 , the tensor product (or outer product) x⊗ y is defined as
the n×m matrix over F2 where the i-th row is xi · y. We use the following property.
Fact 4.2.1. If x ∈ Fn2 , y ∈ Fm2 and M ∈ Fm×n2 then
M · (x⊗ y)= (M · x)⊗ y.
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4.2.1 Security and Communication Models
We prove security of our protocols in the Universal Composability framework (see Section 2.4).
The adversary model we consider is a static, active adversary who corrupts up to n−1 out of n
parties. We recall this means that the identities of the corrupted parties are fixed at the beginning
of the protocol, and they may deviate arbitrarily from the protocol.
We assume all parties are connected via authenticated communication channels, as well as
secure point-to-point channels and a broadcast channel. The default method of communication in
the protocols in this chapter is authenticated channels, unless otherwise specified. Note that in
practice, these can all be implemented with standard techniques (in particular, for broadcast a
simple 2-round protocol suffices, since we allow abort [65]).
4.2.2 Circular 2-Correlation Robust Pseudorandom Functions
The BMR garbling technique from [93] is proven secure based on a pseudorandom function (PRF)
with multiple keys. When the keys are independently chosen then security with multiple keys can
be derived from the standard PRF notion (defined in Section 2.2.2) by a simple hybrid argument.
However, since our scheme supports Free-XOR, we require a stronger assumption, discussed
next.
We adapt the definition of correlation robustness with circularity from [40] given for hash
functions to double-key PRFs. This definition captures the related key and circularity re-
quirements induced by supporting the Free-XOR technique. Formally, fix some function F :
{0,1}n×{0,1}κ×{0,1}κ 7→ {0,1}κ. Let b1,b2,b3 take values in {0,1}, and k1,k2,r in {0,1}κ. We define
an oracle Circr as follows:
• Circr(k1,k2, g, j,b1,b2,b3) outputs Fk1⊕b1r,k2⊕b2r(g‖ j)⊕b3r.
The outcome of oracle Circ is compared with the a random string of the same length computed by
an oracle Rand:
• Rand(k1,k2, g, j,b1,b2,b3): if this input was queried before then return the answer given
previously. Otherwise choose u ← {0,1}κ and return u.
Definition 4.1 (Circular 2-correlation robust PRF). A PRF F is circular 2-correlation robust if
for any non-uniform polynomial-time distinguisher D making legal queries to its oracle, there
exists a negligible function negl such that:
∣∣Pr[r ← {0,1}κ;DCircr(·)(1κ)= 1]−Pr[DRand(·)(1κ)= 1]∣∣≤ negl(κ).
As in [40], some trivial queries must be ruled out. Specifically, the distinguisher is restricted
as follows: (1) it is not allowed to make any query of the form O (k1,k2, g, j,0,0,b3) (since it can
compute Fk1,k2 (g‖ j) on its own) and (2) it is not allowed to query both tuples O (k1,k2, g, j,b1,b2,0)
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and O (k1,k2, g, j,b1,b2,1) for any values k1,k2, g, j,b1,b2 (since that would allow it to trivially
recover the global difference). We say that any distinguisher respecting these restrictions makes
legal queries.
4.2.3 Almost-1-Universal Linear Hashing
We use a family of almost-1-universal linear hash functions over F2, defined by:
Definition 4.2 (Almost-1-Universal Linear Hashing). We say that a family H of linear functions




where H is chosen uniformly at random from the family H . We will identify functions H ∈H
with their s×m transformation matrix, and write H(x)= H · x.
This definition is slightly stronger than a family of almost-universal linear hash functions
(where the above need only hold for y = 0, as in [37]). However, this is still much weaker than
2-universality (or pairwise independence), which a linear family of hash functions cannot achieve,
because H(0) = 0 always. The two main properties affecting the efficiency of a family of hash
functions are the seed size, which refers to the length of the description of a random function
H ← H , and the computational complexity of evaluating the function. The simplest family of
almost-1-universal hash functions is the set of all s×m matrices; however, this is not efficient as
the seed size and complexity are both O(m · s). Recently, in [37], it was shown how to construct a
family with seed size O(s) and complexity O(m), which is asymptotically optimal. A more practical
construction is a polynomial hash based on GMAC (used also in [107]), described as follows (here
we assume that s divides m, for simplicity):
• Sample a random seed α← F2s
• Define Hα to be the function:
Hα : Fm/s2s → F2s , Hα(x1, . . . , xm/s)=α · x1 +α2 · x2 +·· ·+αm/s · xm/s
Note that by viewing elements of F2s as vectors in Fs2, multiplication by a fixed field element
αi ∈ F2s is linear over F2. Therefore, Hα can be seen as an F2-linear map, represented by a
unique matrix in Fs×m2 .
Here, the seed is short, but the computational complexity is O(m · s). However, in practice
when s = 128 the finite field multiplications can be performed very efficiently in hardware on
modern CPUs. Note that this gives a 1-universal family with ε= ms ·2−s. This can be improved to





We use a commitment functionality FCommit (Figure 4.1). This can be implemented in the random
oracle model by defining Commit(x,Pi)=H(x, i, r), where H is a random oracle and r ← {0,1}κ.
Functionality FCommit
Commit: On input (Commit, x, i,τx) from Pi, store (x, i,τx) and output (i,τx) to all parties.
Open: On input (Open, i,τx) by Pi, output (x, i,τx) to all parties.
If instead (NoOpen, i,τx) is given by the adversary, and Pi is corrupt, the functionality outputs
(⊥, i,τx) to all parties.
Figure 4.1: Commitments functionality.
4.2.5 Coin-Tossing Functionality
We also require a standard coin-tossing functionality, FRand (Figure 4.2), which can be imple-
mented using commitments (FCommit above) to random values.
Functionality FRand
Upon receiving (rand,S) from all parties, where S is any efficiently sampleable set, sample r ← S,
send r to A and wait for its input. If A inputs OK then output r to all parties, otherwise output ⊥.
Figure 4.2: Coin-tossing functionality.
4.2.6 Correlated Oblivious Transfer
In this work we use an actively secure protocol for oblivious transfer (OT) on correlated pairs
of strings of the form (ai,ai ⊕∆), where ∆ is fixed for every OT. The TinyOT protocol [104] for
secure two-party computation constructs such a protocol, and a significantly optimized version of
this is given in [107]. The communication cost is roughly κ+ s bits per OT. The ideal functionality
is shown in Figure 4.3.
Fixed Correlation OT Functionality F∆-ROT
Initialize: Upon receiving (init,∆), where ∆ ∈ {0,1}κ from PS and (init) from PR , store ∆. Ignore
any subsequent initcommands.
Extend: Upon receiving (extend, x1, . . . , xm) from PR , where xi ∈ {0,1}, and (extend) from PS , do the
following:
• Sample ti ∈ {0,1}κ, for i ∈ [m]. If PR is corrupted then wait for A to input ti.
• Compute qi = ti + xi ·∆, for i ∈ [m].
• If PS is corrupted then wait for A to input qi ∈ {0,1}κ and recompute ti = qi + xi ·∆.
• Output ti to PR and qi to PS , for i ∈ [m].
Figure 4.3: Fixed correlation oblivious transfer functionality.
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The Bit MPC Functionality - FBit×Bit
The functionality runs with parties P1, . . . ,Pn and an adversary A . The functionality maintains a
dictionary, Val← {}, to keep track of values in F2.
Input: On receiving (Input,id1, . . . ,id`, x1, . . . , x`,P j) from party P j and (Input,id1, . . . ,id`,P j) from
all other parties, where xi ∈ F2, store Val[idi]← xi for i ∈ [`].
Add: On input (Add,id,id1, . . . ,id`) from all parties, where (id1, . . . ,id`) are keys in Val, set
Val[id]←∑`i=1Val[idi].
Multiply: On input (multiply,id,id1,id2) from all parties, where (id1,id2) are keys in Val, com-
pute y ← Val[id1] ·Val[id2]. Receive shares yi ∈ F2 from A , for i ∈ I, then sample random
honest parties’ shares y j ∈ F2, for j ∉ I, such that ∑ni=1 yi = y. Send yi to party Pi, for i ∈ [n], and
store the value Val[id]← y.
Open: On input (Open,id) from all parties, where id is a key in Val, send x ← Val[id] to A . Wait for
an input from A . If it inputs OK then output x to all parties, otherwise output ⊥ and terminate.
Figure 4.4: Functionality for GMW-style MPC for binary circuits.
4.2.7 Functionality for Secret-Sharing-Based MPC
We make use of a general, actively secure protocol for secret-sharing-based MPC for binary
circuits, which is modeled by the functionality FBit×Bit in Figure 4.4. This functionality allows
parties to provide private inputs, which are then stored and can be added or multiplied internally
by FBit×Bit, and revealed if desired. Note that we also need the Multiply command to output a
random additive secret-sharing of the product to all parties, which is the main difference with
the generic MPC functionality given in Figure 2.1 and essentially assumes that the underlying
protocol is based on secret-sharing.
We use the notation 〈x〉 to represent a secret-shared value x that is stored internally by
FBit×Bit, and define xi to be party Pi ’s additive share of x (if it is known). We also define the +
and · operators on two shared values 〈x〉,〈y〉 to call the Add and Multiply commands of FBit×Bit,
respectively, and return the identifier associated with the result.
4.3 Generic Protocol for Multi-Party Garbling
We now describe our generic method for creating the garbled circuit using any secret-sharing
based MPC protocol (modeled by FBit×Bit) and the correlated OT functionality F∆-ROT. We first
describe the functionality in Section 4.3.1 and the protocol in Section 4.3.2, and then analyse its
security in Sections 4.3.4–4.3.5.
4.3.1 The Preprocessing Functionality
The preprocessing functionality, formalized in Figure 4.5, captures the generation of the garbled
circuit as well as an error introduced by the adversary. The adversary is allowed to submit
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an additive error, chosen adaptively after seeing the garbled circuit, which is added by the
functionality to each entry when the garbled circuit is opened.
4.3.2 Protocol Overview
The garbling protocol, shown in Figure 4.6, proceeds in three main stages. Firstly, the parties
locally sample all of their keys and shares of wire masks for the garbled circuit. Secondly, the
parties compute shares of the products of the wire masks and each party’s global difference string;
these are then used by each party to locally obtain a share of the entire garbled circuit. Finally,
the bit masks for the output wires are opened to all parties. The opening of the garbled circuit is
shown in Figure 4.7.
Concretely, each party Pi starts by sampling a global difference string r i ← {0,1}κ, and for
each wire w which is an output wire of an AND gate, or an input wire, Pi also samples the keys
kiw,0, k
i
w,1 = kiw,0 ⊕ r i and an additive share of the wire mask, λiw ← F2. As in [25], we let Pi input
the actual wire mask (instead of a share) for every input wire associated with Pi ’s input.
In step 4.3.2, the parties compute additive shares of the bit products λuv = λu ·λv ∈ F2, and
then, for each j ∈ [n], shares of:
(4.2) λu · r j, λv · r j, λuvw · r j ∈ Fκ2
where λuvw :=λuv ⊕λw, and u,v and w are the input and output wires of AND gate g. We note
that (as observed in [25]) only one bit/bit product and 3n bit/string products are necessary, even
though each gate has 4n entries, due to correlations between the entries, as can be seen below.
We compute the bit multiplications using the FBit×Bit functionality on the bits that are
already stored by FBit×Bit. To compute the bit/string multiplications in equation (4.2), we use
correlated OT, followed by a consistency check to verify that the parties provided the correct
shares of λw and correlation r i to each F∆-ROT instance; see Section 4.3.3 for details.
Using shares of the bit/string products, the parties can locally compute an unauthenticated
additive share of the entire garbled circuit (steps 3d–4). First, for each of the four values (a,b) ∈
{0,1}2, each party Pi, i 6= j computes the share
ρ ij,a,b =
a · (λv · r
j)i ⊕b · (λu · r j)i ⊕ (λuvw ·R j)i if i 6= j
a · (λv · r j)i ⊕b · (λu · r j)i ⊕ (λuvw ·R j)i ⊕a ·b · r j if i = j
These define additive shares of the values
ρ j,a,b = R j · (a ·λv ⊕b ·λu ⊕λuvw ⊕a ·b)
= r j · ((λu ⊕a) · (λv ⊕b)⊕λw)
Each party’s share of the garbled circuit is then obtained by adding the appropriate PRF
values and keys to the shares of each ρ j,a,b. To conclude the Garbling stage, the parties reveal
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Functionality FPreprocessing
Let F be a circular 2-correlation robust PRF. The functionality runs with parties P1, . . . ,Pn and an
adversary A , who corrupts a subset I ⊂ [n] of parties.
Garbling: On input (Garbling,C f ) from all parties, where C f is a boolean circuit, denote by W its
set of wires and by G its set of AND gates. The functionality is defined as follows:
• Sample a global difference r j ← {0,1}κ, for each j ∉ I, and receive corrupt parties’ strings
r i ∈ {0,1}κ from A , for i ∈ I.
• Passing topologically through all the wires w ∈W of the circuit:
– If w is an input wire:
1. Sample λw ← {0,1}. If P j, the party who provides input on that wire in the online
phase, is corrupt, instead receive λw from A .
2. Sample a key k jw,0 ← {0,1}κ, for each j ∉ I, and receive corrupt parties’ keys kiw,0
from A , for i ∈ I. Define kiw,1 = kiw,0 ⊕ r i for all i ∈ [n].
– If w is the output of an AND gate:
1. Sample λw ← {0,1}.
2. Sample a key k jw,0 ← {0,1}κ, for each j ∉ I, and receive corrupt parties’ keys kiw,0
from A , for i ∈ I. Set kiw,1 = kiw,0 ⊕ r i, for i ∈ [n].
– If w is the output of a XOR gate, and u and v its input wires:
1. Compute and store λw =λu ⊕λv.
2. For i ∈ [n], set kiw,0 = kiu,0 ⊕kiv,0 and kiw,1 = kiw,0 ⊕ r i.












r j · ((λu ⊕a) · (λv ⊕b)⊕λw)
)
, (a,b) ∈ {0,1}2, j ∈ [n].
Set g̃a,b = g̃1a,b ◦ . . .◦ g̃na,b (a,b) ∈ {0,1}2. The functionality stores the values g̃a,b.
• Wait for an input from A . If it inputs OK then output λw to all parties for each circuit-
output wire w, and output to each Pi all the keys {kiw,0}w∈W , and r
i. Otherwise, output ⊥
and terminate.
Open Garbling: On receiving (OpenGarbling) from all parties, when the Garbling command has
already run successfully, the functionality sends to A the values g̃a,b for all g ∈G and waits for
a reply.
• If A returns ⊥ then the functionality aborts.
• Otherwise, the functionality receives OK and an additive error e = {ea,bg }a,b∈{0,1},g∈G chosen
by A . Afterwards, it sends to all parties the garbled circuit g̃a,b ⊕ ea,bg for all g ∈G and
a,b ∈ {0,1}.
Figure 4.5: The Preprocessing Functionality FPreprocessing.
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The Preprocessing Protocol – ΠPreprocessing
Given a gate g, we denote by u (resp. v) its left (resp. right) input wire, and by w its output wire. 〈·〉i
denotes the i-th share of an authenticated bit and (·)i the i-th share of a string. Let F : {0,1}2κ× [|G|]×
[n]→ {0,1}κ be a circular 2-correlation robust PRF, and G : {0,1}κ→ {0,1}4nκ|G| be a PRG.
Garbling: 1. Each party Pi samples a random key offset r i ← Fκ2 .
2. Generate wire masks and keys: Passing through the wires of the circuit topologically:
• If w is a circuit-input wire, and P j is the party whose input is associated with it:
a) P j calls Input on FBit×Bit with a randomly sampled λw ∈ {0,1} to obtain 〈λw〉. P j
defines the share λ jw =λw, every other Pi sets λiw = 0.
b) Every Pi samples a key kiw,0 ← {0,1}κ and sets kiw,1 = kiw,0 ⊕ r i.
• If the wire w is the output of an AND gate:
a) Each Pi calls Input on FBit×Bit with a randomly sampled λiw ← {0,1}. The parties
then compute the secret-shared wire mask as 〈λw〉 =∑i∈[n]〈λiw〉.
b) Every Pi samples a key kiw,0 ← {0,1}κ and sets kiw,1 = kiw,0 ⊕ r i.
• If the wire w is the output of a XOR gate:
a) The parties compute the mask on the output wire as 〈λw〉 = 〈λu〉+〈λv〉.
b) Every Pi sets kiw,0 = kiu,0 ⊕kiv,0 and kiw,1 = kiw,0 ⊕ r i.
3. Secure product computations:
a) For each AND gate g ∈G, the parties compute 〈λuv〉 = 〈λu〉 · 〈λv〉 by calling Multiply
on FBit×Bit.
b) Each Pi calls Input on FBit×Bit with randomly sampled bits x̂i1, . . . , x̂
i
s. For ` ∈ [s], the
parties compute secret-shared mask 〈x̂`〉 =∑i∈[n]〈x̂i`〉.
c) For every j ∈ [n], the parties run the subprotocol ΠBit×String, where P j inputs r j and
everyone inputs the 3|G|+ s shared bits:
(〈λu〉,〈λv〉,〈λuv〉+〈λw〉)(u,v,w) and (〈x̂1〉, . . . ,〈x̂s〉).
where the (u,v,w) indices are taken over the input/output wires of each AND gate
g ∈G.
d) For each AND gate g ∈G, party Pi obtains from ΠBit×String an additive share of the
3n values (each defined as one row of the matrix Z j in this subprotocol):
λu · r j, λv · r j, λuvw · r j, for j ∈ [n]
where λuvw :=λuv +λw. Each Pi then uses these to compute a share of
ρ j,a,b =λuvw · r j ⊕a ·λv · r j ⊕b ·λu · r j ⊕a ·b · r j
4. Garble gates: For each AND gate g ∈ G, each j ∈ [n], and the four combinations of
a,b ∈ {0,1}2, the parties compute shares of the j-th entry of the garbled gate g̃a,b:
• P j sets ( g̃
j
a,b)
j = ρ jj,a,b ⊕Fk ju,a,k jv,b (g‖ j)⊕k
j
w,0.
• For every i 6= j, Pi sets ( g̃ ja,b)i = ρ ij,a,b ⊕Fkiu,a,kiv,b (g‖ j).
5. Reveal masks for output wires: For every circuit-output-wire w, the parties call Open
on FBit×Bit to reveal λw to all the parties.
Figure 4.6: The preprocessing protocol that realizes FPreprocessing in the
{F∆-ROT,FBit×Bit,FRand FCommit}-hybrid model.
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The Preprocessing Protocol ΠPreprocessing – Open Garbling Stage
Open Garbling: Let C̃ i = (( g̃ ja,b)i) j,a,b,g ∈ {0,1}4nκ|G| be Pi ’s share of the whole garbled circuit.
1. Each party Pi samples random seeds sij ← {0,1}κ, j 6= i. Pi sends sij to P j over a private
channel.
2. Pi computes the shares S ii =
⊕




i ), for j 6= i.a
3. Each Pi, for i = 2, . . . ,n, sends C̃ i ⊕⊕nj=1 S ji to P1.
4. P1 reconstructs the garbled circuit, C̃, and broadcasts this.
aSteps 1 to 2 are independent of C̃ i , so can be merged with previous rounds in the Garbling stage.
Figure 4.7: Open Garbling stage of the preprocessing protocol.
the masks for all output wires using FBit×Bit, so that the outputs can be obtained in the online
phase.
Before opening the garbled circuit, the parties must rerandomize their shares by distributing
a fresh, random secret-sharing of each share to the other parties, via private channels. This
is needed so that the shares do not leak any information on the PRF values, so we can prove
security. This may seem unnecessary, since the inclusion of the PRF values in the shares should
randomize them sufficiently. However, we cannot prove this intuition: the same PRF values are
used to compute the garbled circuit that is output by the protocol, so they cannot also be used as
a one-time pad.2 In steps 1 to 2 of Figure 4.7, we show how to perform this extra rerandomization
step with O(n2 ·κ) communication.
Finally, to reconstruct the garbled circuit, the parties sum up and broadcast the rerandomized
shares and add them together to get g̃ ja,b.
4.3.3 Bit/String Multiplications
Our method for this is in the subrotocol ΠBit×String (Figure 4.8). It proceeds in two stages: first
the Multiply step creates the shared products, then the Consistency Check verifies that the
correct inputs were used to create the products.
Recall that the task is for the parties to obtain an additive sharing of the products, for each
j ∈ [n] and (a,b) ∈ {0,1}2:
(4.3) r j · ((λu ⊕a) · (λv ⊕b)⊕λw)
where the string r j is known only to P j, and fixed for every gate. Denote by x one of the additively
shared λ(·) bits used in a single bit/string product and stored by FBit×Bit. We obtain shares of
x · r j using actively secure correlated OT (see Figure 4.3), as follows:
2Furthermore, the environment sees all of the PRF keys of the honest parties, since these are outputs of the
protocol, which seems to rule out any kind of computational reduction in the security proof.
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1. For each i 6= j, parties Pi and P j run a correlated OT, with choice bit xi and correlation r j.
Pi obtains Ti, j and P j obtains Q i, j such that:
Ti, j =Q i, j + xi · r j.









Q i, j + x j · r j =
∑
i 6= j
(Ti, j +Q i, j)+ x j · r j = x · r j
as required.
The above method is performed 3|G| times and for each P j, to produce the shared bit/string
products x · r j, for x ∈ {λu,λv,λuv}.
4.3.4 Consistency Check
We now show how the parties verify that the correct shares of x and correlations r j were used in
the correlated OTs, and analyse the security of this check. The parties first create m+ s bit/string
products, where m is the number of products needed and s is a statistical security parameter,
and then open random linear combinations (over F2) of all the products and check correctness of
the opened results. This is possible because the products are just a linear function of the fixed
string r j. In more detail, the parties first sample a random ε-almost 1-universal hash function
H ← Fm×s2 , and then open
cx = H · x+ x̂
using FBit×Bit. Here, x is the vector of all m wire masks to be multiplied, whilst x̂ ∈ Fs2 are
the additional, random masking bits, used as a one-time pad to ensure that cx does not leak
information on x.
To verify that a single shared matrix Z j is equal to x⊗R j (as in Figure 4.8), each party Pi,
for i 6= j, then commits to H ·Z ij, whilst P j commits to H ·Z
j
j + cx ⊗ r j. The parties then open
all commitments and check that these sum to zero, which should happen if the products were
correct.
The intuition behind the check is that any errors present in the original bit/string products
will remain when multiplied by H, except with probability ε, by the almost-1-universal property
(Definition 4.2). Furthermore, it turns out that cancelling out any non-zero errors in the check
requires either guessing an honest party’s global difference r j, or guessing the secret masking
bits x̂. We formalize this, by first considering the exact deviations that are possible by a corrupt
P j in ΠBit×String. These are:
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Bit/string multiplication subprotocol – ΠBit×String
Inputs: Each P j inputs the private global difference string r j ∈ Fκ2 , which was generated in the main
protocol. All parties input 3|G| authenticated, additively shared bits, 〈x1〉, . . . ,〈x3|G|〉, and s additional,
random shared bits, 〈x̂1〉, . . . ,〈x̂s〉, to be used as masking values and discarded.
I: Init: Every ordered pair of parties (Pi,P j) calls Initialize on F∆-ROT, where P j, the sender, inputs
the global difference string R j.
II: Multiply: For each j ∈ [n], the parties do as follows:
1. For every i 6= j, parties Pi and P j call Extend on the F∆-ROT instance where P j is sender,
and Pi inputs the choice bits xi = (xi1, . . . , xi3|G|, x̂i1, . . . , x̂is).
For each OT between (Pi,P j), P j receives q ∈ {0,1}κ and Pi receives t ∈ {0,1}κ. Pi stores
their 3|G|+ s strings from this instance into the rows of a matrix T i, j, and P j stores the
corresponding outputs in Q i, j. These satisfy
T i, j =Q i, j + xi ⊗ r j ∈ F(3|G|+s)×κ2 .




i 6= j Q i, j + x j ⊗ r j.




j = x⊗ r j, for each j ∈ [n].
III: Consistency Check: The parties check correctness of the above as follows:
1. Each Pi removes the last s rows from Z ij (for j ∈ [n]) and places these ‘dummy’ masking
values in a matrix Ẑ ij ∈ Fs×κ2 . Similarly, redefine xi = (xi1, . . . , xi3|G|) and let x̂i = (x̂1 i, . . . , x̂s i).
2. The parties call FRand (Figure 4.2) to sample a seed for a uniformly random, ε-almost
1-universal linear hash function, H ∈ Fs×3|G|2 .
3. All parties compute the vector:
〈cx〉 = H · 〈x〉 +〈x̂〉 ∈ Fs2
and open cx using the Open command of FBit×Bit. If FBit×Bit aborts, the parties abort.
4. Each party Pi calls Commit on FCommit (Figure 4.1) with input the n matrices:
C ij = H ·Z ij + Ẑ
i
j, for j 6= i, and C ii = H ·Z ii + Ẑ
i
i + cx ⊗ r i.
5. All parties open their commitments and check that, for each j ∈ [n]
n∑
i=1
C ij = 0.
If the check fails, the parties abort.
6. Each party Pi stores the matrices Z i1, . . . , Z
i
n.
Figure 4.8: Subprotocol for bit/string multiplication and checking consistency.
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1. Provide inconsistent inputs r j when acting as sender in the Initialize command of the
F∆-ROT instances with two different honest parties.
2. Input an incorrect share x j when acting as receiver in the Extend command of F∆-ROT.
Note that in both of these cases, we are only concerned when the other party in the F∆-ROT
execution is honest, as if both parties are corrupt then F∆-ROT does not need to be simulated in
the security proof.
We model these two attacks by defining r j,i and x j,i to be the actual inputs used by a corrupt
P j in the above two cases, and then define the errors (for j ∈ I and i ∉ I):








, ` ∈ [3|G|].
Note that ∆ j,i is fixed in the initialization of F∆-ROT, whilst δ
j,i
`
may be different for every OT.
Whenever Pi and P j are both corrupt, or both honest, for convenience we define ∆ j,i = 0 and
δ j,i = 0. This means the outputs of F∆-ROT with (Pi,P j) then satisfy (omitting ` subscripts)
ti, j = qi, j + xi · r j +δi, j · r j +∆ j,i · xi,
where δi, j 6= 0 if Pi cheated, and ∆ j,i 6= 0 if P j cheated.
Now, as in step 1 of the first stage of ΠBit×String, we can put the F∆-ROT outputs for each party
into the rows of a matrix, and express the above as:
T i, j =Q i, j + xi ⊗ r j +δi, j ⊗ r j + xi ⊗∆ j,i
where δ j,i = (δ j,i1 , . . . ,δ
j,i
3|G|), and the tensor product notation is defined in Section 4.2.
Accounting for these errors in the outputs of the Multiply step in ΠBit×String, we get:
(4.4) Z j =
n∑
i=1
Z ij = x⊗ r j +
∑
i∈I





The following lemma demonstrates that if a party cheated, then to pass the check they must
either guess all of the shares x̂i ∈ Fs2 for some honest Pi, or guess Pi ’s global difference R i (except
with negligible probability over the choice of the ε-almost 1-universal hash function, H).
Lemma 4.3.1. If the check in ΠBit×String passes, then except with probability max(2−s,ε+2−κ), all
of the errors δ j,∆i, j are zero.
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Notice that steps 4–5 of the check in Figure 4.8 perform n individual checks on the matrices
Z1, . . . , Zn in parallel. Fix j, and first consider the check for a single matrix Z j. From here, we
omit the subscript j to simplify notation.
Let (C∗)i, for i ∈ I, be the values committed to by corrupt parties in step 4, and define
C̃ i =
H ·Z
i + Ẑ i, if i 6= j
H ·Z i + Ẑ i + cx ⊗ r i, if i = j
to be the value which a corrupt Pi should have committed to.
Denote the difference between what a corrupt Pi actually committed to, and what they should
have committed to, by:
D i = (C∗)i + C̃ i ∈ Fs×κ2 .
Also, define the sum of the differences D I =∑i∈I D i. To pass the consistency check, it must hold













Ẑ i + cx ⊗ r j
= H(x⊗ r j +δ j ⊗ r j +∑
i∉I
xi ⊗∆ j,i)+ Ẑ+H(x)⊗ r j + x̂⊗ r j(4.5)
= H(δ j ⊗ r j +∑
i∉I
xi ⊗∆ j,i)+ Ẑ+ x̂⊗ r j(4.6)
where (4.5) holds because cx = H(x)+ x̂, and (4.6) due to the linearity of H and Fact 4.2.1.
Now, taking into account the fact that Ẑ is constructed the same way as Z, and considering
(4.4), there exist some adversarially chosen errors δ̂ j ∈ Fs2 such that:
Ẑ = x̂⊗ r j + δ̂ j ⊗ r j +∑
i∉I
x̂i ⊗∆ j,i.
Plugging this into equation (4.6), the check passes if and only if:
D I = H(δ j ⊗ r j +
∑
i∉I
xi ⊗∆ j,i)+ δ̂ j ⊗ r j +∑
i∉I
x̂i ⊗∆ j,i
= (H(δ j)+ δ̂ j)⊗ r j +∑
i∉I
(H(xi)+ x̂i)⊗∆ j,i.(4.7)
We now show that the probability of this holding is negligible, if any errors are non-zero.
First consider the left-hand summation in (4.7), supposing that at least one of δ j, δ̂ j is non-
zero. Recall that δ j and δ̂ j are fixed by the adversary’s inputs to F∆-ROT, so are independent of
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the random choice of the hash function H. Therefore, by the ε-almost 1-universal property of the
family of linear hash functions (Definition 4.2), it holds that
Pr
H
[H(δ j)+ δ̂ j = 0]≤ ε.
So except with probability ε, A will have to guess r j to construct D I to pass the check, since r j
is independent of the right-hand summation. By a union bound, therefore, if at least one of δ j or
δ̂
j is non-zero then the check passes with probability at most ε+2−κ.
Now suppose that δ j = δ̂ j = 0, so A only needs to guess the right-hand summation of (4.7)
to pass the check. If the error ∆ j,i 6= 0 for some i ∉ I then the adversary must successfully guess
H(xi)+ x̂i to be able to pass the check. Since x̂i is uniformly random in the view of the adversary,
this can only occur with probability 2−s.
In conclusion, the probability of passing the j-th check when any of the errors δ j, δ̂ j or ∆ j,i
are non-zero, is no more than max(2−s,ε+2−κ). Since the adversary must pass all n checks to
prevent an abort, this also gives an upper bound for the overall success probability. ■
4.3.5 Security Proof
We now give some intuition behind the security of the whole protocol. In the proof, the strategy
of the simulator is to run an internal copy of the protocol, using dummy, random values for the
honest parties’ keys and wire mask shares. All communication with the adversary is simulated
by computing the correct messages according to the protocol and the dummy honest shares, until
the final output stage. In the output stage, we switch to fresh, random honest parties’ shares,
consistent with the garbled circuit received from FPreprocessing and the corrupt parties’ shares.
Firstly, by Lemma 4.3.1, it holds that in the real execution, if the adversary introduced any
non-zero errors then the consistency check fails with overwhelming probability. The same is true
in the ideal execution; note that the errors are still well-defined in this case because the simulator
can compute them by comparing all inputs received to F∆-ROT with the inputs the adversary
should have used, based on its random tape. This implies that the probability of passing the
check is the same in both worlds. Also, if the check fails then both executions abort, and it is
straightforward to see that the two views are indistinguishable because no outputs are sent to
honest parties (hence, also the environment).
It remains to show that the two views are indistinguishable when the consistency check
passes, and the environment sees the outputs of all honest parties, as well as the view of the
adversary during the protocol. The main point of interest here is the output stage. We observe
that, without the final rerandomization step, the honest parties’ shares of the garbled circuit
would not be uniformly random. Specifically, consider an honest Pi ’s share, ( g̃
j
a,b)
i, where P j is
corrupt. This is computed by adding some PRF value, v, to the F∆-ROT outputs where Pi was
receiver and P j was sender (step 2 of ΠBit×String). Since P j knows both strings in each OT, there
are only two possibilities for Pi ’s output (depending on the choice bit), so this is not uniformly
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random. It might be tempting to argue that v is a random PRF output, so serves as a one-time
pad, but this proof attempt fails because v is also used to compute the final garbled circuit. In
fact, it seems difficult to rely on any reduction to the PRF, since all the PRF keys are included in
the output to the environment.
To avoid this issue, we need the rerandomization step using a PRG, and the additional
assumption of secure point-to-point channels. Note that this is missing from the protocol of [25],
which does not currently have a security proof. Rerandomization ensures that the honest shares
can be simulated with random values which, together with the corrupt shares, sum up to the
correct garbled circuit. We proceed with the complete proof.
Theorem 4.3.1. Protocol ΠPreprocessing from Figure 4.6 UC-securely computes FPreprocessing from
Figure 4.5 in the presence of a static, active adversary corrupting up to n− 1 parties in the
{F∆-ROT,FBit×Bit,FRand,FCommit}-hybrid model.
Proof. Let A denote a PPT adversary corrupting a strict subset I of parties. As part of the proof,
we will construct a simulator S that plays the roles of the honest parties on arbitrary inputs,
as well as the roles of functionalities {F∆-ROT,FBit×Bit,FRand,FCommit} and interacts with A . We
assume w.l.o.g. that A is a deterministic adversary, which receives as additional input a random
tape that determines its internal coin tosses. Nevertheless, since A is active, it may still ignore
the random tape, and use its own (possibly biased) random values instead.
The simulator begins by initializing A with the inputs from the environment, Z , and a
uniform string r as its random tape. During the simulation, we will use r to compute values that
A should (but might not) use during the protocol. We can now define the rest of S as follows:
Garbling: 1. The simulator emulates F∆-ROT.Initialize as follows:
• For a honest party Pi, i ∉ I, S samples r i ∈ {0,1}κ.
• For a corrupted party P j, j ∈ I, S computes r j from that party’s random tape.
Additionally, for each pair of parties involving that party, (P j,Pi) where i ∉ I, S
receives by A values r j,i ∈ {0,1}κ and stores ∆ j,i = r j,i +r j. If ∀i ∉ I,∆ j,i = d, then
S modifies its stored values by setting r j ← r j +d and ∆ j,i ← 0,∀i ∉ I.
2. GENERATE WIRE MASKS AND KEYS: Passing through each wire w of the circuit
topologically, the simulator S proceeds as follows.
• It emulates FBit×Bit and defines the wire masks:
– If w is a circuit-input wire, Pi is the party whose input is associated with it
and i ∈ I, then S receives λw by A . If i 6∈ I, then S chooses λw.
– If w is the output of an AND gate, S samples λw ← F2 and receives from the
adversary λiw for every i ∈ I. Then, S samples random λ jw, j 6∈ I, such that
λw =∑`∈[n]λ`w.
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– If w is the output of a XOR gate, S , it sets λw =λu +λv.
• It defines the PRF keys:
– If w is not the output of a XOR gate, S computes kiw,0 ∈ {0,1}κ for i ∈ [n]. For
corrupted parties i ∈ I, S reads this off Pi ’s random tape, whereas for honest
parties it samples a random key.
– If w is the output of a XOR gate, for i ∈ [n], it sets kiw,0 = kiu,0 ⊕ kiv,0 and
kiw,1 = kiw,0 ⊕ r i for i ∈ [n].
• Finally, it sends to FPreprocessing the global difference R i and the keys kiw,0, for
each i ∈ I and each w that is an output wire of an AND gate, as well as the wire
masks λw (for each w that is an input wire of a corrupt party).
3. SECURE PRODUCT COMPUTATIONS: The simulator S emulates FBit×Bit.Input receiv-
ing x̂i = (x̂i1, . . . , x̂is) for every i ∈ I, and also samples honest parties’ shares x̂ j, for j ∉ I.
For each AND gate g ∈ G, it emulates FBit×Bit.Multiply by receiving shares (λuv)i
from A for i ∈ I and setting random (λuv) j for j 6∈ I such that ∑`∈[n](λuv)` =λu ·λv. For
the ΠBit×String subprotocol:
• Multiply: S emulates F∆-ROT.Extend between each pair of parties Pi and P j.
If both parties are honest, or if both are corrupted, the simulation is trivial.
Hereafter, we focus on the cases where exactly one party of each pair is corrupted:
– When Pi is a corrupted sender, S receives a (possibly) different qi ∈ {0,1}κ
from A for each of the 3|G|+ s calls.
– When Pi is a corrupted receiver, S receives values x̂i1 +δ
i, j
x̂1
, . . . , x̂is +δi, jx̂s and,
for each AND gate,
(
λiu +δi, jλu ,λ
i
v +δi, jλv ,λ
i
uv +λiw +δi, jλuv+λw
)
(u,v,w)
. For each of
the 3|G|+ s previous inputs, it also receives a (possibly) different ti ∈ {0,1}κ
from A .
Note that the errors δi, j and the ti, qi values received from A are stored by S ,
whilst the λ values and shares were fixed in the previous stage.
• Consistency Check:
2. S emulates FRand and sends a seed for a uniformly random ε-almost 1-
universal linear hash function H ∈ Fs×3|G|2 to A .
3. S emulates FBit×Bit.Open and sends cx = H · x+ x̂ ∈ Fs2 to A , where x is
the vector of 3|G| values (λu,λv,λuvw)(u,v,w) from the previous stage, and
x̂=∑i∈[n] x̂i, received just before the Multiply step. If A does not send back
OK to S , then S sends ⊥ to FPreprocessing and aborts.
4-5. Emulating FCommit, S receives C i` from A for all ` ∈ [n] and i ∈ I. It then
computes C j
`
for j ∉ I, as each honest party would, and completes the emula-







6= 0, for any ` ∈ [n],
S sends ⊥ to FPreprocessing and terminates.
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4. GARBLE GATES: For every AND gate g ∈ G, the simulator S computes and stores
corrupt parties’ shares of the garbled circuit, C̃ i, for i ∈ I, as the adversary should
do according to the protocol. Note that S has all the necessary values to do so from
the messages it previously received and the knowledge of A ’s random tape. Namely,
the simulator knows the PRF keys, the global differences, and the ti and qi values
received in the F∆-ROT calls.
5. REVEAL MASKS FOR OUTPUT WIRES: S emulates FBit×Bit.Open and for every circuit-
output wire w, it calls FPreprocessing to get the wire mask λw and forward it to A . If A
does not send back OK to S , then S sends ⊥ to FPreprocessing and terminates.
Open Garbling:
6. For each i ∈ I, S samples random shares {S ij} j∉I and sends these to A .
7. S then calls FPreprocessing to receive the garbled circuit C̃. Using the corrupted parties’
shares C̃ i, i ∈ I, received previously, S generates random honest parties’ shares C̃ j,
j ∉ I, subject to the constraint that ∑`∈[n] C̃` = C̃. Once this is done, S forwards the
honest shares of the garbled circuit to A . If A does not respond with OK then S sends
⊥ to FPreprocessing and terminates. Otherwise, it receives from the adversary OK and
shares Ĉ i for i ∈ I. Finally, S computes the error E =∑i∈I (C̃ i + Ĉ i) and sends this to
FPreprocessing.
INDISTINGUISHABILITY: We will first show that, during the Garbling phase, the environment
Z cannot distinguish between an interaction with S and FPreprocessing and an interaction with
the real adversary A and ΠPreprocessing. We then argue that the garbled circuit, and the honest
parties’ shares of it, are also identically distributed in both worlds.
Garbling phase indistinguishability: Let’s look at the Garbling command. In both worlds
and for every AND gate, the honest parties’s shares for the masks λw, and for the products λuv
are uniformly random additive shares, whereas the corrupted parties shares’ are chosen by A .
Every other step up to the execution of the ΠBit×String subprotocol provides no output to the
parties, and hence Z has exactly the same view in both worlds up to that point.
In the Multiply step of ΠBit×String, S only receives values from A , so no further information
is added to his view here. Note that since the corrupted parties’ inputs to F∆-ROT are received by
S , all the errors ∆i, j,δ j =∑i∈I δi, j are well-defined in the simulation.
Next, consider the Consistency Check step. If any of the errors are non-zero, then from
Lemma 4.3.1, we know that in both worlds the check fails with overwhelming probability. In
this case, no outputs are sent to the honest parties, and (recalling that there are no inputs from
honest parties) indistinguishability is trivial since the simulator just behaved as honest parties
would until this point.
We now assume that all of the errors ∆i, j,δ j = ∑i∈I δi, j are zero, and so the check passes.
The values H and cx = Hx+ x̂ seen by A are uniformly random in both worlds, since the
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masking values x̂ are uniformly random and never seen by the environment. The distribution
of the committed and opened values, C ij, is more subtle, however. First, consider the case when
there is exactly one honest party. In this case, in both worlds the values C ji , for honest Pi,





Therefore, these values are identically distributed in both worlds.
Now, suppose there is more than one honest party. The values C ii are computed based on
the Z ii values, which are the sum of outputs from F∆-ROT with every other party. This means
for every honest Pi, C ii is uniformly random, since it includes an F∆-ROT output with one other
honest party. On the other hand, the values C ij, where j ∈ I and i ∉ I, only come from a single
F∆-ROT instance between Pi and P j, and Pi ’s output from F∆-ROT in this case is not random in
the view of A . It actually should satisfy:
C ij = H ·Z ij + Ẑ
i
j = H ·Q i, j +Q̂ i, j + (H · xi + x̂i)⊗ r j
where Q i, j,Q̂ i, j are the F∆-ROT outputs of corrupt P j, and r j is also known to P j. This means
for each row of C ij, in the view of A there are only two possibilities, depending on one bit from
(H · xi + x̂i). Since the shares x̂i are uniformly random and never seen by the environment,
H · xi + x̂i is also uniformly random in both worlds, subject to the constraint that these sum to cx
(which was opened previously). We conclude that the C ji values are identically distributed.
After ΠBit×String, Z remains unable to distinguish in the garbling phase. First, the Garble
Gates step of ΠPreprocessing requires no communication. Finally, regarding Reveal masks for
output wires, the revealed wire masks are random bits in both worlds.
Open Garbling phase indistinguishability: The seeds sent in the first step of the Open Gar-
bling stage are uniformly random in both executions. We claim that the rerandomized shares of
the garbled circuit in the real execution are computationally indistinguishable from the simulated
random shares. This holds because, (1) The simulated shares seen by the adversary are uniformly
random, subject to the constraint that all shares sum up to the same garbled circuit, and (2) In
the real world, every pair of honest parties masks their shares with outputs from the PRG G ,
using a unique seed that is not seen by the environment. By a standard hybrid argument, we
can therefore reduce indistinguishability of the shares to security of the PRG, by successively
replacing each PRG output sent between two honest parties with a random string. ■
4.4 More Efficient Garbling with Multi-Party TinyOT
We now describe a less general, but concretely more efficient, variant of the protocol in the
previous section. We replace the generic FBit×Bit functionality with a more specialized one based
on ‘TinyOT’-style information-theoretic MACs. This is asymptotically worse, but more practical,
than using [75] for FBit×Bit. It also allows us to completely remove the bit/string multiplications
and consistency checks in ΠBit×String, since we show that these can be obtained directly from the
TinyOT MACs. This means the only cost in the protocol, apart from opening and evaluating the
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garbled circuit, is the single bit multiplication per AND gate in the underlying TinyOT-based
protocol.
For completeness, we present a complete description of a suitable TinyOT-based protocol in
Section 4.7. This is done by combining the multiplication triple generation protocol (over F2)
from [58] with a consistency check to enforce correct shared random bits, which is similar to the
more general check from the previous section.
4.4.1 Secret-Shared MAC Representation
For x ∈ {0,1} held by Pi, define the following two-party MAC representation, as used in 2-party
TinyOT [104]:
[x]i, j = (x, M ij,K ji ), M ij = K
j
i + x ·R j
where Pi holds x and a MAC M ij, and P j holds a local MAC key K
j
i , as well as the fixed, global
MAC key R j. Similarly, we define the n-party representation of an additively shared value
x = x1 +·· ·+ xn:
[x]= (xi, {M ij,K ij} j 6=i)i∈[n], M ij = K ji + xi ·R j
where each party Pi holds the n−1 MACs M ij on xi, as well as the keys K ij on each x j, for j 6= i,
and a global key R i. Note that this is equivalent to every pair (Pi,P j) holding a representation
[xi]i, j.
The key observation for this section, is that a sharing [x] can be used to directly compute
shares of all the products x ·R j, as in the following claim.
Claim 4.4.1. Given a representation [x], the parties can locally compute additive shares of x ·R j,
for each j ∈ [n].
Proof. Write [x]= (xi, {M ij,K ij} j 6=i)i∈[n]. Each party Pi defines the n shares
Z ii = xi ·R i +
∑
j 6=i
K ij and Z
i
j = M ij, for each j 6= i.
We then have, for each j ∈ [n]:
n∑
i=1
Z ij = Z jj +
∑
i 6= j







= x j ·R j +∑
i 6= j
(M ij +K ji )= x j ·R j +
∑
i 6= j
(xi ·R j)= x ·R j.
■
We define addition of two shared values [x], [y], to be straightforward addition of the compo-
nents. We define addition of [x] with a public constant c ∈ F2 by:
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Functionality Fn-TinyOT
Initialize: On receiving (init) from all parties, the functionality receives R i ∈ {0,1}κ, for i ∈ I, from
the adversary, and then samples R i ← {0,1}κ, for i ∉ I, and sends R i to party Pi.
Prep: On receiving (Prep,m, M) from all parties, generate m random bits as follows:
1. Receive corrupted parties’ shares bi
`
∈ F2 from A , for i ∈ I.
2. Sample honest parties’ shares, bi
`
← F2, for i ∉ A and ` ∈ [m].
3. Run n-Bracket(b1
`
, . . . ,bn
`
), for every ` ∈ [m], so each party obtains the shares bi
`
, as well as
n−1 MACs on bi
`
and a key on each b j
`
, for j 6= i.
And M multiplication triples as follows:
1. Sample a`,b`← F2 and compute c` = a` ·b`, for ` ∈ [M].
2. For each x ∈ {a`,b`, c`}`∈[M], authenticate x as follows:
a) Receive corrupted parties’ shares xi ∈ F2, for i ∈ I, from A .
b) Sample honest parties’ shares xi ← F2, for i ∉ I subject to ∑ni=1 xi = x.
c) Run n-Bracket(x1, . . . , xn), so the parties obtain [x].
Key queries: On receiving (i,R′) from A , where i ∈ [n], output 1 to A if R i = R′. Otherwise, output
0 to A .
Figure 4.9: Functionality for secure multi-party computation based on TinyOT
• P1 stores: (x1 + c, {M1j ,K1j } j 6=1)
• Pi stores: (xi, (M i1,K
i
1 + c ·R i), {M ij,K ij} j∈[n]\{1,i})), for i 6= 1
This results in a correct sharing of [x+ c].
We can create a sharing of the product of two shared values using a random multiplication
triple ([x], [y], [z]) such that z = x · y with Beaver’s technique [16], shown in Figure 4.18.
4.4.2 MAC-Based MPC Functionality
The functionality Fn-TinyOT, which we use in place of FBit×Bit for the optimized preprocessing, is
shown in Figure 4.9. It produces authenticated sharings of random bits and multiplication triples.
For both of these, Fn-TinyOT first receives corrupted parties’ shares, MAC values and keys from
the adversary, and then randomly samples consistent sharings and MACs for the honest parties.
Another important aspect of the functionality is the Key Queries command, which allows
the adversary to try to guess the MAC key R i of any party, and will be informed if the guess is
correct. This is needed to allow the security proof to go through; we explain this in more detail in
Section 4.7. In that section we also present a complete description of a variant on the multi-party
TinyOT protocol, which can be used to implement this functionality.
75
CHAPTER 4. GARBLING USING OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER
Macro n-Bracket
This subroutine of Fn-TinyOT uses the global MAC keys R1, . . . ,Rn stored by the functionality.
On input (x1, . . . , xn), authenticate the share xi ∈ {0,1}, for each i ∈ [n], as follows:
If Pi is corrupt: receive a MAC M ij ∈ Fκ2 from A and compute the key K
j
i = M ij + xi ·R j, for each j 6= i.
Otherwise:
1. Sample honest parties’ keys K ji ← Fκ2 , for j ∈ [n]\ (I ∪ {i}).
2. Receive keys K ji ∈ Fκ2 , for each j ∈ I, from A .
3. Compute the MACs M ij = K
j
i + xi ·R j, for j ∈ I.
Finally, output (xi, {M ij,K
i
j} j 6=i) to party Pi, for i ∈ [n].
Figure 4.10: Macro used by Fn-TinyOT to authenticate bits
4.4.3 Garbling with Fn-TinyOT
Following from the observation in Claim 4.4.1, if each party P j chooses the global difference
string in ΠPreprocessing to be the same R j as in the MAC representation, then given [λ], additive
shares of the products λ·R j can be obtained at no extra cost. Moreover, the shares are guaranteed
to be correct, and the honest party’s shares will be random (subject to the constraint that they
sum to the correct value), since they come directly from the Fn-TinyOT functionality. This means
there is no need to perform the consistency check, which greatly simplifies the protocol.
The rest of the protocol is mostly the same as ΠPreprocessing in Figure 4.6, using Fn-TinyOT
with [·]-sharings instead of FBit×Bit with 〈·〉-sharings. One other small difference is that because
Fn-TinyOT does not have a private input command, we instead sample [λw] shares for input wires
using random bits, and later use a private output protocol to open the relevant input wire masks
to Pi. This change is not strictly necessary, but simplifies the protocol for implementing Fn-TinyOT
– if Fn-TinyOT also had an Input command for sharing private inputs based on n-Bracket, it would
be much more complex to implement with the correct distribution of shares and MACs.
In more detail, the Garbling phase proceeds as follows.
1. Each party obtains a random key offset r i by calling the Initialize command of Fn-TinyOT.
2. For every wire w which is an input wire, or the output wire of an AND gate, the parties
obtain a shared mask [λw] using the Bit command of Fn-TinyOT.
3. All the wire keys kiw,0,k
i
w,1 = kiw,0 ⊕R i are defined by Pi the same way as in ΠPreprocessing.
4. For XOR gates, the output wire mask is computed as [λw]= [λu]+ [λv].
5. For each AND gate, the parties compute [λuv] = [λu ·λv] using the subprotocol ΠMult in
Figure 4.18.
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6. The parties then obtain shares of the garbled circuit as follows:
• For each AND gate g ∈ G with wires (u,v,w), the parties use Claim 4.4.1 with the
shared values [λu], [λv], [λuv +λw], to define, for each j ∈ [n], shares of the bit/string
products:
λu ·R j, λv ·R j, (λuv +λw) ·R j
• These are then used to define shares of ρ j,a,b and the garbled circuit, as in the original
protocol.
7. For every circuit-output-wire w, the parties run ΠOpen to reveal λw to all the parties.
8. For every circuit input wire w corresponding to party Pi ’s input, the parties run ΠiOpen
(Figure 4.15) to open λw to Pi.
The only interaction introduced in the new protocol is in the multiply and opening protocols,
which were abstracted away by FBit×Bit in the previous protocol. Simulating and proving security
of these techniques is straightforward, due to the correctness and randomness of the multiplica-
tion triples and MACs produced by Fn-TinyOT. One important detail is the Key Queries command
of the Fn-TinyOT functionality, which allows the adversary to try to guess an honest party’s global
MAC key share, R i, and learn if the guess is correct. To allow the proof to go through, we modify
FPreprocessing to also have a Key Queries command, so that the simulator can use this to respond
to any key queries from the adversary. We denote this modified functionality by FKQPreprocessing.
The following theorem can be proven, similarly to the proof of Theorem 4.3.1 where we modify
the preprocessing functionality to support key queries, and adjust the simulation as described
above.
Theorem 4.4.1. The modified protocol described above UC-securely computes FKQPreprocessing from
Figure 4.5 in the presence of a static, active adversary corrupting up to n− 1 parties in the
Fn-TinyOT-hybrid model.
Finally, in Section 4.5.1 we discuss how to extend the proof of the online phase, showing that
allowing key queries in the preprocessing functionality does not affect security.
4.5 The Online Phase
Our final protocol, presented in Figure 4.11, implements the online phase where the parties
reveal the garbled circuit’s shares and evaluate it. Our protocol is presented in the FPreprocessing-
hybrid model. Upon reconstructing the garbled circuit and obtaining all input keys, the process of
evaluation follows what was described in Section 2.6.1. Decrypting the ‘double encrypted’ garbled
rows here requires each party to compute compute n2 PRF values per gate. We recall that during
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The MPC Protocol - ΠBMR
On input a circuit C f representing the function f and ρ = (ρ1, . . . ,ρn) where ρ i is party Pi ’s input, the
parties execute the following commands in sequence.
Preprocessing: This sub-task is performed as follows.
• Call Garbling on FPreprocessing with input C f .
• Each party Pi obtains the λw wire masks for every output wire and every wire associated
with their input, and all the keys {kiw,0}w∈W and r
i.
Online Computation: This sub-task is performed as follows.
• For all input wires w with input from Pi, party Pi computes Λw = ρw ⊕λw, where ρw is
Pi ’s input to C f , and λw was obtained in the preprocessing stage. Then, Pi broadcasts the
public value Λw to all parties.
• For all input wires w, each party Pi broadcasts the key kiw associated to Λw.
• The parties call Open Garbling on FPreprocessing to reconstruct g̃
j
a,b for every gate g and
values a,b.
• Passing through the circuit topologically, the parties can now locally compute the following
operations for each gate g. Let the gates input wires be labelled u and v, and the output
wire be labelled w. Let a and b be the respective external values on the input wires.
1. If g is a XOR gate, set the public value on the output wire to be c = a⊕b. In addition,
for every j ∈ [n], each party computes k jw,c = k ju,a ⊕k jv,b.
2. If g is an AND gate , then each party computes, for all j ∈ [n]:







3. If kiw,c 6∈ {kiw,0,kiw,1 = kiw,0 ⊕ r i}, then Pi outputs abort. Otherwise, it proceeds. If Pi
aborts it notifies all other parties with that information. If Pi is notified that another
party has aborted it aborts as well.
4. If kiw,c = kiw,0 then Pi sets c = 0; if kiw,c = kiw,1 then Pi sets c = 1.
5. The output of the gate is defined to be (k1w,c, . . . ,k
n
w,c) and the public value c.
• Assuming no party aborts, everyone will obtain a public value cw for every circuit-output
wire w. The party can then recover the actual output value from ρw = cw ⊕λw, where λw
was obtained in the preprocessing stage.
Figure 4.11: The MPC Protocol - ΠBMR.
the evaluation parties only see the randomly masked wire values and cannot determine the
actual wire values. Upon completion, the parties compute the actual output using the output
wire masks revealed from FPreprocessing. We conclude with the following theorem.
Theorem 4.5.1. Let f be an n-party functionality {0,1}nκ 7→ {0,1}κ and assume that F is a circular
2-correlation robust PRF. Then Protocol ΠBMR, from Figure 4.11, UC-securely computes f in the
presence of a static, active adversary corrupting up to n−1 parties in the FPreprocessing-hybrid.
Our proof follows by first demonstrating that the adversary’s view is computationally indis-
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tinguishable in both real and simulated executions. To be concrete, we consider an event for
which the adversary successfully causes the bit transferred through some wire to be flipped and
prove that this event can only occur with negligible probability (our proof is different to the proof
in [93] as in our case the adversary may choose its additive error as a function of the garbled
circuit). Then, conditioned on the event flip not occurring, we prove that the two executions
are computationally indistinguishable via a reduction to the correlation robust PRF, inducing a
garbled circuit that is indistinguishable. The complete proof is found below.
Proof. Let A be a PPT adversary corrupting a subset of parties I ⊂ [n]. We prove that there
exists a PPT simulator S with access to an ideal functionality F that implements f , that
simulates the adversary’s view. Denoting the set of honest parties by Ī, our simulator S is
defined below.
DESCRIPTION OF THE SIMULATION.
1. INITIALIZATION. Upon receiving the adversary’s input (1κ, I,~xI ), S incorporates A and
internally emulates an execution of the honest parties running ΠBMR with the adversary
A .
2. PROCESSING. S emulates the preprocessing phase of functionality FPreprocessing, obtaining
the adversary input (init, C f ) where C f is a Boolean circuit that computes f with a set of
wires W and a set G of AND gates.
3. GARBLING. Let W ′ denote the set of input wires that are associated with the adversary’s
input. Then upon receiving the input (Garbling,C f ) from the adversary the simulator
emulates the garbling phase as follows.
• Upon receiving the global differences {r i}i∈I from the adversary the simulator records
this set.
• For every input wire w ∈W ′ that is associated to the adversary’s input, the simulator
obtains from the adversary a random masking value λw ∈ {0,1} and an input key
kiw,0 ∈ {0,1}κ.
• For every wire w ∈ W that is the output of an AND gate and i ∈ I, the simulator
chooses a random λw ∈ {0,1} and records it. Moreover, the simulator obtains from the




w,1 = kiw,0 ⊕ r i).
• Upon receiving an OK command from the adversary, the simulator forwards it a random
masking value λw ∈ {0,1}, for every output wire w ∈W .
4. ONLINE COMPUTATION. In the online computation the simulator honestly generates the
external values {Λw}w∈W ′′ and the input keys {kiw,Λw }i∈Ī,w∈W ′′ that are associated with the
honest parties’ input wire set W ′′, and broadcasts these to the adversary.
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It then obtains the adversary’s external values {Λw}w∈W ′ as well as its input keys {k̂iw}i∈I,w∈W ′
(which may be different to the keys received in the garbling phase), and defines the adver-
sary’s input as follows.
• INPUT EXTRACTION. For each input wire w ∈W ′, the simulator computes ρw =Λw⊕λw
and fixes the adversary’s input {~xI } to be the concatenation of these bits. S sends
this input to the trusted party computing f , receiving the output y= (y1, . . . , ym). Note
that A may still provide inconsistent input keys with ρ which we view as providing
incorrect PRF values for these wires.
5. SIMULATED GARBLED CIRCUIT GENERATION. Upon receiving the adversary’s (OpenGarbling)
message on FPreprocessing the simulator completes the generation of the garbled circuit as
follows.
• It first generates the honest parties’ keys {kiw,Λw }i∈Ī,w∈W associated with every internal
wire w ∈ W that is an output of an AND gate. Note that for the honest parties the
simulator generates a single key per wire.
• Next, the simulator chooses a random Λw ← {0,1} for the public value on every internal
wire w ∈W that is an output of an AND gate, except for the circuit output wires. For
the t-th output wire, S defines Λw = λw ⊕ yt (recall that the masking values for the
output wires are already fixed at this point, so the external values must be consistent
with the output y= y1, . . . ym).
• For every XOR gate with input wires u and v and output wire w, S sets kiw,0 =
kiu,0 ⊕kiv,0 and kiw,1 = kiw,0 ⊕ r i for all i ∈ [n], and Λw =Λu ⊕Λv.
• ACTIVE PATH GENERATION. In the next step the simulator computes an active path
of the garbled circuit which corresponds to the sequence of keys that will be observed
by the adversary. More formally, for every AND gate g that is not an output gate, S
honestly generates the entry in row (Λu,Λv), where Λu (resp. Λv) is the public value











fixing g̃Λu,Λv = g̃1Λu,Λv ◦ . . .◦ g̃nΛu,Λv . The remaining three rows are sampled uniformly







in order to generate the garbled circuit.
6. The simulator hands the adversary the complete garbled circuit. In case the adversary
aborts, the simulator sends ⊥ to the trusted party and aborts. Otherwise, the simulator
obtains an additive error e = {ea,bg }a,b∈{0,1},g∈G and computes the modified garbled circuit as
g̃Λu,Λv + eΛu,Λvg .
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Next, the simulator evaluates the modified circuit using the input wire keys {k̂iw,Λw }w∈W ′,i∈I
and {k jw,Λw }w∈W ′′, j∈I and checks whether the honest parties would have aborted. Namely,
for each gate, whether the evaluation reveals the honest parties’ keys associated with Λw
for w the output wire of some AND gate. If there exists a gate for which the evaluation does
not yield the key associated with Λw then the simulator outputs fail and aborts.
This concludes the description of the simulation. Note that the difference between the simu-
lated and the real executions is the way the garbled circuit is generated. More concretely, the
simulated garbled circuit is only generated after the simulator extracts the adversary’s input.
Moreover, the simulated garbled gates include a single row that is properly produced, whereas
the remaining three rows are picked at random. Let HYB
FPreprocessing
ΠBMR,A ,Z
(1κ, z) denote the output
distribution of the adversary A and honest parties in a real execution using ΠBMR with adversary
A . Moreover, let IDEALF ,S ,Z (1κ, z) denote the output distribution of S and the honest parties
in an ideal execution.
We next define Flip to be the event that there exists an AND gate g and an honest party
P j, who, when evaluating the modified garbled circuit, (1) Does not abort; and (2) Obtains the
incorrect key k j
w,Λ̄w
for the output wire w of g. Note that this event implies that the adversary
causes P j to compute an incorrect value, as the bit value being transferred within the output
wire w is now flipped with respect to P j.
To prove that this event occurs with negligible probability, we consider an execution ãIDEAL
where a simulator S̃ produces a view that is identical to the view produced by S in IDEAL.
Namely, the adversary’s view is simulated exactly as in IDEAL by a simulator S̃ with the




k jw,Λw ⊕ r
j for j ∈ Ī,w ∈ W (which are never defined by S ). Moreover, the event for which the
simulator outputs fail and aborts is modified as follows. Namely, the simulator aborts if there
exists a gate for which the evaluation does not yield the key associated with Λw or with Λ̄w. Note
that this event is well-defined since all the wire keys are chosen in this game. Then the difference
between IDEAL and ãIDEAL is the event that S aborts whereas S̃ does not abort. Note that
this event occurs when the adversary successfully flipped a wire value. Specifically, this will
yield a valid evaluation in ãIDEAL but not in IDEAL. We next show that this event occurs with
negligible probability.
Fix the additive error e = {ea,bg }a,b∈{0,1},g∈G that is added to the simulated garbled circuit, and
let g̃a,b + ea,bg for all g ∈G and a,b ∈ {0,1} denote the garbled circuit with the additive error. We
prove that Flip only occurs with negligible probability in ãIDEAL which implies that the statement
also holds in IDEAL. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that the adversary can only succeed in
this attack by guessing correctly the global difference r j of a honest party.
Lemma 4.5.1. The probability that Flip occurs in ãIDEAL is no more than 2−κ.
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Proof: Recall first that the simulated garbling in IDEAL involves only generating a single key





simulator does not even need to choose a global difference r i in order to complete the garbling.
Furthermore, the simulator in ãIDEAL does generate these extra values, but never uses them;
this means that the simulated garbled circuit given to A is completely independent of the honest
parties’ global differences.
Now, suppose Flip occurs with respect to party P j, and let g be the first flipped AND gate (in
some topological order), with input wires u,v and output wire w. Then, because P j did not abort,
the keys on wires u and v obtained by P j must contain k
j
u,Λu
,k jv,Λv . Note that it is possible that
the corrupt parties’ keys for these wires may be incorrect, so we denote these by k̂iu, k̂
i
w, for i ∈ I.



















To cause this to happen, the adversary needs to introduce an error into this entry of the original
garbled gate g̃, given by:







Fk̂iu,k̂iv (g‖ j)⊕Fkiu,Λu ,kiv,Λv (g‖ j)
)
⊕ r j
This boils down to correctly guessing r j for the honest party P j, which is bounded by 2−κ as r j is
picked truly at random and independently of all other items in the execution. 
In the next step we prove that the ideal and real executions are indistinguishable, conditioned
on the event Flip not occurring.






• {IDEALF ,S ,Z (1κ, z)}κ∈N,z∈{0,1}∗
Proof: We begin by defining a slightly modified real execution HYB, where the creation of the
garbled circuit is moved from the preprocessing stage to the online computation stage, after the
parties have broadcast their masked inputs. Moreover, the generation of the garbled circuit is
modified so that upon receiving the honest parties’ inputs {ρ i}i∈Ī and extracting the corrupted
parties’ inputs {ρ i}i∈I , the simulator S̃ first evaluates the circuit C f , computing the actual bit
`w to be transferred through each w ∈ W, where W is the set of wires of C f . It then chooses
two keys kiw,0,k
i
w,1 and a random bit λ
i
w for all i ∈ Ī and w ∈W, and fixes the active key for this
wire to be (k1w,`w⊕λw , . . . ,k
n
w,`w⊕λw ). The rest of this hybrid is identical to the real execution. Note
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that the garbled circuit is still computed according to FPreprocessing, and the rest of the protocol
is identical to HYB, which induces the same view for the adversary. This hybrid execution is
needed in order to construct a distinguisher for the correlation robustness assumption. LetHYBFPreprocessing
ΠBMR,A ,Z
(1κ, z) denote the output distribution of the adversary A and honest parties in
this game.
Our proof of the lemma follows by a reduction to the correlation robustness of the PRF F (cf.
Definition 4.1). Assume by contradiction the existence of an environment Z , an adversary A and
a non-negligible function p(·) such that
∣∣Pr[Z (HYBFPreprocessing
ΠBMR,A ,Z
(1κ, z))= 1]−Pr[Z (IDEALF ,S ,Z (1κ, z))= 1]
∣∣≥ 1
p(κ)
for infinitely many κ’s. We construct a distinguisher D′ with access to an oracle O (that implements
either Circ or Rand) that breaks the security of the correlation robustness assumption. Namely,
we show that ∣∣Pr[r ← {0,1}n;A Circr(·)(1κ)= 1]−Pr[A Rand(·)(1κ)= 1]∣∣≥ 1
p(κ)
.
Distinguisher D′ receives the environment’s input z and internally invokes Z and simulator S ,
playing the role of functionality f . In more details,
• D′ internally invokes Z that fixes the honest parties’ inputs ρ.
• D′ emulates the communication with the adversary (controlled by Z ) in the initialization,
preprocessing and garbling steps as in the simulation with S .
• For each wire u, let `u ∈ {0,1} be the actual value on wire u. Note that these values, as well
as the output of the computation y, can be determined since D′ knows the actual input of
all parties to the circuit (where the adversary’s input is extracted as in the simulation with
S ).
• It next constructs the garbled circuit as follows. For each wire w in the circuit that is an
output wire of an AND gate and i ∈ Ī, it samples a key kiw and a public value Λw. Using the
internal values `w, we can also compute the masks λw = `w ⊕Λw.
• For each wire that is the output of an XOR gate with input wires u and v and output wire
w, the distinguisher sets kiw = kiu ⊕kiv for all i ∈ [n], and Λw =Λu ⊕Λv.
• The distinguisher picks an honest party, say Pi0 , and samples global differences r i for






kiw ⊕ r i.
• Finally, for each wire that is the output of an AND gate g with input wires u and v and
output wire w, the distinguisher computes four ciphertexts c00, c01, c10 and c11 as the
garbled gate, that are generated as follows,
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– Next, for all (a,b) ∈ {0,1}2 such that (a,b) 6= (Λu,Λv) the distinguisher sets `a,b = 0 if
g(a⊕λu,b⊕λv)= `w, and sets `a,b = 1 otherwise. It then queries h ja,b =O (k
i0
u,Λu
,ki0v,Λv , g, j,








– For the output wires the distinguisher sets the external values as in the simulation.
• D′ hands the adversary the complete description of the garbled circuit and concludes the
execution as in the simulation with S .
• D′ outputs whatever Z does.
Note first that D′ only makes legal queries to its oracle. Furthermore, if O =Circ then the view
of A is identically distributed to its view in the real execution of the protocol on the given
inputs, whereas if O =Rand then A ’s view is distributed identically to the output of the simulator
described previously since the oracle’s response is truly random in this case. This completes the
proof. 
Finally, we demonstrate that the probability Flip occurs in HYB is negligible as well due
to indistinguishability of executions. This concludes the proof as it demonstrates that with
overwhelming probability the adversary is getting caught whenever cheating in the computation
of the PRF values.
Lemma 4.5.3. The probability that Flip occurs in HYB is bounded by 2−κ +negl(κ) for some
negligible function negl(·).
Proof: Intuitively speaking, we prove that if Flip occurs in the real execution with a non-
negligible probability, then we can leverage this distinguishing gap in order to break the correla-
tion robustness assumption. Namely, if this event occurs then it is possible to extract r i and all
pairs of inputs keys associated with every wire with respect to an honest party. Given all keys it
is possible to recompute the garbled circuit and verify whether it was generated honestly or as in
the simulation. More formally, assume by contradiction that
Pr[Flip occurs in HYB]≥ 1
q(κ)
for some non-negligible function q(·) and infinitely many κ’s. We construct a distinguisher D that
breaks the security of the underlying correlation robust PRF with non-negligible probability as
follows.
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1. Distinguisher D is identically defined as the distinguisher in the proof of Lemma 4.5.2,
externally communicating with an oracle Q that either realizes the function Circ or Rand,
while internally invoking A . The only difference is that D chooses i0 at random. This is
due to the fact that the event Flip holds with respect to (at least) one honest party, whose
identity is unknown.
2. Upon receiving the modified garbled circuit from A , D evaluates the circuit on the parties’
inputs and compares every active key k̃iw that is revealed during the execution with the
actual active key kiw that was created by D in the garbling phase. For every gate g for
which there exists a difference ∆ig = k̃iw ⊕kiw for all i ∈ Ī, D sets r ig =∆ig.
3. For every gate g for which D recorded a global difference r i0g for party i0, it defines the
inactive key for the output wire w ∈W of this gate by ki0
w,Λ̄w
= ki0w,Λw ⊕ r
i0
g . Next, for some
gate g′ for which wire w is an input wire (say associated with left input wire to g′ w.l.o.g., D
queries its oracle on (ki0
w,Λ̄w
,ki0v , g, j, ā⊕λw,b⊕λv,`a,b) where ki0v is the active key associated
with the other input wire of Pi0 . D compares this outcome with the values it obtained from
its oracle for the query (ki0w,Λw ,k
i0
v , g, j,a⊕λw,b⊕λv,`a,b). If equality holds, then D outputs
Circ.
4. Upon concluding the execution so that D did not output Circ, it returns Rand.
Clearly, whenever Flip occurs with respect to i0 then D can identify this event by extracting some
inactive key and querying its oracle in this key. Therefore D outputs Circ with probability 1q(κ)·n .
On the other hand, due to the claim made in Lemma 4.5.2, Flip rarely occurs in IDEAL and thus
D outputs Rand on the event of Flip only with negligible probability. This implies a non-negligible
gap with respect to the event occurring in the two executions and concludes the proof.  ■
4.5.1 The Online Phase with FKQPreprocessing
In this section we now prove the following theorem, for the online protocol based on FPreprocessing
with key queries, denoted by FKQPreprocessing and formally defined in Section 4.4.3.
Theorem 4.5.2. Let f be an n-party functionality {0,1}nκ 7→ {0,1}κ and assume that F is a circular
2-correlation robust PRF. Then Protocol ΠBMR, from Figure 4.11, UC-securely computes f in the
presence of a static, active adversary corrupting up to n−1 parties in the FKQPreprocessing-hybrid
model.
In what follows, we discuss how to adapt the proof of Theorem 4.5.1 to support key queries.
Proof Sketch: We first modify the simulator specified in that proof. Namely, upon receiving the
adversary’s queries (i,R′), the simulator outputs 0. Intuitively, we claim that with overwhelming
probability the adversary only sees zero responses to its key queries as it can only guess a global
key with negligible probability. In the following, we formalize this intuition and discuss how
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to modify the proof of Theorem 4.5.1 by re-proving Lemma 4.5.1. Namely, we need to take into
account the fact that the probability that the event Flip occurs also depends on the leakage
obtained by the key queries made to the functionality.
We define a new hybrid game H where the simulator SH is defined identically to simulator S
with the exception that SH knows the honest parties’ inputs and further generates the inactive
keys by picking global differences for the honest parties. Furthermore, for every key query (i,R′)
made by A , SH verifies first whether R′ = R i and aborts in case equality holds. Otherwise, it
replies with 0. Nevertheless, SH garbles the circuit the same way S does. Let Guess denote the
event in H for which the adversary makes a key query R i (meaning, it guesses the correct R i
value). We prove the following.
Lemma 4.5.4. The probability that Flip occurs in H is no more than (q+1)/2κ, where q is the
number of key queries.




This implies that the distributions induced within IDEAL and H are statistically close since
the only difference is whenever event Guess occurs. We next claim that the proof of Lemma 4.5.2
holds with respect to H and HYB.














Proof: This proof will have to incorporate the key queries as well. Namely, distinguisher D′ first
picks the identity of party i0 at random. Then, whenever a key query (i0,R i0) is made by A , D′
uses it to calculate the inactive keys of party Pi0 and checks whether this yields the garbling it
obtained from its oracle. In case it does, D outputs Circ. Otherwise, it outputs Rand. Otherwise, if
at the end of the execution no queries have resulted in a correct garbling, output Rand. 
Finally, we reprove Lemma 4.5.3 by demonstrating that if the success probability of Flip is
non-negligibly higher in HYB, then we can distinguish the two executions HYB and H.




Proof: This proof follows similarly to the proof of Lemma 4.5.3 in the sense that the reduction
additionally needs to reply the adversary’s key queries. Namely, for each query (i,R i) such that
i 6= i0, D can answer this query as it picked the global difference for that party. Moreover, for each
query (i0,R i0 ), D uses this query to fix a set of inactive keys for party i0 and verifies whether this
guess is correct by recomputing the garbled circuit and comparing it with the original garbled
circuit. If equality holds then D responses with 1 to this query. The rest of the proof follows
identically. 
4.6 Performance
In this section we present implementation results for our protocol from Section 4.4 for up to 9
parties. We also analyse the concrete communication complexity of the protocol and compare this
with previous, state-of-the-art protocols in a similar setting.
We have made a couple of tweaks to our protocol to simplify the implementation. We moved
the Open Garbling stage to the preprocessing phase, instead of the online phase. This optimizes
the online phase so that the amount of communication is independent of the size of the circuit.
This change means that our standard model security proof would no longer apply, but we could
prove it secure using a random oracle instead of the circular 2-correlation robust PRF, similarly
to [21, 95]. Secondly, when not working in a modular fashion with a separate preprocessing
functionality, the share rerandomization step in the output stage is not necessary to prove
security of the entire protocol, so we omit this.
4.6.1 Implementation
Note: The following implementation work was not carried out by the author, but by Assi Barak,
Moriya Farbstein and Lior Koskas from the software team at Bar-Ilan University. It appears here
for completeness and a better understanding of the previous results in this chapter.
We implemented our variant of the multi-party TinyOT protocol (Section 4.7) using the
libOTe library [117] for the fixed-correlation OTs, and tested it for between 3 and 9 parties. We
benchmarked the protocol over a 1Gbps LAN on 5 servers with 2.3GHz Intel Xeon CPUs with
20 cores. For the experiments with more than 5 parties, we had to run more than one party per
machine; this should not make much difference in a LAN, as the number of threads being used
was still fewer than the number of cores. As benchmarks, we measured the time for securely
computing the circuits for AES (6800 AND gates) and SHA-256 (90825 AND gates).
For the TinyOT bit and triple generation, every pair of parties needs two correlated OT
instances running between them (one in each direction). We ran each OT instance in a separate
thread with libOTe, so that each party uses 2(n−1) OT threads. This gave a small improvement
(≈ 6%) compared with running n−1 threads. We also considered a multiple execution setting,
where many (possibly different) secure computations are evaluated. Provided the total number of
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AES AES SHA-256 SHA-256
(B = 5) (B = 3) (B = 5) (B = 3)
Prep. 1329 586.9 10443 6652
Online 35.34 33.30 260.58 252.8
Table 4.2: Runtimes in ms for AES and SHA-256 evalution with 9 parties.











Figure 4.12: AES performance (6800
AND gates).













Figure 4.13: SHA-256 performance
(90825 AND gates).
AND gates in the circuits being evaluated is at least 220, this allows us to generate the TinyOT
triples for all executions at once using a bucket size of B = 3, compared with B = 5 for one
execution of AES or B = 4 for one execution of SHA-256. Since the protocol in Section 4.7 scales
with B2, this has a big impact on performance. The results for 9 parties, for the different choices
of B, are shown in Table 4.2.
Figures 4.12–4.13 show how the performance of AES and SHA-256 scales with different
numbers of parties, in the amortized setting. Although the asymptotic complexity is quadratic,
the runtimes grow relatively slowly as the number of parties increases. This is because in the
preprocessing phase, the amount of data sent per party is actually linear. However, the super-
linear trend is probably due to the limitations of the total network capacity, and the computational
costs.
4.6.1.1 Comparison with other works.
We calculated the cost of computing the SPDZ-BMR protocol [93] using [80] to derive estimates for
creating the SPDZ triples (the main cost). Using MASCOT over F2κ with Free-XOR, SPDZ-BMR
requires 3n+1 multiplications per garbled AND gate. This gives an estimated cost of at least 14
seconds to evaluate AES, which is over 20x slower than our protocol.
At the time of writing this thesis, the only other implementation of actively secure, constant-
round, dishonest majority MPC is the work of [129], which presents implementation figures for
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up to 256 parties running on Amazon servers. Their runtimes with 9 parties in a LAN setting
are around 200ms for AES and 2200ms for SHA-256, which is around 3 times faster than our
results. However, their LAN setup has 10Gbps bandwidth, whereas we only tested on machines
with 1Gbps bandwidth. Since the bottleneck in our implementation is mostly communication, it
seems that our implementation could perform similar to or even faster than theirs in the same
environment, despite our higher communication costs. However, it is not possible to make an
accurate comparison without testing both implementations in the same environment.
Our implementation does not scale well to a WAN environment in the cloud because we have
not fully exploited the low round complexity of the protocol. However, the LAN results in our
work serve to demonstrate the practicality of the protocol and its low round complexity means
that it will still be practical in a WAN setting, even more with some refactoring.
Compared with protocols based solely on secret-sharing, such as SPDZ and TinyOT, the
advantage of our protocol is the low round complexity. We have not yet managed to benchmark
our protocol in a WAN setting, but since our total round complexity is less than 20, it should
perform reasonably well. With secret-sharing, using e.g. TinyOT, evaluating the AES circuit
requires at least 40 rounds in just the online phase (it can be done with 10 rounds [46], but
this uses a special representation of the AES function, rather than a general circuit), whilst
computing the SHA-256 circuit requires 4000 rounds. In a network with 100ms delay between
parties, the AES online time alone would be at least 4 seconds, whilst SHA-256 would take over
10 minutes to securely compute in that setting. If our protocol is run in this setting, we should be
able to compute both AES and SHA-256 in just a few seconds (assuming that latency rather than
bandwidth is the bottleneck).
4.6.2 Communication Complexity Analysis
We now focus on analysing the concrete communication complexity of the optimized variant of
our protocol and compare it with the state of the art in constant-round two-party and multi-
party computation protocols. We have not implemented our protocol, but since the underlying
computational primitives are very simple, the communication cost will be the overall bottleneck.
As a benchmark, we estimate the cost of securely computing the AES circuit (6800 AND gates,
25124 XOR gates), where we assume that one party provides a 128-bit plaintext or ciphertext
and the rest of them have an XOR sharing of a 128-bit AES key. This implies we have 128 ·n
input wires and an additional layer of XOR gates in the circuit to add the key shares together. We
consider a single set of 128 output wires, containing the final encrypted or decrypted message.
4.6.2.1 Complexity of Our TinyOT-Based Protocol
We now measure the exact communication cost of our optimized protocol based on TinyOT (in the
random oracle model), in terms of number of bits sent over the network per party (multiply this
by n for the overall complexity). We exclude one-time costs such as checking MACs, which can be
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done in a batch at the end, and initializing the base OTs. Consider a circuit with G AND gates, I
input wires (in total) and O output wires. The costs of the different stages are as follows, with
computational security parameter κ= 128 and statistical security parameter s = 40.
TINYOT PREPROCESSING: One triple and one random bit per AND gate, plus one random
bit per input wire. From the analysis in Section 4.7 this gives
(504B2 +168)(n−1)G+168(n−1)I.
GARBLING: Two bit openings for each AND gate (for the bit multiplication), one bit opening
for every output wire and one private opening for every input wire, gives
2(n−1)G+ (n−1)O+ (n−1)I.
OPEN GARBLING: The rerandomization step costs κ(n−1) bits per party. Opening the garbled
circuit can be done efficiently by each party sending their share to P1, who broadcasts the result;
this costs 4nκG bits per party, giving a total of
4nκG+κ(n−1).
ONLINE: If party Pi has I i input bits then the cost for Pi is I i + I · (n−1) ·κ bits.
Note that for a single execution of AES we have G = 6800, I = 128n and O = 128, which means
for multi-party TinyOT we can choose B = 4, following the combinatorial analysis of [59].
4.6.2.2 Two Parties
In Table 4.3 we compare the cost of our protocol in the two-party case, with state-of-the-art secure
two-party computation protocols. We instantiate our TinyOT-based preprocessing method with
the optimized, two-party TinyOT protocol from [128], lowering the previous costs further. For
consistency with the other two-party protocols, we divide the protocol costs into three phases:
function-independent preprocessing, which only depends on the size of the circuit; function-
dependent preprocessing, which depends on the exact structure of the circuit; and the online
phase, which depends on the parties’ inputs. As with the implementation, we move the garbled
circuit opening to the function-dependent preprocessing, to simplify the online phase.
The online phase of the modified protocol is just two rounds of interaction, and has the lowest
online cost of any actively secure two-party protocol.3 The main cost of the function-dependent
preprocessing is opening the garbled circuit, which requires each party to send 8κ bits per AND
gate. This is slightly larger than the best Yao-based protocols, due to the need for a set of keys for
every party in BMR.
3If counting the total amount of data sent, in both directions, our online cost would be larger than [128], which is
highly asymmetric. In practice, however, the latency depends on the largest amount of communication from any one
party, which is why we measure in this way.
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32 – 3.75 MB 25.76 kB
128 – 2.5 MB 21.31 kB
1024 – 1.56 MB 16.95 kB
[107]
1 14.94 MB 227 kB 16.13 kB
32 8.74 MB 227 kB 16.13 kB
128 7.22 MB 227 kB 16.13 kB
1024 6.42 MB 227 kB 16.13 kB
[128]
1 2.86 MB 570 kB 4.86 kB
32 2.64 MB 570 kB 4.86 kB
128 2.0 MB 570 kB 4.86 kB
1024 2.0 MB 570 kB 4.86 kB
Ours + [128]
1 2.86 MB 872 kB 4.22 kB
32 2.64 MB 872 kB 4.22 kB
128 2.0 MB 872 kB 4.22 kB
1024 2.0 MB 872 kB 4.22 kB
Table 4.3: Communication estimates for secure AES evaluation with our protocol and previous
works in the two-party setting. Cost is the maximum amount of data sent by any one party, per
execution.
In the batch setting, where many executions of the same circuit are needed, protocols such
as [118] clearly still perform the best. However, if many circuits are required, but they may be
different, or not known in advance, then our multi-party protocol is highly competitive with
two-party protocols.
4.6.2.3 Comparison with Multi-Party Protocols
In Table 4.4 we compare our work with previous constant-round protocols suitable for any
number of parties, again for evaluating the AES circuit. We do not present the communication
complexity of the online phase as we expect it to be very similar in all of the protocols. We denote
by MASCOT-BMR-FX an optimized variant of [93], modified to use Free-XOR as in our protocol,
with multiplications done using the OT-based MASCOT protocol [80].
As in the previous section, we move the cost of opening the garbled circuit to the preprocessing
phase for all of the presented protocols (again relying on random oracles). By applying this
technique the online phase of our work is just two rounds, and has exactly the same complexity
as the current most efficient semi-honest constant-round MPC protocol for any number of parties
[25], except we achieve active security. We see that with respect to other actively secure protocols,
we improve the communication cost of the preprocessing by around 2–4 orders of magnitude.
Moreover, our protocol scales much better with n, since the complexity is O(n2) instead of O(n3).
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Protocol Security Function-indep. prep. Function-dep. prep.
n = 3 n = 10 n = 3 n = 10
SPDZ-BMR active 25.77 GB 328.94 GB 61.57 MB 846.73 MB
SPDZ-BMR covert, pr. 15 7.91 GB 100.98 GB 61.57 MB 846.73 MB
MASCOT-
BMR-FX
active 3.83 GB 54.37 GB 12.19 MB 178.25 MB
[129] active 4.8 MB 20.4 MB 1.3 MB 4.4 MB
Ours active 14.01 MB 63.22 MB 1.31 MB 4.37 MB
Table 4.4: Comparison of the cost of our protocol with previous constant-round MPC protocols in
a range of security models, for secure AES evaluation. Costs are the amount of data sent over the
network per party.
The concurrent work of Katz et al. [129] requires around 3 times less communication than our
protocol, which is due to their optimized version of the multi-party TinyOT protocol.
4.7 A Multi-Party TinyOT-Style Protocol
Here we describe the full protocol for realizing the Fn-TinyOT functionality. It essentially consists
of the bit triple generation protocol from [58], with some minor modifications, and a method for
producing random shared bits with a consistency check that is similar to the bit/string check
from Section 4.3.3.
We first recall the two-party and n-party MAC representations from Section 4.4:
[xi]i, j = (xi, M ij,K ji )
[x]= (xi, {M ij,K ij} j 6=i))i∈[n], M ij = K ji + xi ·R j
where in the two-party sharing [xi]i, j, Pi holds the share xi and MAC M ij, whilst P j holds the
local key K ji and a fixed, global key R
j. In the n-party sharing, each party Pi holds n−1 MACs on
xi, as well as a key on x j, for each j 6= i, and a global key R i. Note that if Pi holds xi and P j holds
the key R j, a sharing [xi]i, j can easily be created using one call to the correlated OT functionality
(Figure 4.3), in which the correlation R j is fixed by P j in the initialization stage.
As required in the modified preprocessing protocol from Section 4.4, we need a method
for opening [x]-shared values, both to all parties, and privately to a single party. These are
straightforward, shown in Figure 4.14–4.15.
The main protocol, shown in Figure 4.16, consists of two main parts, for creating shared
random bits, and for multiplication (AND) triples. Creating shared bits is straightforward, by
92
4.7. A MULTI-PARTY TINYOT-STYLE PROTOCOL
Subprotocol ΠOpen
To open a shared value [x] to all parties:
1. Each party Pi broadcasts its share xi, and sends the MAC M ij to P j, for j 6= i.
2. All parties compute x = x1 +·· ·+ xn.
3. Each Pi has received MACs M
j
i , for j 6= i, and checks that
M ji = K ij + x j ·R i.
If any check fails, broadcast ⊥ and abort.
Figure 4.14: Subprotocol for opening and checking MACs on n-party authenticated secret shares.
Subprotocol Π jOpen
To open a shared value [x] to only P j:
1. Each party Pi, for i 6= j, privately sends its share xi and MAC M ij to P j.
2. P j computes x = x1 +·· ·+ xn, and checks that, for each i 6= j
M ij = K ji + xi ·R j.
If any check fails, broadcast ⊥ and abort.
Figure 4.15: Subprotocol for private opening to one party.
using F∆-ROT to MAC random bits, then opening a random linear combination of the MACs to
ensure consistency.
To create shares of a random multiplication triple (x, y, z), each party first locally samples
shares xi, yi, and then uses F∆-ROT to authenticate these shares. The MAC on a share xi is




) known to P j (using
a hash function), and then P j converts this to a share of xi · y j by sending a correction bit in
step 3a. This opens up an avenue for cheating, as P j may send an incorrect correction value to
some Pi. This could result in the triple being correct, or, if xi = 0 the triple would still be correct
but P j would learn the bit xi. These issues are addressed by the bucket-based cut-and-choose
procedure in Figure 4.17, which first checks correctness by sacrificing triples, and then removes
any potential leakage on the x values by combining several triples together. Note that the complex
bucketing procedure is necessary for these steps, as opposed to simple pairwise checks, because
with triples over F2, one pairwise check (or leakage combiner) can only guarantee correctness (or
remove leakage) if at least one of the two triples is correct (or leakage-free). So, the cut-and-choose
and bucketing procedure are done so that each bucket contains at least one good triple, with
overwhelming probability.
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Protocol Πn-TinyOT
Let H : {0,1}κ→ {0,1} be a single-bit output hash function, modeled as a random oracle.
Initialize: 1. Each party Pi samples R i ← {0,1}κ.
2. Every ordered pair (Pi,P j) calls F∆-ROT, where Pi sends (init,R i) and P j sends (init).
Prep: To create m random shared bits [b1], . . . , [bm] do:
1. Each party Pi samples m+κ random bits bi1, . . . ,bim, ri1, . . . , riκ← {0,1}.
2. Every ordered pair (Pi,P j) calls F∆-ROT, where Pi is receiver and inputs




1, . . . , r
i
κ). Using the output, define sharings [b1], . . . , [bm], [r1], . . . , [rκ].
3. Check consistency of the F∆-ROT inputs as follows:
a) Call FRand to obtain random field elements χ1, . . . ,χm ∈ F2κ







X h−1 · [rh]
c) Each Pi now has a share C i ∈ F2κ , and the MACs and keys (M ij,K ij) j 6=i from [C].
d) Each Pi rerandomizes C i by privately distributing fresh shares, and sums up the
shares they receive to obtain a new share C̄ i.
e) Broadcast C̄ i and reconstruct c = C̄1 +·· ·+ C̄n.
f) Each party Pi defines and commits to the n+1 values:
C i, Z ij = M ij (for j 6= i), Z ii =
∑
j 6=i
K ij + (C+C i) ·R i.
g) All parties open their commitments and check that, for each j ∈ [n], ∑ni=1 Z ij = 0.
Additionally, each Pi checks that Z
j
i = K ij +C j ·R i . If any check fails, abort.
To create M AND triples, first create m′ = B2M+ c triples as follows:
1. Each party Pi samples xi`, y
i
`
← F2 for ` ∈ [m′]
2. Every ordered pair (Pi,P j) calls F∆-ROT, where Pi is receiver and inputs
(extend, xi1, . . . , x
i
m′ ). Pi and P j obtain their respective value of [x
i
`










·R j ∈ Fκ2 .
3. For each ` ∈ [m′] and each pair of parties (Pi,P j):





































)+ xi` · yi`






6. Use the above, and the previously obtained MACs on xi
`
, to create sharings [x`], [y`], [z`].
Finally, run ΠTripleBucketing on ([x`], [y`], z`])`∈[m′], to output M correct and secure triples.
Figure 4.16: Protocol for TinyOT-style Multi-Party Computation of binary circuits.
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Subprotocol ΠTripleBucketing
The protocol takes as input m′ = B2m+ c triples, which may be incorrect and/or have leakage on the x
component, and produces m triples which are guaranteed to be correct and leakage-free.
B determines the bucket size, whilst c determines the amount of cut-and-choose to be performed.
Input: Start with the shared triples {[xi], [yi], [zi]}i∈[m′].
I: Cut-and-choose: Using FRand, the parties select at random c triples, which are opened with
ΠOpen and checked for correctness. If any triple is incorrect, abort.
II: Check correctness: The parties now have B2m unopened triples.
1. Use FRand to sample a random permutation on {1, . . . ,B2m}, and randomly assign the
triples into mB buckets of size B, accordingly.
2. For each bucket, check correctness of the first triple in the bucket, say [T]= ([x], [y], [z]),
by performing a pairwise sacrifice between [T] and every other triple in the bucket.
Concretely, to check correctness of [T] by sacrificing [T ′]= ([x′], [y′], [z′]):
a) Open d = x+ x′ and e = y+ y′ using ΠOpen.
b) Compute [ f ]= [z]+ [z′]+d · [y]+ e · [x]+d · e.
c) Open [ f ] using ΠOpen and check that f = 0.
III: Remove leakage: Taking the first triple in each bucket from the previous step, the parties are
left with Bm triples. They remove any potential leakage on the [x] bits of these as follows:
1. Place the triples into m buckets of size B.
2. For each bucket, combine all B triples into a single triple. Specifically, combine the first
triple ([x], [y], [z]) with [T ′]= ([x′], [y′], [z′]), for every other triple T ′ in the bucket:
a) Open d = y+ y′ using ΠOpen.
b) Compute [z′′]= d · [x′]+ [z]+ [z′] and [x′′]= [x]+ [x′].
c) Output the triple [x′′], [y], [z′′].
If all the checks and MAC checks passed, output the first triple from each of the m buckets in
the final stage.
Figure 4.17: Checking correctness and removing leakage from triples with cut-and-choose.
Subprotocol ΠMult
Given a multiplication triple [a], [b], [c] and two shared values [x], [y], the parties compute a sharing
of x · y as follows:
1. Each party broadcasts d i = ai + xi and ei = bi + yi.
2. Compute d =∑i d i, e =∑i ei, and run ΠOpen to check the MACs on [d] and [e].
3. Output
[z]= [c]+d · [b]+ e · [a]+d · e = [x · y].
Figure 4.18: Subprotocol for multiplying secret shared values using a triple.
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4.7.1 Why the Need for Key Queries?
For completeness, we briefly explain why these are needed in Fn-TinyOT, when using this protocol.
After the protocol execution the environment learns the honest parties’ outputs, which include
MAC keys K i and R. On the other hand, during the protocol the adversary sees values of the
form (simplifying things slightly)
U =H(K i)+H(K i +R)
where H is modeled as a random oracle. In the security proof, U is simulated as a uniformly
random value U, since the simulator, S , does not know K i or K i +R. This means that if the
environment later queries both K i and (K i +R) to the random oracle then they could distinguish,
as S would not be able to detect this, so the response would be inconsistent with the simulated U .
However, with a Key Query command in the functionality, the simulator can detect this (based
on the technique from [104]):
• For each query Q, S looks up all previous queries Q i, and sends (Q+Q i) to the Key Query
of the functionality.
• If Key Query is successful then S knows that Q+Q i = R, so can program the response
H(Q) such that H(Q)+H(Q i)=U , as required.
4.7.2 Security
In this section we formalize the security of the implementation of the Prep command of Fn-TinyOT
in our Πn-TinyOT protocol. More concretely, we focus on the consistency check in the production
of m random bits. This guarantees that the MAC keys are consistent, after which the triple
generation protocol can be proven secure similarly to [58]. The exact deviations that are possible
by a corrupt P j in the bit generation are:
1. Provide inconsistent inputs r j when acting as sender in the Initialize command of the
F∆-ROT instances with two different honest parties.
2. Input inconsistent shares b j
`
,` ∈ [m] or r jh,h ∈ [κ] when acting as receiver in the Extend
command of F∆-ROT with two different honest parties.
Note that in both of these cases, we are only concerned when the other party in the F∆-ROT
execution is honest, as if both parties are corrupt then F∆-ROT does not need to be simulated in
the security proof. We should also remark that preventing the first attack in the production of
the random bits extends to preventing it everywhere else in the protocol, as the r j values are
fixed in the Initialize phase.
These two attacks are modelled by defining r j,i,b j,i
`
and r j,ih to be the actual inputs used by
a corrupt P j in the above two cases. Without loss of generality, we pick a honest party Pi0 and
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, r jh = r
j,i
h ,r
j = r j,i0 to be the inputs by P j that should be consistent with every other
honest party. Let I be the set of corrupted parties. For each j ∈ I, we can resume the previous
statements by defining the values:


















h, h ∈ [κ], i ∉ (I ∪ i0).
Note that ∆ j,i is fixed in the initialization of F∆-ROT, whilst δ
j,i
`
may be different for every OT.
Whenever Pi and P j are both corrupt, or both honest, for convenience we define ∆ j,i = 0 and




)= K ij(b j,i` )+b
j,i
`














) · (r i +∆i, j),
where δ j,i 6= 0 if P j (the receiver) cheated, and ∆i, j 6= 0 if Pi (the sender) cheated. Recall from















and represents the sender’s MAC key on that same value.
We start by assuming that the corrupted party in the couple (Pi,P j) running F∆-ROT is the
sender P j, trying to have inconsistent correlations R j,i with different honest parties Pi, i ∉ I. We
prove the inconsistency impossible in the next claim:
Claim 4.7.1. If the Prep step of Πn-TinyOT succeeds then all the global keys R j are consistent and
well-defined, i.e. ∆ j,i = 0 for every i, j ∈ [n].




j = 0 in
Step 3g with which we want to catch inconsistent R j,i values to different honest parties. These
possible disruptions are the following two:
In Step 3e, the parties broadcast C̄ i values, every corrupted P`,` ∈ I can send instead some
adversarial value Ĉ` such that
∑n
j=1 Ĉ
j = C+ e, where e is some additive error of the Adversary’s





`∈I Z`j +E j.




Ẑ ij = E j +Z jj +
∑
i 6= j










E j + (C+ e+C j) ·R j +∑
i 6= j
(K ji (C
i)+M ij(C i))= E j + (C+ e+C j) ·R j +
∑
i 6= j
C i ·R j,i =
E j + (C+ e+C j +∑
i 6= j
C i) ·R j +∑
i 6= j
C i ·∆ j,i = E j + e ·R j +∑
i 6= j
C i ·∆ j,i
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As having inconsistent keys requires that there exists i0, i1 ∉ I such that ∆ j,i0 6=∆ j,i1 6= 0, the
attack would require the adversary to set E j + e ·R j = C i0 ·∆ j,i0 +C i1 ·∆ j,i1 . But this is negligible
in κ, as the only information the adversary has about C i0 ,C i1 ∈ F2κ at the time of committing to
the values Ẑ`j ,` ∈ I is that they are two uniform additive shares of C, due to the rerandomization
in Step 3d. ■





Claim 4.7.2. If the Prep step of Πn-TinyOT succeeds, every ordered pair (Pi,P j) holds a secret
sharing of b j
`
·R i for every ` ∈ [m]. In other words, δ j,i
`
= 0 for every i, j,`.











X h−1 ·M ji (r
j,i
h )





χ` ·K ij(b j,i` )+
κ∑
h=1
X h−1 ·K ij(r j,ih )
In Step 3f of Bits, an adversarial P j can also commit to incorrect MACs Ẑ
j
i (c
j)= M ji (c j)+E
j
i
and Ĉ j = C j + e j. Nevertheless, in order to succeed an attack, the check Ẑ ji = K ij(C j)+ Ĉ j ·R i from
Step 3g would have to hold. This check implies the following:
M ji (C
j)+E ji = K ij(C j)+ (C j + e j) ·R i
⇔ E ji + (C j + e j) ·R i = M
j
i (C
j)+K ij(C j)= (
m∑
`=1
χ` ·b j,i` +
κ∑
h=1
X h−1 · r j,ih ) ·R i
⇔ E ji =
(
C j + e j +
m∑
`=1











= (e j +
m∑
`=1
χ` ·δ j,i` +
κ∑
h=1
X h−1 · δ̂ j,ih ) ·R i
An active P j has then just two options to cheat Pi, both with only probability 2−κ to succeed:





+∑κh=1 X h−1 · δ̂ j,ih ) ·R i 6= 0, which requires guessing the string
R i ∈ F2κ kept secret by the honest party Pi.





+∑κh=1 X h−1 · δ̂ j,ih for every i ∉ I. As δ j,i0` = δ̂ j,i0h = 0, this




χ` ·δ j,i` +
κ∑
h=1
X h−1 · δ̂ j,ih =
κ∑
h=1
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where the χ`,h values are defined in such a way that χ` =
∑κ
h=1 X
h−1 ·χ`,h. This would need










which can only happen with probability 1/2 for each of them, as χ`,h ∈ F2 are uniformly






Based on the analysis from previous works [58, 59, 128], if roughly 1 million triples are created
at once then the buckets in the cut-and-choose stages can be of size B = 3, to guarantee security
except with probability 2−40. The additional cut-and-choose parameter c can be as low as 3, so is
insignificant as we initially need m′ = B2m+ c triples to produce m final triples.
4.7.4 Communication Complexity
Here we analyse the communication complexity of Πn-TinyOT. The cost of creating one shared
random bit is the same as one invocation of the extend command in F∆-ROT between all pairs of
parties, giving n(n−1)(κ+ s) bits (we ignore the consistency check, since this cost amortizes away
when creating many bits).
The cost of one triple (not counting the bucketing stage), is 3 calls to F∆-ROT between every
pair of parties for authenticating shares of (x, y, z), plus sending one correction bit between every
pair of parties, giving n(n−1)(3(κ+ s)+1) bits. This is then multiplied by approximately B2 to
account for the bucketing. When creating a batch of at least a million triples (with s = 40), we can
set B = 3, so the overall cost per party is around (n−1)27 · (κ+ s) bits.
We remark that when checking a large number of MACs using ΠOpen or ΠiOpen, the checks can
be batched together, by first computing a random linear combination of all MACs, and checking
the MAC on this, as in e.g. [44, 80]. This means that the cost of checking many MACs is roughly
the cost of checking one, which is why we did not factor the MAC checks into the cost of the
bucketing stage.
4.7.5 Round Complexity
Initializing the correlated OTs can be done with any 2-round OT protocol. Extending the corre-
lated OTs using [107] and [11] takes 3 rounds. Note that when authenticating random bits, the s
additional bits in the consistency check can be created in parallel with the original m bits, giving
an overall cost of 5 rounds for random bits.
The triple generation consists of one set of correlated OTs (2 + 3 rounds), plus 1 round, plus
another round of correlated OTs (3 rounds). Then there are 2 rounds for FRand in the bucketing
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Protocol Πn-TinyOT Input
1. Create a shared random bit [b].
2. Open b to Pi using ΠiOpen.
3. Pi broadcasts d = x−b.
4. All parties compute [x]= [b]+d.
Figure 4.19: Input protocol for TinyOT-style Multi-Party Computation
(which can all be done in parallel), one round for the openings in step 2a and one round for step 2c.
The openings in step 2a can be merged with the previous round. This gives a total of 13 rounds.
4.7.6 Realizing General Secure Computation
The previous protocol can easily be used to implement a general secure computation functionality
such as FBit×Bit. The main feature missing is the ability for parties to provide inputs, since we
only need to create random bits and triples for our application to garbled circuits. However, this
is easy to do with a standard technique: if Pi wishes to secret-share an input x, the parties do as










MULTI-PARTY COMPUTATION WITH SHORT KEYS
This chapter is based on joint work with Carmit Hazay, Emmanuela Orsini and Peter Scholl [69],
which was presented at CRYPTO 2018.
In this chapter we investigate designing MPC protocols where an arbitrary threshold t forthe number of corrupted parties can be chosen, which are practical both when n is verylarge, and also for small to medium sizes of n. Specifically, we ask the question:
Can we design concretely efficient MPC protocols where the performance improves
gracefully as the number of honest parties increases?
In the semi-honest case most protocols either require t < n/2, in which case unconditionally
secure protocols [28, 38] based on Shamir secret-sharing can be used, or support any choice of t up
to n−1, as in computationally secure protocols based on oblivious transfer [62, 64]. Interestingly,
within these two ranges, the efficiency of most practical semi-honest protocols does not depend on
t. For instance, the GMW [64] protocol (and its many variants) is full-threshold, so supports any
t < n corruptions. However, we do not know of any practical protocols with threshold, say, t = 23 n,
or even t = n/2+1, that are more efficient than full-threshold GMW-style protocols.
One exception to this is when the number of parties becomes very large, in which case
protocols based on committees can be used. In this approach, introduced by Bracha [33], first
a random committee of size n′ ¿ n is chosen. Then every party secret-shares its input to the
parties in the committee, which runs a protocol secure against t < n′ corrupted parties to obtain
the result. The committee size n′ must be chosen to ensure (with high probability) that not the
whole committee is corrupted, so clearly a lower threshold t allows for smaller committees, giving
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significant efficiency savings. However, this technique is only really useful when n is very large,
at least in the hundreds or thousands.
Note that the performance of an MPC protocol can be measured both in terms of commu-
nication overhead and computational overhead. Using fully homomorphic encryption [61], it is
possible to achieve very low communication overhead that is independent of the circuit size [9]
even in the malicious setting, but for reasonably complex functions FHE is impractical due to
very high computational costs. On the other hand, practical MPC protocols typically communicate
for every AND gate in the circuit, and use oblivious transfer (OT) to carry out the computation.
Fast OT extension techniques allow a large number of secret-shared bit multiplications1 to be
performed using only symmetric primitives and an amortized communication complexity of
O(κ) [74] or O(κ/ logκ) [51, 83] bits, where κ is a computational security parameter. This leads
to an overall communication complexity which grows with O(n2κ/ logκ) bits per AND gate in
protocols based on secret-sharing following the GMW [64] style, and O(n2κ) in those based on
garbled circuits in the style of BMR [18, 25, 132].
5.1 Introduction
Our main idea towards achieving the above goal is to build a secure multi-party protocol with h
honest parties, by distributing secret key material so that each party only holds a small part of
the key. Instead of basing security on secret keys held by each party individually, we then base
security on the concatenation of all honest parties’ keys.






where H is a suitable hash function and each key ki ∈ {0,1}` belongs to party Pi. In the full-
threshold setting with up to n−1 corruptions, to hide the message we need each party’s key to
be of length `= 128 to achieve 128-bit computational security. However, if only t < n−1 parties
are corrupted, it seems that, intuitively, an adversary needs to guess all h := n− t honest parties’
keys to recover the message, and potentially each key ki can be much less than 128 bits long
when h is large enough. This is because the ‘obvious’ way to try to guess m would be to brute
force all h keys until decrypting ‘successfully’.
In fact, recovering m when there are h unknown keys corresponds to solving an instance of
the regular syndrome decoding problem [12], which is related to the well-known learning parity
with noise (LPN) problem, and believed to be hard for suitable choices of parameters.
1Note that OT is equivalent to secret-shared bit multiplication, and when constructing MPC it is more convenient




In this work we use the above idea of short secret keys to design new MPC protocols in both the
constant round and non-constant round settings, which improve in efficiency as the number of
honest parties increases. Our contributions are captured by the following:
GMW-STYLE MPC WITH SHORT KEYS (SECTION 5.3). We present a GMW-style MPC protocol
for binary circuits, where multiplications are done with OT extension using short symmet-
ric keys. This reduces the communication complexity of OT extension-based GMW from
O(n2κ/ logκ) [83] to O(nt`), where the key length ` decreases as the number of honest
parties, h = n− t, increases. When h is large enough, we can even have ` as small as 1.
To construct this protocol, we first analyse the security of the IKNP OT extension proto-
col [74] when using short keys, and formalise the leakage obtained by a corrupt receiver in
this case. We then show how to use this version of ‘leaky OT’ to generate multiplication
triples using a modified version of the GMW method, where pairs of parties use OT to
multiply their shares of random values. We also optimize our protocol by reducing the
number of communication channels using two different-sized committees, improving upon
the standard approach of choosing one committee to do all the work.
MULTI-PARTY GARBLED CIRCUITS WITH SHORT KEYS (SECTION 5.4). Our second contribution
is the design of a constant round, BMR-style (see Section 2.6) protocol based on garbled
circuits with short keys. Our offline phase uses the multiplication protocol from the previous
result in order to generate the garbled circuit, using secret-shared bit and bit/string
multiplications as done in previous works [25, 70], with the exception that the keys are
shorter. In the online phase, we then use the LPN-style assumption to show that the
combination of all honest parties’ `-bit keys suffices to obtain a secure garbling protocol.
This allows us to save on the key length as a function of the number of honest parties.
As well as reducing communication with a smaller garbled circuit, we also reduce com-
putation when evaluating the circuit, since each garbled gate can be evaluated with only
O(n2`/κ) block cipher calls (assuming the ideal cipher model), instead of O(n2) when using
κ-bit keys. For this protocol, ` can be as small as 5 when n is large enough, giving a
significant saving over 128-bit keys used previously.
It is worth mentioning that the techniques presented here were later successfully extended to
the malicious setting by the same authors [68]. We achieved so by efficiently constructing short
message authentication codes and carefully using them to produce secret-shared bit multiplica-
tions.
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5.1.1.1 Concrete Efficiency Improvements.
The efficiency of our protocols depends on the total number of parties, n, and the number of honest
parties, h, so there is a large range of parameters to explore when comparing with other works.
We discuss this in more detail in Section 5.5. Our protocols seem most significant in the dishonest
majority setting, since when there is an honest majority there are unconditionally secure protocols
with O(n logn) communication overhead and reasonable computational complexity e.g. [45], whilst
our protocols have Ω(nt) communication overhead.
Our GMW-style protocol starts to improve upon previous protocols when we reach n = 20
parties and t = 14 corruptions: here, our triple generation method requires less than half the
communication cost of the fastest GMW-style protocol based on OT extension [51] tolerating up
to n−1 corruptions. When the number of honest parties is large enough, we can use 1-bit keys,
giving a 25-fold reduction in communication over previous protocols when n = 400 and t = 280. In
addition, we describe a simple threshold-t variant of GMW-style protocols, which our protocol
still outperforms by 1.1x and 13x, respectively, in these two scenarios.
For our constant round protocol, with n = 20, t = 10 we can use 32-bit keys, so the size of each
garbled AND gate is 1/4 the size of [25]. As n increases the improvements become greater, with a
16-fold reduction in garbled AND gate size for n = 400, t = 280. We also reduce the communication
cost of creating the garbled circuit. Here, the improvement starts at around 50 parties, and goes
up to a 7 times reduction in communication when n = 400, t = 280. Note that our protocol does
incur a slight additional overhead, since we need to use extra ‘splitter gates’ [126], but this cost
is relatively small.
To demonstrate the practicality of our approach, we also present an implementation of the
online evaluation phase of our constant-round protocol for key lengths ranging between 1−4
bytes, and with an overall number of parties ranging from 15−1000; more details can be found
in Section 5.5.
5.1.1.2 Applications.
Our techniques seem most useful for large-scale MPC with around 70% corruptions, where we
obtain the greatest concrete efficiency improvements. An important motivation for this setting is
privacy-preserving statistical analysis of data collected from a large network with potentially
thousands of nodes. In scenarios where the nodes are not always online and connected, our
protocols can also be used with the ‘random committee’ approach discussed earlier, so only a
small subset of, say, a hundred nodes need to be online and interacting during the protocol.
An interesting example is safely measuring the Tor network [53] which is amongst the
most popular tools for digital privacy, consisting of more than 6000 relays that can opt-in for
providing statistics about the use of the network. Nowadays and due to privacy risks, the statistics
collected over Tor are generally poor: There is a reduced list of computed functions and only a
minority of the relays provide data, which has to be obfuscated before publishing [53]. Hence, the
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statistics provide an incomplete picture which is affected by a noise that scales with the number
of relays. Running MPC in this setting would enable for more complex, accurate and private data
processing, for example through anomaly detection and more sophisticated censorship detection.
Moreover, our protocols are particularly well-suited to this setting since all relays in the network
must be connected to one another already, by design.
Another possible application is for securely computing the interdomain routing within the
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), which is performed at a large scale of thousands of nodes. A
recent solution in the dishonest majority setting [8] centralizes BGP so that two parties run this
computation for all Autonomous Systems. Our techniques allow scaling to a large number of
systems computing the interdomain routing themselves using MPC, hence further reducing the
trust requirements.
5.1.1.3 Decisional Regular Syndrome Decoding problem.
The security of our protocols relies on the Decisional Regular Syndrome Decoding (DRSD)
problem, which, given a random binary matrix H, is to distinguish between the syndrome
obtained by multiplying H with an error vector e = (e1‖· · ·‖eh) where each ei ∈ {0,1}2` has
Hamming weight one, and the uniform distribution. This can equivalently be described as
distinguishing
⊕h
i=1H(i,ki) from the uniform distribution, where H is a random function and
each ki is a random `-bit key (as in the toy example described earlier).
We remark that when h is large enough, the problem is unconditionally hard even for `= 1,
which means for certain parameter choices in our GMW-based protocol we can use 1-bit keys
without introducing any additional assumptions. This introduces a significant saving in our triple
generation protocol.
Overall, our approach demonstrates a new application of LPN-type assumptions to efficient
MPC without introducing asymmetric operations. Our techniques may also be useful in other
distributed applications where only a small fraction of nodes are honest.
5.1.1.4 Additional related work
Another work which applies a similar assumption to secure computation is that of Applebaum [3],
who built garbled circuits with the free-XOR technique in the standard model under the LPN
assumption. Conceptually, our work differs from Applebaum’s since our focus is to improve the
efficiency of multi-party protocols with fewer corruptions, whereas in [3], LPN is used in a more
modular way in order to achieve encryption with stronger properties and under a more standard
assumption.
In a recent work [106], Nielsen and Ranellucci designed a protocol in the dishonest majority
setting with malicious, adaptive security in the presence of t < cn corruption for t ∈ [0,1). Their
protocol is aimed to work with a large number of parties and uses committees to obtain a protocol
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with poly-logarithmic overhead. This protocol introduces high constants and is not useful for
practical applications.
Finally, Ben-Efraim and Omri [27] also explore how to optimize garbled circuits in the
presence of non-full-threshold adversaries. By using deterministic committees they achieve AND
gates of size 4(t+1)κ, where κ is the computational security parameter. By using the same
technique we achieve a size of 4(t+h)`, where `¿ κ depends on h, a parameter for the minimum
number of honest parties in the committee. The rest of their results apply only to the honest
majority setting.
5.1.2 Technical Overview
In what follows we introduce the technical side of our results in more detail.
5.1.2.1 Leaky oblivious transfer (OT).
We first present a two-party secret-shared bit multiplication protocol, based on a variant of the
IKNP OT extension protocol [74] with short keys. Our protocol performs a batch of r multiplica-
tions at once. Namely, the parties create r correlated OTs on `-bit strings using the OT extension
technique of [74], by transposing a matrix of ` OTs on r-bit strings and swapping the roles of
sender and receiver. In contrast to the IKNP OT extension and followups, that use κ ‘base’ OTs
for computational security parameter κ, we use `=O(logκ) base OTs.
This protocol leaks some information on the global secret ∆← {0,1}` picked by the receiver, as
well as the inputs of the receiver. Roughly speaking, the leakage is of the form H(i,∆)+ xi, where
xi ∈ {0,1} is an input of the receiver and H is a hash function with 1-bit output. Clearly, when `
is short this is not secure to use on its own, since all of the receiver’s inputs only have ` bits of
min-entropy (based on the choice of ∆).
5.1.2.2 MPC from leaky OT.
We then show how to apply this leaky two-party protocol to the multi-party setting, whilst
preventing any leakage on the parties shares. The main observation is that, when using additive
secret-sharing, we only need to ensure that the sum of all honest parties’ shares is unpredictable; if
the adversary learns just a few shares, they can easily be rerandomized by adding pseudorandom
shares of zero, which can be done non-interactively using a PRF. However, we still have a problem,
which is that in the standard GMW approach, each party Pi uses OT to multiply their share xi
with every other party P j ’s share y j. Now, there is leakage on the same share xi from each of the
OT instances between all other parties, which seems much harder to prevent than leakage from
just a single OT instance.
To work around this problem, we have the parties add shares of zero to their xi inputs before
multiplying them. So, every pair (Pi,P j) will use leaky OT to multiply xi ⊕ si, j with y j, where
106
5.1. INTRODUCTION
si, j is a random share of zero satisfying
⊕n
i=1 s
i, j = 0. This preserves correctness of the protocol,











(xi ⊕ si, j)= xy.
This also effectively removes leakage on the individual shares, so we only need to be concerned
with the sum of the leakage on all honest parties’ shares: This turns out to be of the form⊕n
i=1(H(i,∆i)+ xi), which is pseudorandom under the decisional regular syndrome decoding
assumption.
We realize our protocol using a hash function with a polynomial-sized domain, so that is can
be implemented using a CRS which simply outputs a random lookup-table. This means that,
unlike when using the IKNP protocol, we do not need to rely on a random oracle or a correlation
robustness assumption.
When the number of parties is large enough, we can improve our triple generation protocol
using random committees. In this case the amortized communication cost is ≤ nhn1(`+`κ/r+1)
bits per multiplication where we need to choose two committees of sizes nh and n1 which have at
least h and 1 honest parties, respectively.
5.1.2.3 Garbled circuits with short keys.
We next revisit the multi-party garbled circuits technique by Beaver, Micali and Rogaway,
described in Section 2.6 and known as BMR, where essentially all the parties jointly garble using
one set of keys each. This method was recently improved in a sequence of works [25, 70, 93, 96],
within which [25, 70] further support the Free-XOR property.
Our garbling method uses an expansion function H : [n]× {0,1}× {0,1}`→ {0,1}n`+1, where ` is
the length of each parties’ keys used as wire labels in the garbled circuit. To garble a gate, the
hash values of the input wire keys kiu,b and k
i
v,b are XORed over i and used to mask the output
wire keys.
Specifically, for an AND gate g with input wires u,v and output wire w, the 4 garbled rows







⊕ (c,k1w,c, . . . ,knw,c).
Security then relies on the DRSD assumption, which implies that the sum of h hash values on
short keys is pseudorandom, which suffices to construct a secure garbling method with h honest
parties.
Using this assumption instead of a PRF (as in recent works) comes with difficulties, as we can
no longer garble gates with arbitrary fan-out, or use the Free-XOR technique, without degrading
the DRSD parameters. To allow for arbitrary fan-out circuits with our protocol we use splitter
gates, which take as input one wire w and provide two outputs wires u,v, representing the same
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Functionality F rZero(P )
On receiving (zero) from all parties in P = {P1, . . . ,Pn}:
1. Sample random shares s2, . . . ,sn ← {0,1}r and let s1 = s2 ⊕·· ·⊕ sn
2. Send si to party Pi
Figure 5.1: Random zero sharing functionality.
wire value. Splitter gates were previously introduced in [126] as a fix for an error in the original
BMR paper. We stress that transforming a general circuit description into a circuit with only
fan-out-1 gates requires adding at most a single splitter gate per AND or XOR gate.
The restriction to fan-out-1 gates and the use of splitter gates additionally allows us to garble
XOR gates for free in BMR without relying on circular security assumptions or correlation-robust
hash functions, based on the FlexOR technique [84] where each XOR gate uses a unique offset.
Furthermore, the overhead of splitter gates is very low, since garbling a splitter gate does not
use the underlying MPC protocol: shares of the garbled gate can be generated non-interactively.
We note that this observation also applies to Yao’s garbled circuits, but the overhead of adding
splitter gates there is more significant; this is because in most 2-party protocols, the size of the
garbled circuit is the dominant cost factor, whereas in multi-party protocols the main cost is
creating the garbled circuit in a distributed manner.
5.2 Preliminaries
5.2.1 Security and Communication Models
We prove security of our protocols in the universal composability (UC) framework [35]. See
Section 2.4 for a summary of this. We assume all parties are connected via secure, authenticated
point-to-point channels, which is the default method of communication in our protocols. The
adversary model we consider is a static, honest-but-curious adversary who corrupts a subset
A ⊂ [n] of parties at the beginning of the protocol. We denote by Ā the subset of honest parties,
and define h = |Ā| = n− t.
5.2.2 Random Zero-Sharing
Our protocols require the parties to generate random additive sharings of zero, as in the FZero
functionality in Figure 5.1. This can be done efficiently using a PRF F, with interaction only
during a setup phase, as in [6]. We do this by asking each party Pi to send a random PRF key
ki, j to every other party P j. Next, Pi defines its share by
⊕
j 6=i(Fki, j (τ)⊕Fk j,i (τ)) where τ is an
index that identifies the generated share. It is simple to verify that all the shares XOR to zero
since each PRF value is used exactly twice. Moreover, privacy holds in the presence of any subset
of n−2 corrupted parties because the respective values Fkl,l′ and Fkl′ ,l of honest parties Pl and
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Pl′ are pseudorandom, which implies that their zero shares are also pseudorandom. Finally,
the communication complexity of the setup phase amounts to sending O(n2) PRF keys, whilst
creating the shares requires 2(n−1) PRF evaluations to produce κ bits.
5.2.3 Syndrome Decoding and Learning Parity with Noise
For completeness, we describe the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) and Syndrome Decoding
(SD) search problems, as well as how they relate to each other.
Definition 5.1 (Learning Parity with Noise (LPN)). Let `, q ∈ N and let χ be a distribution
defined over Fq2 . Sample A ← F
q×`
2 uniformly random and e ∈ F
q
2 according to χ. Given (A, A ·s+e),
the LPNq,`,χ problem is to recover s ∈ F`2 with noticeable probability.
Most commonly, the LPN problem is presented for χ consisting of q independent, identi-
cally distributed (i.i.d.) Bernoulli distributions with parameter τ ∈ (0,0.5). In other words, if
e = (e1, . . . , eq), then each e i is set to 1 with probability τ. Unlike most assumptions used in
cryptography, the LPN problem is not known to be broken in the presence of a quantum adversary.
As we will show below, the search LPN problem can also be presented as the problem of decoding
random linear codes.
A binary [m,k,d]2 linear code C is a k-dimensional subspace of Fm2 , where m is the length of
the code, k is its dimension as a vector subspace and d is its distance, i.e. the minimal non-zero
Hamming distance between any two elements of C. We say G ∈ Fk×m2 is a generator matrix of a
linear code C if G’s rows are a basis of C. Given any message s ∈ Fm2 , we can encode it using C by
computing G · s= x. We call any such x ∈ C a codeword.
Equivalently, C can be defined as the kernel of a full-rank matrix H ∈ F(m−k)×m2 , called a
parity-check matrix of C. Given a vector z = x+ e ∈ Fm2 , where x ∈ C is a codeword and e an error
vector, the syndrome corresponding to z is the vector y= H · z = H ·x+H · e = H · e ∈ Fm−k2 . Hence,
the syndrome does not depend on the codeword, but only on the error vector. When the Hamming
weight wt(e) of e is smaller than the error correction capability of C, that is wt(e)≤ b d−12 c, y is
called a correctable syndrome and z can be uniquely decoded to x. More formally, we can define a
mapping
Syn : Fm2 −→ Fr2 (r = m−k)
e 7−→ H · e(= y).
When the domain of Syn is restricted to vectors of upper bounded Hamming weight, inverting Syn
is strictly related to the problem of decoding the [m,k,d]2 linear code with parity-check matrix
H, and this problem is equivalent to the average-case hardness of the following computational
search problem.
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Definition 5.2 (Syndrome Decoding (SD)). Let r,h,m ∈N. Sample a parity check matrix H ←
Fr×m2 and e ← Fm2 such that wt(e)= h. Given (H,H · e), the SDr,m,h problem is to recover e with
noticeable probability.
Let G be C’s generator matrix and s a message prior to its encoding. As described above,
the SDr,m,h problem is then equivalent to recovering the message s from the noisy codeword
z =Gs+ e. If we define χ̃ to be the uniformly random distribution over the elements of Fm2 with
Hamming weight h, then this is exactly LPNm−r,m,χ̃. Actually, it turns out that defining LPN
with such distribution is at least as hard as its more common presentation, where χ is made out
of i.i.d. Bernoulli distributions [54, Lemma 3.6.]. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that if e is
sampled according to i.i.d. Bernoulli distributions, then with noticeable probability e will also be
a sample of χ̃.
The extension of LPN from the binary field F2 to a prime field Fp is known as Learning with
Errors [116], which has become a major assumption in lattice-based cryptography for realizing
complex primitives such as homomorphic encryption. In this chapter, though, we are interested
in a variant of the SD problem in which some further structure is added to the error vector e.
5.2.4 Regular Syndrome Decoding Problem
We introduce the Regular Syndrome Decoding (RSD) problem and some of its properties.
Definition 5.3. A vector e ∈ Fm2 is (m,h)-regular if e = (e1‖· · ·‖eh) where each ei ∈ {0,1}m/h has
Hamming weight one. We denote by Rm,h the set of all the (m,h)-regular vectors in Fm2 .
Definition 5.4 (Regular Syndrome Decoding (RSD)). Let r,h,` ∈N with m = h ·2`, H ← Fr×m2
and e ← Rm,h. Given (H,He), the RSDr,h,` problem is to recover e with noticeable probability.
The decisional version of the problem, given below, is to distinguish the syndrome He from
uniform.
Definition 5.5 (Decisional Regular Syndrome Decoding (DRSD)). Let H ← Fr×m2 and e ← Rm,h,
and let Ur be the uniform distribution on r bits. The DRSDr,h,` problem is to distinguish between
(H,He) and (H,Ur) with noticeable advantage.
5.2.4.1 Hash function formulation.
The DRSD problem can be equivalently described as distinguishing from uniform
⊕h
i=1H(i,ki)
where H : [h]× {0,1}`→ {0,1}r is a random hash function, and each ki ← {0,1}`. With this formula-
tion, it is easier to see how the DRSD problem arises when using our protocols with short keys,
since this appears when summing up a hash function applied to h honest parties’ secret keys.
To see the equivalence, we can define a matrix H ∈ Fr×h·2`2 , where for each i ∈ {0, . . . ,h−1} and
k ∈ [2`], column i ·2`+k of H contains H(i,k). Then, multiplying H with a random (m,h)-regular
vector e is equivalent to taking the sum of H over h random inputs, as above.
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5.2.4.2 Statistical hardness of DRSD.
We next observe that for certain parameters where the output size of H is sufficiently smaller than
the min-entropy of the error vector e, the distribution in the decisional problem is statistically
close to uniform.
Lemma 5.2.1. If ` = 1 and h ≥ r+ s then DRSDr,h,` is statistically hard, with distinguishing
probability 2−s.
Proof. Suppose `= 1 and h ≥ r+ s, so m = 2h. For a vector e = (e1‖· · ·‖eh) ∈ Rm,h, we can write
each of the weight-1 vectors ei ∈ {0,1}2 as (e′i,1− e′i). An RSD sample H, y= He therefore defines
a system of r linear equations in the h variables {e′i}i, and it can be shown that this simplifies to
the form y = H′e′+ c, where e′ = (e′1, . . . , e′h), by defining the j-th column of H′ ∈ Fr×h2 to be the
sum of columns 2 j−1 and 2 j from H, and c to be the sum of all even-indexed columns in H. Note
that H′ is uniformly random because H is, and it is easy to show (e.g. [110, Lemma 1]) that the
probability that H′ ← Fr×h2 is not full rank is no more than 2−s when h ≥ r+ s. Assuming that H′
has full rank and h ≥ r, y= H′e′+ c must be uniformly random because e′ is. ■
For the general case of `-bit keys, we use the following form of the leftover hash lemma.
Lemma 5.2.2 (Leftover Hash Lemma [72]). Let H ← Fr×m2 and e ← χ, where χ is a distribution
over Fm2 with min-entropy at least k. If r ≤ k−2s then
∆SD((H,He), (H,u))≤ 2−s
where u ← Fr2 and ∆SD is the statistical distance.
Note that if e ← Rm,h then we have H∞(e)= h`. Applying Lemma 5.2.2 with k = h`, we obtain
the following.
Corollary 5.2.1. If h ≥ (r+2s)/` then DRSDr,h,` is statistically hard, with distinguishing proba-
bility 2−s.
5.2.4.3 Search-to-decision reduction.
For all parameter choices of DRSD, there is a simple reduction to the search version of the regular
syndrome decoding problem with the same parameters.
Lemma 5.2.3. Any efficient distinguisher for the DRSDr,h,` problem can be used to efficiently
solve RSDr,h,`.
The proof (inspired by a similar result for LPN [4]) is a simplified version of previous reduc-
tions for syndrome decoding. We first recall the Goldreich-Levin hardcore-bit theorem.
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Theorem 5.2.2 ([63]). Let f be a one-way function. Then, given (r, f (x)) for uniformly random r
and x, the inner product 〈x, r〉 over F2 is unpredictable.
Proof. (of Lemma 5.2.3) Suppose A distinguishes between (H,He) and (H,Ur) with noticeable
advantage δ. We construct an adversary A ′ that breaks the Goldreich-Levin hardcore bit of
f (e)= (H,He) by guessing the inner product 〈e,s〉 for some vector s ∈ Fm2 . On input (H, y= He,s),
algorithm A ′ proceeds as follows:
1. Sample t← {0,1}r
2. Compute H′ = H− t · s>
3. Run A on input (H′, y)
4. Output the same as A
First notice that because H is uniformly random, H′ is also. Secondly, y= He = (H′+ t · s>)e =
H′e+t·〈s, e〉. So, if 〈s, e〉 = 0 then the input to A is a correct sample (H′,H′e), whereas if 〈s, e〉 = 1
then the input is uniformly random. Therefore, it holds that:
Pr[A ′(H,He,r)= 〈e,r〉]=Pr[A ′(H,He,r)= 0|〈e,r〉 = 0] ·Pr[〈e,r〉 = 0] +
+ Pr[A ′(H,He,r)= 1|〈e,r〉 = 1] ·Pr[〈e,r〉 = 1]
= 1
2








We now consider a variant of DRSD with multiple sets of secrets, where the matrix H is fixed
for each sample. We then reduce this to the standard DRSD problem with the same parameters,
with a security loss of the number of secrets.
Definition 5.6 (Multi-Secret DRSD). Let H ← Fr×m2 and e1, . . . , eq ← Rm,h (as in Definition 5.4).




Lemma 5.2.4. q-DRSDr,h,` is reducible to DRSDr,h,`, where the reduction loses a tightness factor
of q.
Proof. The proof is based on a standard hybrid argument with a sequence of q + 1 hybrid
distributions, where each pair of neighbouring hybrids is indistinguishable based on DRSD.
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The first hybrid, H0, outputs (H,u1, . . . ,uq), where H ← Fr×m2 and ui ← {0,1}r, which is exactly
the uniform distribution used in q-DRSD. In hybrid Hi, for i = 1, . . . , q, we sample regular
secrets e1, . . . , ei and output (H,He1, . . . ,Hei,ui+1, . . . ,uq). Note that Hq is the same as the real
distribution in the q-DRSD problem. Any adversary A who distinguishes between Hi and Hi+1
can be used to break DRSDr,h,`, as follows. The distinguisher D receives a DRSD challenge (H, y),
then samples e1, . . . , ei from the error distribution and random strings ui+2, . . . ,uq ← {0,1}r. It
then outputs A (H,He1, . . . ,Hei, y,ui+2, . . . ,uq). The advantage of D against the DRSD problem
is identical to that of A . A standard argument then implies that any adversary who distinguishes
H0 and Hq with advantage δ can solve DRSDr,h,` with advantage at least δ/q. ■
5.2.4.5 Extended Double-Key RSD.
In our final variant of RSD – used in the security proof of our BMR-style online phase – we
consider multiple sets of secrets, and also give the adversary two challenges for each secret which
captures the double use of each key in the garbling procedure. This means we cannot preserve
the RSD parameters, and must reduce to 2-DRSD2r,h,`. We also make a conceptual change, and
specify the problem using a random hash function H with small domain (which can be modelled
as a random oracle, or a random lookup table generated in a trusted setup phase which can be
modelled as a common random string) instead of matrices and vectors. We switch to this notation
in order to capture the computation made by the honest parties when garbling a gate.
Definition 5.7 (Extended Double-Key DRSD). The extended double-key DRSD problem states

















where H : [n]× {0,1}× {0,1}`→ {0,1}r is a randomly sampled function, and ki,k′i ← {0,1}` for i ∈ S.
Lemma 5.2.5. The extended double-key DRSD problem with parameters (r,h,`) is reducible to
2-DRSD(2r,h,`).
Proof. Suppose there exists a set S ⊂ [n] for which an adversary A distinguishes the above
two distributions with noticeable advantage. We use A to construct a distinguisher D for the
2-DRSD(2r,h,`) problem. D receives a challenge (H, y0, y1), where H ∈ F2r×m2 , m = h ·2` and









. Define the hash function H : [n]× {0,1}× {0,1}`→ {0,1}r
so that H(si,b,k) is equal to column 2` i+k (viewing k also as an integer in [2`]) of the matrix Hb,
for each si ∈ S and b ∈ {0,1}. For i ∈ [n]\ S, let the output of H(i, ·, ·) be uniformly random. The
distinguisher then runs A with input
(
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Functionality F r,`
∆-ROT
After receiving ∆ ∈ {0,1}` from PS and (x1, . . . , xr) ∈ {0,1}r from PR , do the following:
1. Sample qi ← {0,1}`, for i ∈ [r], and let ti = qi ⊕ xi ·∆.
2. Output qi to PS and ti to PR , for i ∈ [r].
Figure 5.2: Functionality for oblivious transfer on random, correlated strings.
and outputs the same as A . Notice that if the DRSD challenge is random then the input to A is
random, whereas if the challenge is computed as y j = He j for some regular error e j and j ∈ {0,1},
then we have z j = H0e j and z′j = H1e j, and by the definition of H, these values are equal to the
sum of hash function outputs under some secret keys corresponding to e j. It follows that the
distinguishing advantage of D is the same as that of A . ■
5.3 GMW-Style MPC with Short Keys
In this section we design a protocol for generating multiplication triples over F2 using short
secret keys, with reduced communication complexity as the number of honest parties increases.
More concretely, we first design a leaky protocol for secret-shared two-party bit multiplication,
based on correlated OT and OT extension techniques with short keys. This protocol is not fully
secure and we precisely define the leakage obtained by the receiver. We next show how to use
the leaky protocol to produce multiplication triples, removing the leakage by rerandomizing the
parties’ shares with shares of zero, and using the DRSD assumption. Finally, this protocol can be
used with Beaver’s multiplication triple technique [16] to obtain MPC for binary circuits with an
amortized communication complexity of O(nt`) bits per triple, where t is the threshold and ` is
the secret key length. When the number of honest parties is large enough we can even use `= 1
and avoid relying on DRSD.
5.3.1 Leaky Two-Party Secret-Shared Multiplication
We first present our protocol for two-party secret-shared bit multiplication, based on a variant
of the [74] OT extension protocol, modified to use short keys. With short keys we cannot hope
for computational security based on standard symmetric primitives, because an adversary can
search every possible key in polynomial time. Our goal, therefore, is to define the precise leakage
that occurs when using short keys, in order to remove this leakage at a later stage.
5.3.1.1 OT extension and correlated OT
Recall that the main observation of the IKNP protocol for extending oblivious transfer [74] is
that correlated OT is symmetric, so that κ correlated OTs on r-bit strings can be locally converted
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into r correlated OTs on κ-bit strings. Secondly, a κ-bit correlated OT can be used to obtain an
OT on chosen strings with computational security. The first stage of this process is abstracted
away by the functionality F∆-ROT in Figure 5.2.
Using IKNP to multiply an input bit xk from the sender, PA, with an input bit yk from PB,
the receiver, PB sends yk as its choice bit to F∆-ROT and learns tk = qk ⊕ yk ·∆. The sender PA
obtains qk, and then sends
dk =H(qk)⊕H(qk ⊕∆)⊕ xk,
where H is a 1-bit output hash function. This allows the parties to compute an additive sharing of
xk · yk as follows: PA defines the share H(qk), and PB computes H(tk)⊕ yk ·dk. This can be repeated
many times with the same ∆ to perform a large batch of poly(κ) secret-shared multiplications,
because the randomness in ∆ serves to computationally mask each x with the hash values (under
a suitable correlation robustness assumption for H). The downside of this is that for ∆ ∈ {0,1}κ,
the communication cost is O(κ) bits per two-party bit multiplication, to perform the correlated
OTs.
5.3.1.2 Variant with short keys
We adapt this protocol to use short keys by performing the correlated OTs on `-bit strings, instead
of κ-bit, for some small key length `=O(logκ) (we could have ` as small as 1). This allows F∆-ROT
to be implemented with only O(`) bits of communication per OT instead of O(κ).
Our protocol, shown in Figure 5.4, performs a batch of r multiplications at once. First the
parties create r correlated OTs on `-bit strings using F∆-ROT. Next, the parties hash the output
strings of the correlated OTs, and PA sends over the correction values dk, which are used by PB
to convert the random OTs into a secret-shared bit multiplication. Finally, we require the parties
to add a random value (from FZero, shown in Figure 5.1) to their outputs, which ensures that
they have a uniform distribution.
Note that if ` ∈O(logκ) then the hash function HAB has a polynomial-sized domain, so can be
described as a lookup table provided as a common input to the protocol by both parties. At this
stage we do not make any assumptions about HAB; this means that the leakage in the protocol
will depend on the hash function, so its description is also passed to the functionality FLeaky-2-Mult
(Figure 5.3). We require HAB to take as additional input an index k ∈ [r] and a bit in {0,1}, to
provide independence between different uses, and our later protocols require the function to be
different in protocol instances between different pairs of parties (we use the notation HAB to
emphasize this).
5.3.1.3 Leakage
We now analyse the exact security of the protocol in Figure 5.4 when using short keys, and
explain how this is specified in the functionality FLeaky-2-Mult (Figure 5.3). Since a random share
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Functionality F r,`Leaky-2-Mult
INPUT: (x1, . . . , xr) ∈ Fr2 from PA and (y1, . . . , yr) ∈ Fr2 from PB.
COMMON INPUT: A hash function HAB : [r]× {0,1}× {0,1}`→ {0,1}.
1. Sample zA , zB ← Fr2 such that zA + zB = x∗ y (where ∗ denotes component-wise product).
2. Output zA to PA and zB to PB.
Leakage: If PB is corrupt:
1. Let H ∈ Fr×2`2 be defined so that entry (k,k′) of H is HAB(k,1⊕ yk, tk ⊕k′), where tk ← {0,1}`.
2. Sample a random unit vector e ∈ F2`2 and send (H,u = He+ x) to A .
Figure 5.3: Ideal functionality for leaky secret-shared two-party bit multiplication.
of zero is added to the outputs, note that the output distribution is uniformly random. Also, like
IKNP, the protocol is perfectly secure against a corrupt PA (or sender), so we only need to be
concerned with leakage to a corrupt PB who also sees the intermediate values of the protocol.
The leakage is different for each k, depending on whether yk = 0 or yk = 1, so we consider the
two cases separately. Within each case, there are two potential sources of leakage: firstly, the
corrupt PB ’s knowledge of tk and ρk may cause leakage (where ρk is a random share of zero),
since these values are used to define PA ’s output. Secondly, the dk values seen by PB, which
equal
(5.1) dk =HAB(k, yk, tk)⊕HAB(k,1⊕ yk, tk ⊕∆)⊕ xk,
may leak information on PA ’s inputs xk.
Case 1 (yk = 1):
In this case there is only leakage from the values tk and ρk, which are used to define PA ’s
output. Since zAk =HAB(k,0, tk ⊕∆)⊕ρk, all of PA ’s outputs (and hence, also inputs) where yk = 1
effectively have only ` bits of min-entropy in the view of PB, corresponding to the random
choice of ∆. In this case PB ’s output is zBk = zAk ⊕ xk =HAB(k,0, tk ⊕∆)⊕ρk ⊕ xk. To ensure that
PB ’s view is simulable the functionality needs to sample a random string ∆← {0,1}` and leak
HAB(k,0, tk ⊕∆)⊕ xk to a corrupt PB.
Concerning the dk values, notice that when yk = 1 PB can compute HAB(k,1, tk) and use (5.1)
to recover HAB(k,0, qk)+ xk, which equals zAk +ρk+ xk. However, this is not a problem, because in
this case we have zBk = zAk + xk, so dk can be simulated given PB ’s output.
Case 2 (yk = 0):
Here the dk values seen by PB causes leakage on PA ’s inputs, because ∆ is short. Looking at (5.1),
dk leaks information on xk because ∆← {0,1}` is the only unknown in the equation, and is fixed
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Protocol Πr,`Leaky-2-Mult
PARAMETERS: r, number of multiplications; `, key length.
INPUT: x= (x1, . . . , xr) ∈ Fr2 from PA and y= (y1, . . . , yr) ∈ Fr2 from PB.
COMMON INPUT: A hash function HAB : [r]× {0,1}× {0,1}`→ {0,1}.
1. PA and PB invoke F
r,`
∆-ROT where PA is sender with a random input∆← {0,1}`, and PB is receiver
with inputs (y1, . . . , yr). PA receives random strings qk ∈ {0,1}` and PB receives tk = qk ⊕ yk ·∆,
for k ∈ [r].
2. Call F rZero so that PA and PB obtain the same random ρk ∈ {0,1} for every k ∈ [r].
3. For each k ∈ [r], PA privately sends to PB:
dk =HAB(k,0, qk)+HAB(k,1, qk +∆)+ xk.
4. PB outputs
zBk =HAB(k, yk, tk)+ yk ·dk +ρk, for k ∈ [r].
5. PA outputs
zAk =HAB(k,0, qk)+ρk, for k ∈ [r].
Figure 5.4: Leaky secret-shared two-party bit multiplication protocol.
for every k. Similarly to the previous case, this means that all of PA ’s inputs where yk = 0 have
only ` bits of min-entropy in the view of an adversary who corrupts PB. We can again handle this
leakage, by defining FLeaky-2-Mult to leak HAB(k,1, tk ⊕∆)+ xk to a corrupt PB.
Note that there is no leakage from the tk values when yk = 0, because then tk = qk, so these
messages are independent of ∆ and the inputs of PA.
In the functionality FLeaky-2-Mult, we actually modify the above slightly so that the leakage is
defined in terms of linear algebra, instead of the hash function HAB, to simplify the translation to
the DRSD problem later on. Therefore, FLeaky-2-Mult defines a matrix H ∈ Fr×2`2 , which contains
the 2` values {HAB(k,1⊕ yk, tk ⊕∆)}∆∈{0,1}` in row k, where each tk is uniformly random. Given
H, the leakage from the protocol can then be described by sampling a random unit vector e ∈ F2`2
(which corresponds to ∆ ∈ {0,1}` in the protocol) and leaking u = He+ x to a corrupt PB.
5.3.1.4 Communication complexity and security
The cost of computing r secret-shared products is that of ` random, correlated OTs on r-bit
strings, and a further r bits of communication. Using OT extension [10, 74] to implement the
correlated OTs the amortized cost is `(r+κ) bits, for computational security κ. This gives a total
cost of `(r+κ)+ r bits.
Theorem 5.3.1. Protocol Πr,`Leaky-2-Mult securely implements the functionality F
r,`
Leaky-2-Mult with
perfect security in the (F∆-ROT,FZero)-hybrid model in the presence of static honest-but-curious
adversaries.
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Proof. The main challenge in the proof consists of showing that the leakage to PB in the
functionality can be translated directly to the leakage introduced in the protocol in the view of
PB. More formally, for the two cases of a corrupt PA , and a corrupt PB, we define a simulator who
obtains the corrupted party’s inputs and the output of FLeaky-2-Mult, and simulates the view of
the corrupted party during a protocol execution.
NO CORRUPTIONS: Here, no simulation is necessary because all communication is over
private channels, so we just need to show that the outputs of an honest execution are distributed
identically to the functionality. By inspection, the protocol is correct. Observe that the outputs of
PA are uniformly random, because ρk is uniformly random. Since PB ’s outputs are fixed by the
inputs and PA ’s outputs, we are done.
CORRUPT PA : This is the simpler of the remaining two cases. The simulator SA receives
PA ’s inputs x1, . . . , xr ∈ F2, as well as the outputs zA1 , . . . , zAr from FLeaky-2-Mult. It completes
the view of PA by sampling the q1, . . . , qr ← {0,1}` PA receives from F∆-ROT, and then sends
ρk = zAk −HAB(k,0, qk) to simulate PA ’s outputs from FZero.
It is easy to see that the views in the two executions are identically distributed, since no
messages are sent to PA during the protocol, and the definition of ρk in the simulation ensures
that ρk is uniformly random (because zAk is) and also consistent with PA ’s output and the hash
function, as in the protocol.
CORRUPT PB : We define a simulator SB, who receives the inputs y1, . . . , yr ∈ {0,1}, and then
obtains the values zB1 , . . . , z
B
r ,H,u = (u1, . . . ,ur) from the functionality.
Let SB sample values t1, . . . , tr ∈ {0,1}` at random, subject to the constraint that for every
k ∈ [r] and k′ ∈ {0,1}`, HAB(k,1⊕ yk, tk ⊕ k′) is equal to entry (k,k′) of H (viewing k′ also as an
integer in [2`]). Note that because of the way H is defined in FLeaky-2-Mult, such a tk is guaranteed
to exist and can be found by searching all 22` = poly(κ) possibilities of k′ and tk. This also ensures
it will be identically distributed to the tk sampled by the functionality. SB sends these values tk
as the outputs of F∆-ROT to PB.
For all k ∈ [r], SB then emulates the output of FZero to PB as follows:
1. If yk = 0, send ρk = zBk +HAB(k,0, tk).
2. If yk = 1, send ρk = zBk +uk.
Finally, for k ∈ [r], SB sends dk = uk +HAB(k, yk, tk) to PB. This completes the simulation of PB ’s
view.
Regarding indistinguishability, first note that, as observed above, the tk values are identically
distributed in both executions. Now considering the case when yk = 0, we have:
zBk +HAB(k,0, tk)+ρk = 0,
from the definition of ρk. Since in both worlds zBk , tk and ρk are all uniformly random, subject to
the above, this means that these values are identically distributed in both worlds. Also, it is easy
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to see that the simulated dk values are computed exactly as in the protocol, because of the way
FLeaky-2-Mult computes uk.
When yk = 1, we have:
zBk +HAB(k,1, tk)+dk +ρk = 0 ⇐⇒ (ρk +uk)+HAB(k,1, tk)+ρk = dk
⇐⇒HAB(k,0, tk ⊕ ∆̃)+HAB(k,1, tk)+ xk = dk,
where ∆̃ ∈ [2`] denotes the position of the 1 in e sampled by FLeaky-2-Mult to compute u, so is
identically distributed to ∆ ∈ {0,1}` in the real protocol. Therefore, the last equation above holds,
which implies that zBk , ρk and dk are all distributed identically to the values in the real protocol.
■
5.3.2 MPC for Binary Circuits From Leaky OT
We now show how to use the leaky OT protocol to compute multiplication triples over F2, using a
GMW-style protocol [62, 64] optimized for the case of at least h honest parties. This can then be
used to obtain a general MPC protocol for binary circuits using Beaver’s method [16].
5.3.2.1 Triple generation
We implement the triple generation functionality over F2, shown in Figure 5.5. Recall that to
create a triple using the GMW method, first each party locally samples shares xi, yi ← F2. Next,
















where xi denotes Pi ’s share of x =∑i xi.
Since each party can compute xi yi on its own, in order to obtain additive shares of z = xy it
suffices for the parties to obtain additive shares of xi y j for every pair i 6= j. This is done using
oblivious transfer between Pi and P j, since a 1-out-of-2 OT implies two-party secret-shared bit
multiplication. Due to efficiency considerations we realize a slight variation of this functionality
where two (possibly overlapping) subsets P (h),P (1) such that P (h) has at least h honest parties
and P (1) has at least one honest party, choose the respective shares of x and y.
If we use the leaky two-party batch multiplication protocol from the previous section, this
approach fails to give a secure protocol because the leakage in FLeaky-2-Mult allows a corrupt PB
to guess PA ’s inputs with probability 2−`. When using this naively, PA carries out a secret-shared
multiplication using the same input shares with every other party, which allows every corrupt
party to attempt to guess PA ’s shares, increasing the success probability further. If the number of
corrupted parties is not too small then this gives the adversary a significant chance of successfully
guessing the shares of every honest party, completely breaking security.
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Functionality F rTriple


















j) to party Pi, for j ∈ [r].
Figure 5.5: Multiplication triple generation functionality.
To avoid this issue, we require PA to randomize the shares used as input to FLeaky-2-Mult, in
such a way that we still preserve correctness of the protocol. To do this, the parties will use FZero
to generate random zero shares si, j ∈ F2 (held by Pi), satisfying ∑i si, j = 0 for all j ∈ [n], and then











(xi + si, j)= xy,
so still obtain a correct triple.
Finally, to ensure that the output shares are uniformly random, fresh shares of zero will be
added to each party’s share of xy. Note that masking each xi input to FLeaky-2-Mult means that
it doesn’t matter if the individual shares are leaked to the adversary, as long as it is still hard
to guess the sum of all shares. This means that we only need to be concerned with the sum of
the leakage from FLeaky-2-Mult. Recall that each individual instance leaks the input of an honest
party Pi masked by H i ei, where H i is a random matrix and ei ∈ F2`2 is a random unit vector.
Summing up all the leakage from h honest parties, we get
h∑
i=1






This is exactly an instance of the DRSDr,h,` problem, so is pseudorandom for an appropriate
choice of parameters.
We remark that the number of triples generated, r, affects the hardness of DRSD. However,
we can create an arbitrary number of triples without changing the assumption by repeating the
protocol for a fixed r.
5.3.2.2 Reducing the number of OT channels
The above approach reduces communication of GMW by a factor κ/`, for `-bit keys, but still
requires a complete network of n(n−1) OT and communication channels between the parties.
We can reduce this further by again taking advantage of the fact that there are at least h
honest parties. We observe that when using our two-party secret-shared multiplication protocol
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Protocol ΠrTriple
The protocol runs between a set of parties P = {P1, . . . ,Pn}, containing two (possibly overlapping)
subsets P (h),P (1), such that P (h) has at least h honest parties and P (1) has at least one honest party.
We denote nh = |P (h)|, n1 = |P (1)|.
CRS: Random hash functions Hi : [r]× {0,1}× {0,1}`→ {0,1}, for i ∈ [nh].
1. Each party Pi ∈P (h) samples xik ← F2, and each P j ∈P (1) samples y
j
k ← F2, for k ∈ [r].
2. Call FZero so that each Pτ ∈ P (h) ∪P (1) obtains shares (ρτ1, . . . ,ρτr) and each Pi ∈ P (h) obtains
shares (si, j1 , . . . , s
i, j
r ) j∈P (1) , such that
⊕
τ∈P (h)∪P (1) ρ
τ





3. Every pair (Pi,P j) ∈P (h)×P (1) runs F r,`Leaky-2-Mult(Hi) on input {xik+s
i, j
k }k∈[r] from Pi and {y
j
k}k∈[r]
from P j. For k ∈ [r], Pi receives ai, jk and P j receives b
j,i




k = (xik + s
i, j
k ) · y
j
k.
4. Each Pi ∈P (h) ∪P (1) computes, for k ∈ [r]:














k has not been defined by Pi, it is set to zero.





Figure 5.6: Secret-shared triple generation using leaky two-party multiplication.
to generate triples, information is only leaked on the xi shares, and not the yi shares of each
triple. This means that h−1 parties can choose their shares of y to be zero, and y will still be
uniformly random to an adversary who corrupts up to t = n−h parties. This reduces the number
of OT channels needed from n(n−1) to (t+1)(n−1).
When the number of parties is large enough, we can do even better using random committees.
We randomly choose two committees, P (h) and P (1), such that except with negligible probability,
P (h) has at least h honest parties and P (1) has at least one honest party. Only the parties in P (h)
choose non-zero shares of x, and parties in P (1) choose non-zero shares of y; all other parties do
not take part in any OT instances, and just output random sharings of zero. We remark that
it can be useful to choose the parameter h lower than the actual number of honest parties, to
enable a smaller committee size (at the cost of potentially larger keys). When the total number of
parties, n, is large enough, this means the number of interacting parties can be independent of n.
The complete protocol, described for two fixed committees satisfying our requirements, is shown
in Figure 5.6.
5.3.2.3 Communication complexity and security
Recall from the analysis in Section 5.3.1 that when using protocol ΠLeaky-2-Mult with ΠTriple, the
cost of computing r secret-shared triples is that of ` random, correlated OTs on r-bit strings,
and a further r bits of communication between every pair of parties. This gives a total cost of
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`(r+κ)+ r bits between every pair of parties who has an OT channel (ignoring FZero and the seed
OTs for OT extension, since their communication cost is independent of the number of triples). If
the two committees P (h),P (1) have sizes nh ≤ n and n1 ≤ t+1 then we have the following theorem.





model, based on the DRSDr,h,` assumption, where h is the number of honest parties in P (h). The
amortized communication cost is ≤ nhn1(`+`κ/r+1) bits per triple.
Proof. The claimed communication complexity follows from the previous analysis. Security relies
on the fact that Pi ∈ P (h)’s input to FLeaky-2-Mult is always of the form xi + si, j, where si, j is a
fresh, random sharing of zero. This means that any leakage on Pi ’s input from FLeaky-2-Mult is
perfectly masked by si, j, and we only need to consider the sum of the leakage from all honest
parties in P (h).
Recall that we have two committees P (h) and P (1) of sizes nh and n1, with at least h and 1
honest parties, respectively. Let A be an adversary corrupting a set of parties A. Throughout the
proof we will write x1, . . . , xr to denote the components of a vector x ∈ Fr2.
We construct a simulator, S , which interacts with A as follows:
1. Simulate the CRS with nh randomly sampled functions Hi : [r]× {0,1}× {0,1}`→ {0,1}.





3. For each i ∈P (h)∩A, sample si, j ← Fr2, for j ∈ [n1], and send these to A as the shares output
by FZero.
4. Let Pi ∈P (h),P j ∈P (1). Compute the messages that would be sent by FLeaky-2-Mult to the
adversary as follows:
a) Pi,P j ∈ A: Using both parties’ inputs, generate their random output shares as FLeaky-2-Mult
would do and send these to A . Explicitly, the simulator samples shares ai, j,b j,i that
sum to (xi+si, j)∗ y j, and the leakage (H i, j,ui, j) on xi+si, j (just as FLeaky-2-Mult would
do).
b) Pi ∈ A,P j ∉ A: Emulate the corrupt Pi ’s view honestly, by sampling ai, j ← Fr2.
c) Pi ∉ A,P j ∈ A: Sample uniform values b j,i,ui, j ← Fr2, and sample H i, j ∈ Fm×2
`
2 exactly
as FLeaky-2-Mult would do, using knowledge of Hi and y j.
5. For i ∈ A∩ (P (h) ∪P (1)), compute ρ i = zi + (xi + si,i)∗ yi +
∑
j 6=i(ai, j +bi, j) and send this as
the ρ ik share from FZero.
6. Send to A the values {ai, j}i∈P (h)∩A, j∈P (1) ∪ {b j,i,H i, j,ui, j}i∈P (h), j∈P (1)∩A as defined above, to
simulate the outputs of FLeaky-2-Mult.
We first consider the distribution of the parties’ outputs.
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Claim 5.3.1. The outputs of the protocol are distributed identically to outputs of the functionality.








































yik · si,ik +
∑
j 6=i











= xk · yk









Now, to see that (zik)i are uniformly random, subject to the above, notice that the masks
(ρ ik)
n−1




i=1 . This completes the
claim. 
We next consider the entire view of the environment Z , which is the joint distribution of all
parties’ inputs and outputs, and the messages received by the adversary during the protocol.
Using vector notation, this is:
(xi, y j, zi, z j)i∈P (h), j∈P (1) , (ρ
i,si, j,ai, j)i∈A∩P (h), j∈P (1) , (ρ
j,b j,i,ui, j,H i, j)i∈P (h), j∈P (1)∩A.
First note that the ρτ,τ ∈P (h)∪P (1) and si, j shares, for i ∈P (h)∩A, j ∈P (1) \ A, are uniformly
random in both executions, since the environment never sees the honest parties’ shares. Secondly,
recall that in the simulation, ai, j for corrupt Pi and honest P j and b j,i (for corrupt P j and honest
Pi) are computed uniformly at random, and this is identically distributed to the values in the
protocol sampled by FLeaky-2-Mult, because the outputs of the honest party in that instance are not
seen by Z . Also, notice that when P j is corrupt S computes H i, j exactly as in the real protocol,
because S knows P j ’s input y j.
This leaves the {ui, j}i∈P (h)\A, j∈P (1)∩A values, which are the main challenge, because the simu-
lation computes these with random values, whilst the real execution uses the honest Pi ’s inputs,
computing ui, j = H i, j ei, j + xi + si, j for a random unit vector ei, j. Let Pi1 , . . . ,Pih be the honest
parties in P (h). Because the si, j values are random shares of zero, it holds that the partial
views containing the entire transcript except for (ui1, j) j∈P (1)∩A are identically distributed. This is
because for P j ∈P (1) ∩ A, the masks si2, j, . . . ,sih, j in the protocol are random and independent of
the view of Z , which makes the corresponding ui2, j, . . . ,sih, j values distributed the same as in
the simulation.
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Once we include ui1, j, however, these values are no longer independent because
∑n
i∈P (h) s
i, j = 0.
We therefore look at the distribution of
∑h
k=1 u




ui, j = ∑
i∈P (h)\A
(xi + si, j +H i, j ei, j)
for some random, weight-1 vector ei, j. In the simulation, all of the ui, j ’s are uniformly random.
Since Z can compute
∑
i∈P (h)\A(x
i + si, j) with the information it already has, it follows that
distinguishing the two executions requires distinguishing
H i ei :=
(







and the uniform distribution on r bits (given H i).
We claim that this corresponds exactly to solving the DRSDr,h,` problem, because H i is
uniformly distributed in Fr×2
`h
2 and ei is a uniformly random, 1-regular error vector of weight h.
Lemma 5.3.2. Any environment distinguishing the real and ideal executions with advantage δ
can be used to break DRSDr,h,` with advantage at least δ/t (where t = |P (1) ∩ A|).
Proof. Assume w.l.o.g. that the corrupted parties in P (1) are indexed P1, . . . ,Pt. We construct a
sequence of hybrid executions, HYB0, . . . ,HYBt, where hybrid HYB0 is identical to the simulation.
In hybrid HYB j′ , instead of the simulator sampling ui, j (for j ≤ j′, i ∈ P (h) \ A) at random, we
replace this with the real ui, j generated using Pi ’s inputs as in the protocol. The final hybrid
HYBt is therefore identically distributed to the real execution.
Let A be an adversary for which the environment Z distinguishes between HYB j′ and
HYB j′+1 with advantage δ, for some index j′ < t. We construct a distinguisher D for DRSDr,h,` as
follows. D receives a DRSD challenge H j′ ∈ Fr×h2`2 , c j
′ ∈ Fr2. Write H j′ = (H i1, j
′‖H i2, j′‖· · ·‖H ih, j′),
where each H ik, j
′ ∈ Fr×2`2 . Now D simulates an execution of ΠTriple with A as S would, with the
following differences.
• D samples a set of honest parties’ shares, (xi, yi, zi)i∉A which, together with the corrupt
parties’ shares known to D, form correct triples.
• Instead of sampling the function Hi in the CRS at random, sample it such that for every
k ∈ [h], the matrix H ik, j′ , sent later to the corrupt P j′ , is equal to the challenge matrix
H ik, j
′
. (The remainder of the CRS is sampled at random.)
• Instead of sampling the leakage terms uik, j
′
(for k ∈ [h]) uniformly and independently,
sample them at random such that
∑
i∈P (h)(u
i, j′ + xi)= c j′ .
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• For each j < j′, instead of sampling uik, j′ uniformly, compute them as in the real protocol
using the honest parties’ shares and shares of zero.
To conclude, D sends all the output shares to Z and outputs the same as Z .
If the challenge (H j′ , c j
′
) comes from the DRSD distribution then the uik, j
′
values are dis-
tributed as in a real execution, so we are in hybrid HYB j′+1. On the other hand, if c j
′
is uniformly
random then so are the uik, j
′
, so we are in HYB j′ . Therefore, the advantage of D is δ, the same
as that of Z . A standard hybrid argument then shows that there exists a distinguisher for HYB0
and HYBt, which has advantage at least δ/t. 
This concludes the proof of Theorem 5.3.2. ■
5.3.2.4 Parameters for unconditional security
Recall from Lemma 5.2.1 and Corollary 5.2.1 that if `= 1 and h ≥ r+ s, or if h ≥ (r+2s)/` for any
`, then DRSDr,h,` is statistically hard, with statistical security 2−s. This means when h is large
enough we can use 1-bit keys, and every pair of parties who communicates only needs to send
2+κ/r bits over the network.2
5.3.2.5 MPC using multiplication triples
Our protocol for multiplication triples can be used to construct a semi-honest MPC protocol for
binary circuits using Beaver’s approach [16]. The parties first secret-share their inputs between
all other parties. Then, XOR gates can be evaluated locally on the shares, whilst an AND gate
requires consuming a multiplication triple, and two openings with Beaver’s method. Each opening
can be done with 2(n−1) bits of communication as follows: all parties send their shares to P1,
who sums the shares together and sends the result back to every other party.
In the 1-bit key case mentioned above, using two (deterministic) committees of sizes n and
t+1 and setting, for instance, r = κ implies the following corollary. Note that the number of
communication channels is (t+1)(n−1) and not (t+1)n, because in the deterministic case P (1) is
contained in P (h), so t+1 sets of the shared cross-products can be computed locally.
Corollary 5.3.3. Assuming OT and OWF, there is a semi-honest MPC protocol for binary circuits
with an amortized communication complexity of no more than 3(t+1)(n−1)+4(n−1) bits per
AND gate, if there are at least κ+ s honest parties.
5.4 Multi-Party Garbled Circuits with Short Keys
In this section we present our second contribution: a constant-round MPC protocol based on
garbled circuits with short keys. The protocol has two phases, a preprocessing phase independent
2Note that we still need computational assumptions for OT and zero sharing in order to implement FLeaky-2-Mult
and FZero.
125
CHAPTER 5. MULTI-PARTY COMPUTATION WITH SHORT KEYS
of the parties’ actual inputs where the garbled circuit is mutually generated by all parties, and an
online phase where the computation is performed. We first abstractly discuss the details of our
garbling method, and then turn to the two protocols for generating and evaluating the garbled
circuit.
5.4.1 The Multi-Party Garbling Scheme
Our garbling method is defined by the functionality FPreprocessing (Figure 5.7), which creates a gar-
bled circuit that is given to all the parties. It can be seen as a variant of the multi-party garbling
technique by Beaver, Micali and Rogaway [18], known as BMR and described in Section 2.6.
We recall that the main ideas behind most protocols instantiating the paradigm in Section 2.6.
First, every party Pi contributes a pair of keys kiw,0,k
i
w,1 ∈ {0,1}κ and a share of a wire mask
λiw ∈ {0,1} for each wire w in the circuit. To garble a gate, the corresponding output wire key from
every party is ‘double encrypted’ under the combination of all parties’ input wire keys, using a
PRF or PRG, so that no single party knows all the keys for a gate. In addition, the Free-XOR
property can be supported by having each party choose their keys such that kiw,0 ⊕ kiw,1 = ∆i,
where ∆i is a global fixed random string known to Pi.
The main difference between our work and the ones previously discussed in Section 2.6, Chap-
ter 3 and Chapter 4 is that we use short keys of length `BMR instead of κ, and then garble gates
using a random, expanding function H : [n]× {0,1}× {0,1}`BMR → {0,1}n`BMR+1. Instead of basing
security on a PRF or PRG, we then reduce the security of the protocol to the pseudorandomness
of the sum of H when applied to each of the honest parties’ keys, which is implied by the DRSD
problem from Section 5.2.4. We also use H′ to denote H with the least significant output bit
dropped, which we use for garbling splitter gates.
To garble an AND gate g with input wires u,v and output wire w, each of the 4 garbled rows







⊕ (c,k1w,c, . . . ,knw,c),(5.2)
where c = (a⊕λu) · (b⊕λv)⊕λw and λu,λv,λw are the secret-shared wire masks. Each row can be
seen as an encryption of the correct n output wire keys under the corresponding input wire keys
of all parties. Note that, for each wire, Pi holds the keys kiu,0,k
i
u,1 and an additive share λ
i
u of the
wire mask. The extra bit value that H takes as input is added to securely increase the stretch of
H when using the same input key twice, preventing a ‘mix-and-match’ attack on the rows of a
garbled gate. The output of H is also extended by an extra bit, to allow encryption of the output
wire mask c.3
3This only becomes necessary when using short keys – in BMR with full-length keys the parties can recover the
wire mask by comparing the output with their own two keys, but this does not work if collisions are possible.
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Functionality FPreprocessing
COMMON INPUT: A function H : [n]× {0,1}× {0,1}`BMR → {0,1}n`BMR+1. Let H′ denote the same function
excluding the least significant bit of the output.
Let C f be a boolean circuit with fan-out-one gates. Denote by AND,XOR and SPLIT its sets of AND,
XOR and Splitter gates, respectively. Given a gate, let I and O be the set of its input and output wires,
respectively. If g ∈ SPLIT, then I = {w} and O = {u,v}, otherwise O = {w}.
The functionality proceeds as follows ∀i ∈ [n]:
1. ∀g ∈XOR, sample ∆ig ← {0,1}`BMR .
2. For each circuit-input wire u, sample λu ← {0,1} and kiu,0 ← {0,1}`BMR . If u is input to a XOR
gate g, set kiu,1 = kiu,0 ⊕∆ig, otherwise kiu,1 ← {0,1}`BMR .
3. Passing topologically through all the gates g ∈ {AND∪XOR∪SPLIT} of the circuit:
• If g ∈XOR:
– Set λw =⊕x∈I λx
– Set kiw,0 =
⊕
x∈I kix,0 and k
i
w,1 = kiw,0 ⊕∆ig
• If g ∈AND:
– Sample λw ← {0,1}.
– kiw,0 ← {0,1}`BMR . If w is input to a XOR gate g′ set kiw,1 = kiw,0 ⊕∆ig′ , else kiw,1 ←
{0,1}`BMR .
– For a,b ∈ {0,1}, representing the external values of wires u and v, let c = (a⊕λu) · (b⊕







⊕ (c,k1w,c, . . . ,knw,c), (a,b) ∈ {0,1}2.
• If g ∈ SPLIT:
– Set λx =λw for every x ∈O.
– ∀x ∈O, sample kix,0 ← {0,1}`BMR . If x ∈O is input to a XOR gate g′, set kix,1 = kix,0⊕∆ig′ ,
otherwise kix,1 ← {0,1}`BMR .











⊕ (k1u,c, . . . ,knu,c,k1v,c, . . . ,knv,c), c ∈ {0,1}
4. Output: For each circuit-input wire u, send λu to the party providing inputs to C f on u. For
every circuit wire v and i ∈ [n], send kiv,0,kiv,1 to Pi. Finally, send to all parties g̃ for each
g ∈AND∪SPLIT and λw for each circuit-output wire w.
Figure 5.7: Multi-party garbling functionality.
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5.4.1.1 Splitter gates
When relying on the DRSD problem, the reuse of a key in multiple gates degrades parameters
and makes the problem easier (as the parameter r grows, the key length must be increased), so
we cannot handle circuits with arbitrary fan-out. For this reason, we restrict our exposition of
the garbling to fan-out-one circuits with so-called splitter gates. This type of gate takes as input
a single wire w and provides two output wires u,v, each of them with fresh, independent keys
representing the same value carried by the input wire. Converting an arbitrary circuit to use
splitter gates incurs a cost of roughly a factor of two in the circuit size (see below).
Splitter gates were previously introduced in [126] as a fix for a similar issue in the original
BMR paper [18], where the wire ‘keys’ were used as seeds for a PRG in order to garble the gates,
so that when a wire was used as input to multiple gates, their garbled versions did not use
independent pseudorandom masks. Other recent BMR-style papers avoid this issue by applying
the PRF over the gate identifier as well, which produces distinct, independent PRF evaluations
for each gate.
5.4.1.2 Enabling Free-XOR
The Free-XOR [86] optimization results in an improvement in both computation and communica-
tion for XOR gates where a global fixed random ∆i is chosen by each party Pi and the input keys
are locally XORed, yielding the output key of this gate. We cannot use the standard Free-XOR
technique [25, 86] for the same reason discussed above: reusing a single offset across multiple
gates would make the DRSD problem easier and not be secure. Inspired by FleXOR [84] we
therefore introduce a new Free-XOR technique which, combined with our use of splitter gates,
allows garbling XOR gates for free without additional assumptions. For each arbitrary fan-in
XOR gate g, each party chooses a different offset ∆ig, allowing for a Free-XOR computation for
wires using keys with that offset. For general circuits, this would normally introduce the problem
that the input wires may not have the correct offset, requiring some ‘translation’ to ∆g. However,
because we restrict to gates with fan-out-one and splitter gates, we know that each input wire to
g is not an input wire to any other gate, so we can always ensure the keys use the correct offset
without any further changes.
5.4.1.3 Compiling to fan-out-1 circuits with splitter gates
Let C f be an arbitrary fan-out circuit, with A AND gates and X XOR gates, both with fan-in-two.
Let IC f and OC f be the number of circuit-input and circuit-output wires, respectively. We will
now compute the number S of splitter gates that the compiled circuit needs. First, note that each
time a wire w is used as input to another gate or as a circuit-output wire, w’s fan-out is increased
by one. Each of the AND, XOR gates in the pre-compiled circuit provides a fresh output wire to
be used in C f , while using for its inputs two pre-existing wires in the circuit. Output wires also
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Functionality FBit×Bit
After receiving (xi, yi) ∈ F22 from each party Pi, sample zi ← F2 such that
∑
i zi = (
∑
i xi) · (
∑
i yi), and
send zi to party Pi.
Figure 5.8: Secret-shared bit multiplication functionality.
Functionality F `BMRBit×String(P j)
After receiving (xi, yi) ∈ F22 from each party Pi, as well as ∆ ∈ F
`BMR
2 from P j, sample Zi ← F2 such that∑
i Z i = (
∑
i xi) ·∆, and send Z i to party Pi.
Figure 5.9: Secret-shared bit/string multiplication functionality.
use one pre-existing wire each, while input wires use no pre-existing wires. This means that, to
compile C f to be a fan-out-one circuit, we need to add up to (2·X +2·A+OC f )−(A+X + IC f ) wires.
Each of these missing wires, however, can be created by using a splitter gate in the compiled
circuit, since each of these gates uses one wire to generate two fresh new wires. So, putting all
the pieces together, the compiled circuit requires S ≤ X + A+OC f − IC f splitter gates. This gives
a close upper bound, as if w is a circuit output wire and an input wire of another gate then it is
being counted twice rather than once in the formula.
5.4.2 Protocol and Functionalities for Bit and Bit/String Multiplication
Even though we could implement both FBit×Bit and F
`BMR
Bit×String(P j) using FTriple, there are more
efficient ways to implement the latter: One by building directly from FLeaky-2-Mult, and another
using [10].
• FLeaky-2-Mult-hybrid implementation (Figure 5.11): As the length-`BMR string R
j
g is not
secret-shared and just known to one party, we only need to perform n−1 invocations of
FLeaky-2-Mult in order to multiply it with a secret-shared bit x = x1 +·· ·+ xn. The protocol
uses random shares of zero to mask the inputs and outputs of FLeaky-2-Mult, similarly to the
ΠTriple protocol.
Note that this does not directly implement the functionality shown in Figure 5.9, because
Π
r,`BMR
Bit×String performs a batch of r independent multiplications in parallel. However, in
the protocol Π`BMRPreprocessing all the gates can be garbled in parallel, so a batch version of
the functionality (as described in Figure 5.10) suffices. The amortized communication
complexity obtained is `BMR(1+`OT +`OTκ/r) bits.
• Asharov et al. [10] implementation: The amortized communication complexity is κ+`BMR
bits.
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Functionality F r,`BMRBit×String
After receiving input (P j, xi1, . . . , x
i
m) from every party Pi, and additional inputs ∆1, . . . ,∆r from P j,
where each xik ∈ {0,1} and ∆k ∈ {0,1}`BMR :
1. Sample Z ik ← {0,1}`BMR , for i ∈ [n] and k ∈ [r], subject to the constraint that⊕
i
Z ik =∆k ·
⊕
i
xik, for k ∈ [r]
2. Output Z i1, . . . , Z
i
r to party Pi
Figure 5.10: Batch secret-shared bit/string multiplication between P j and all parties.
Protocol Πr,`BMRBit×String, n-party Bit/String-Mult
To multiply the strings ∆1, . . . ,∆r ∈ {0,1}`BMR held by P j with secret-shared bits (xi1, . . . , xir)i∈[n]:
1. Denote the v-th bit of ∆k by ∆k,v. For v ∈ [`BMR]:
a) Call F 2rZero so that each Pi obtains fresh shares (ρ
i














b) For each i 6= j, Pi and P j run F r,`OTLeaky-2-Mult on input (xik ⊕σik,v)k∈[r] from Pi and (∆k[v])k∈[r]
from P j. Pi receives aik,v and P j receives b
i
k,v such that a
i
k,v ⊕bik,v =∆k[v] · (xik ⊕σik).
2. Each Pi, for i 6= j, outputs the `BMR-bit strings Z ik := (aik,1 ⊕ρ ik,1, . . . ,aik,`BMR ⊕ρ
i
k,`BMR
), for k ∈ [r].




i 6= j(bik,1, . . . ,b
i
k,`BMR
)⊕ (ρ jk,1, . . . ,ρ
j
k,`BMR
), for k ∈ [r].
Figure 5.11: n-party secret-shared bit/string multiplication using leaky 2-party multiplication.
5.4.2.1 Communication complexity and security
The communication complexity ofΠr,`BMRBit×String is exactly that of (n−1)`BMR instances of F
r,`OT
Leaky-2-Mult,
where `OT is the leakage parameter used in the protocol Π
r,`OT
Leaky-2-Mult. Note that `OT is independent
of `BMR used in the bit/string protocol, but affects the security and cost of realising FLeaky-2-Mult.
The total complexity is then (n−1)`BMR(`OT(r+κ)+ r) bits, or an amortized cost of (n−1)`BMR(`OT+
`OTκ/r+1) bits per multiplication.
Theorem 5.4.1. Protocol Πr,`BMRBit×String UC-securely realizes F
r,`BMR
Bit×String in the F
2r
Zero-hybrid in the
presence of static honest-but-curious adversaries, under the DRSDr,h,`OT assumption.
The proof is a direct extension of the proof of Theorem 5.3.2.
5.4.3 The Preprocessing Protocol
Our protocol for generating the garbled circuit is shown in Figure 5.12. We use two functionalities
FBit×Bit (Figure 5.8) and FBit×String(P j) (Figure 5.9) for multiplying two additively shared bits,
and multiplying an additively shared bit with a string held by P j, respectively. FBit×Bit can be
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easily implemented using a multiplication triple from FTriple in the previous section, whilst
FBit×String uses a variant of the ΠTriple protocol optimized for this task.
The Preprocessing Protocol – Π`BMRPreprocessing
COMMON INPUT: H : [n]× {0,1}× {0,1}`BMR → {0,1}n`BMR+1, a uniformly random sampled function and
H′ defined from H excluding the least significant bit of the output. A boolean circuit C f with fan-out 1.
Let AND,XOR and SPLIT be the sets of AND, XOR and splitter gates, respectively. Given a gate, let I
and O be the set of its input and output wires, respectively. If g ∈ SPLIT, then I = {w} and O = {u,v},
otherwise O = {w}.
For each i ∈ [n], the protocol proceeds as follows:
1. Free-XOR offsets: For every g ∈XOR, Pi samples a random value ∆ig ← {0,1}`BMR
2. Circuit-input wires’ masks and keys: If w is a circuit-input wire:
a) Pi samples a key kiw,0 ← {0,1}`BMR and a wire mask share λiw ← {0,1}.
b) If w is input to a XOR gate g′, Pi sets kiw,1 = kiw,0 ⊕∆ig′ , otherwise kiw,1 ← {0,1}`BMR .
3. Intermediate wires’ masks and keys: Passing topologically through all the gates g ∈ G =
{AND∪XOR∪SPLIT} of the circuit:






x∈I kix,0 and k
i
w,1 = kiw,0 ⊕∆ig.
b) If g ∉XOR, Pi does as follows:
• If g ∈AND, λiw ← {0,1}. Else if g ∈ SPLIT, sets λix =λiw for every x ∈O.
• For every x ∈O, kix,0 ← {0,1}`BMR . If x ∈O is input to a XOR gate g′, set kix,1 = kix,0⊕∆ig′ ,
otherwise sample kix,1 ← {0,1}`BMR .
4. Garble gates: For each gate g ∈ {AND∪SPLIT}, the parties run the subprotocol Π`BMRGateGarbling,
obtaining back shares g̃i of each garbled gate.
5. Reveal input/output wires’ masks: For every circuit-output wire w, Pi broadcasts λiw. For
every circuit-input wire w, Pi sends λiw to the party P j who provides input on it. Each party
reconstructs the wire masks from her received values as λw =⊕ni=1λiw.
6. Open Garbling For each g ∈ {AND∪SPLIT}, Pi sends g̃i to P1. P1 reconstructs every garbled
gate, g̃ =⊕ni=1 g̃i, and broadcasts it.
Figure 5.12: The preprocessing protocol that realizes FPreprocessing.
Most of the preprocessing protocol is similar to previous works [25, 70], where first each party
samples their sets of wire keys and shares of wire masks, and then the parties interact to obtain
shares of the garbled gates. It is the second stage where our protocol differs, so we focus here on
the details of the gate garbling procedures.
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The Gate Garbling sub-protocol – Π`BMRGateGarbling
COMMON INPUT: a function H : [n]× {0,1}× {0,1}`BMR → {0,1}n`BMR+1; H′ defined as H excluding the
least significant output bit; the gate g to be garbled.
PRIVATE INPUT: Each Pi, i ∈ [n], holds λiv and kiv,0,kiv,1, for each wire v.
1. If g ∈AND with input wires {u,v} and output wire w:
a) Each party Pi defines R ig = kiw,0 ⊕kiw,1, for each i ∈ [n]
b) Call FBit×Bit to compute shares of λu ·λv, and use these to locally obtain shares of
χg,a,b = (a⊕λu) · (b⊕λv)⊕λw, for (a,b) ∈ {0,1}2
c) Call F `BMRBit×String(Pi) to get shares of χg,a,b ·R ig, for each i ∈ [n] and (a,b) ∈ {0,1}2. Pi then
sets ρ ii,a,b = kiw,0 ⊕ (χg,a,b ·R ig)i, and ∀ j 6= i, P j sets ρ
j
i,a,b = (χg,a,b ·R ig) j.
d) Each Pi sets g̃ia,b =H(i,b,kiu,a)⊕H(i,a,kiv,b)⊕ (χig,a,b,ρ i1,a,b, . . . ,ρ in,a,b), for a,b ∈ {0,1}.
2. If g ∈ SPLIT with input wire w and output wires {u,v}:




1 ∈ {0,1}2n`BMR .
b) Pi sets ρ ic = sic ⊕ (0, . . . ,kiu,c,0, . . . ,kiv,c, . . . ,0) for c ∈ {0,1}.
c) Set g̃ic =
(
H′(i,0,kiw,c),H′(i,1,kiw,c)
)⊕ρ ic, for c ∈ {0,1}.
Figure 5.13: The gate garbling sub-protocol.
5.4.3.1 The Gate Garbling Protocol
We describe the details of the sub-protocol Π`BMRGateGarbling (Figure 5.13), implementing the gate
garbling phase of FPreprocessing. Creating garbled AND gates is done similarly to the OT-based
protocol [25], with the exception that we use short wire keys of length `BMR instead of κ. We also
show how to create sharings of garbled splitter gates without any interaction, so these are much
cheaper than AND gates.





{0,1}`BMR . Pi defines R ig = kiw,0 ⊕kiw,1. After that all parties call FBit×Bit once to compute additive
shares of λuv =λu ·λv ∈ {0,1}, which are then used to locally compute shares of χg,a,b = (a⊕λu)·(b⊕
λv)⊕λw, for each (a,b) ∈ {0,1}2. Each Pi obtains χig,a,b such that χg,a,b =⊕i∈[n]χig,a,b. To compute
shares of the products χg,a,b ·R ig, the parties call F `BMRBit×String(Pi) three times, for each i ∈ [n], to
multiply R ig with each of the bits λu,λv, (λuv ⊕λw). These can then be used for each P j to locally
obtain the shares (χg,a,b ·R ig) j, for all (a,b) ∈ {0,1}2 (just as in [25]).







j j 6= i
kiw,0 ⊕ (χg,a,b ·R ig)i j = i.
These values define shares of χg,a,b ·R ig ⊕ kiw,0. Finally, each party’s share of the garbled AND
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gate is obtained as:
g̃ia,b =H(i,b,kiu,a)⊕H(i,a,kiv,b)⊕ (χig,a,b,ρ i1,a,b, . . . ,ρ in,a,b), a,b ∈ {0,1}










(H(i,b,kiu,a)⊕H(i,a,kiv,b))⊕ (c,k1w,c, . . . ,knw,c),
where c = χg,a,b, as required.
To garble a splitter gate, we observe that here there is no need for any secure multiplications
within MPC, and the parties can produce shares of the garbled gate without any interaction. This
is because the two output wire values are the same as the input wire value, so to obtain a share
of the encryption of the two output keys on wires u,v with input wire w, party Pi just computes:
(H′(i,0,kiw,c),H
′(i,1,kiw,c))⊕ (0, . . . ,kiu,c,0, . . . ,kiv,c,0, . . . ,0)
for c ∈ {0,1}, where the right-hand vector contains Pi ’s keys in positions i and n+ i. The parties
then re-randomize this sharing with a share of zero from FZero, so that opening the shares does
not leak information on the individual keys.4
5.4.4 Complexity and Security
The above approach reduces size of the garbled circuit by a factor κ/`BMR, for `BMR-bit keys, but still
requires n keys for every row in the garbled gates. Similarly to Section 5.3, when n is large we
can reduce this by using a (random) committee P (h) of size nh that has at least h honest parties.
Π`BMRPreprocessing and Π
`BMR
BMR are then run as if called only by the parties in P (h). For circuit-input
wires w where parties in P \P (h) provide input, they are sent the masks λw in Π
`BMR
Preprocessing, so
in Π`BMRBMR (Figure 5.14) they can then broadcast Λw = ρ iw ⊕λw in the same way as parties in P (h).
This reduces the size of the garbled circuit by an additional factor of n/nh. Finally, the same
committee P (h) can be combined with a (random) committee P (1) with a single honest party in
order to optimize the bit multiplications needed to compute the χg,a,b values, as was described in
Section 5.3.
In Section 5.5, we give some examples of committee sizes and key lengths that ensure security,
and compare this with the naive approach of running the preprocessing phase of BMR in P (1)
only.
4For AND gates, the shares output by F`BMRBit×String are uniformly random, so do not need re-randomizing with
sharings of zero.
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Theorem 5.4.2. ProtocolΠ`BMRPreprocessing UC-securely realizes functionality FPreprocessing (Figure 5.7)




Zero )-hybrid model in the presence of static
honest-but-curious adversaries.
Proof. Let A denote a PPT adversary corrupting a subset of parties A ⊂ [n], then we prove that
there exists a PPT simulator S that simulates the adversary’s view. In the following, we denote
by Ā the set of honest parties. When we say that the simulator is given some value, we mean
that it receives it from FPreprocessing.
DESCRIPTION OF THE SIMULATION: Denote by W and OC f , respectively, the set of wires
and the set of circuit-output wires of a boolean circuit C f . Denote by IC f ,S the set of circuit-
input wires of a circuit where a subset of parties S ⊂ [n] provides input to the circuit. We
assume w.l.o.g. that A is a deterministic adversary, which receives as additional input a random
tape that determines its internal coin tosses. Upon receiving A ’s input (1κ, A,C f ) and output




v,1}v∈W , {λu}u∈IC f ,A ), S incorporates A and internally emulates an execution of
the honest parties running Π`BMRPreprocessing with the adversary A .
1. CIRCUIT-INPUT WIRES’ MASKS AND KEYS: For every circuit-input wire u and for j ∈ A, S
samples from P j ’s random tape the wire mask shares λ
j





is meant to obtain from FPreprocessing. If a corrupted P j provides input to the circuit on a






u, where the value λu was
received from FPreprocessing. If it is a honest party providing input on u, S samples {λiu}i∉A
uniformly at random.
2. INTERMEDIATE WIRES’ MASKS AND KEYS: Passing topologically through the gates g of the
circuit:
• For j ∈ A: If g ∈AND, S samples λ jw ∈ {0,1} from P j ’s random tape. If g ∈ SPLIT, it





• For i ∉ A: If g ∈ AND, S samples λiw. If g ∈ SPLIT, it sets λix = λiw for both output
wires x = u,v. If g ∈XOR, it sets λiw =
⊕
x∈I λix.
• If x is a circuit-output wire, the simulator adjusts the value λx ∈ {0,1} that FPreprocessing
sends to the parties to be λx =⊕i∉Aλix ⊕⊕ j∈Aλ jx.
3. GARBLE GATES: For each g ∈AND∪SPLIT:
• If g ∈AND, let ug,vg be its input wires and wg its output wire. S emulates FBit×Bit by
sampling shares z jg from P j ’s random tape, for j ∈ A, and setting random zig for i ∉ A
such that
∑
i∈[n] zig =λug ·λvg , where λug ,λvg were obtained from FPreprocessing. S has
now all the values to compute shares of χg,a,b as χig,a,b = a ·b⊕b ·λiug ⊕a ·λivg ⊕ zig⊕λiwg
for i ∈ [n].
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For j ∈ [n], S emulates three calls to F `BMRBit×String(P j) with inputs {χig,0,0,χig,0,1,χig,1,0}
from every Pi and additional input R
j
g from P j, where R
j
g = k jwg,0 ⊕ k
j
wg,1
. In each of
these emulated calls and for i ∈ A, it computes the corrupted parties’ output shares
from Pi ’s random tape, while for i ∉ A it samples random shares that sum to each of
the values R jg ·χg,0,0, R jg ·χg,0,1 and R jg ·χg,1,0 as required.
• If g ∈ SPLIT, S emulates twice F 2n`BMRZero by computing shares si0, si1 from Pi ’s random
tape for i ∈ A and setting s j0, s
j
1 for j ∉ A such that
⊕
i∈[n] sic = 0 for c ∈ {0,1}.
Setting the ρ and g̃ values is local computation.
4. REVEAL INPUT/OUTPUT WIRES’ MASKS: For every circuit-output wire w, S adds values
λiw, i ∉ A (previously computed in Step 2) to the view of each P j, j ∈ A. For every circuit-
input wire u on which a P j, j ∈ A, provides input, S adds the {λiu}i∉A values it previously
computed in Step 1 to P j ’s view.
5. OPEN GARBLING: Using the adversary’s output { g̃}g∈AND∪SPLIT, S proceeds as follows: If
1 ∈ A, it plays the role of each P j, for j ∉ A, and sends to P1 the shares { g̃ j}g∈AND∪SPLIT
that it previously computed. Otherwise, the simulator plays the role of P1 by sending
{ g̃}g∈AND∪SPLIT to each Pi, i ∈ A.
INDISTINGUISHABILITY: The wire keys and the (circuit-input and circuit-output) wire masks
output by the functionality FPreprocessing are i.i.d. uniformly random variables in the real world
too. In both worlds and for the additional simulated values, the corrupted parties’ shares for
the wire masks, the bit products (FBit×Bit functionality) and bit/string products (F
`BMR
Bit×String
functionality) needed to garble AND gates are fixed by A ’s random tape, while the honest parties’
shares of the same values are uniformly random additive shares. In particular, this implies that
shares g̃ia,b of garbled AND gates are uniformly random additive shares in both executions. The
same applies to shares of garbled splitter gates, due to the use of the F 2n`BMRZero functionality in
the real world. Regarding the OPEN GARBLING step, if 1 ∉ A the reconstructed garbled circuit is
identically distributed in both worlds. Else, if 1 ∈ A, the adversary gets additive shares of the
garbled circuit both in the real and simulated executions, as we argued.
Finally, the distribution of the variables corresponding to additive shares, on the one hand,
and that of the i.i.d. variables, on the other hand, guarantees that the joint output of all par-
ties, together with the simulated/real view of corrupted parties, are identically distributed in
both worlds. More formally, let outputπ(x,κ) (resp. f (x)) be the output of Π`BMRPreprocessing (resp.
FPreprocessing) on input x ∈ {0,1}∗ from all parties and security parameter κ. Let viewπA(x,κ) (resp.
fA(x)) be the restriction of these outputs to the set of corrupted parties A. We just proved that:
{(S (1κ, x, fA(x)), f (x))}x,κ,A ≈ {(viewπA(x,κ),outputπ(x,κ))}x,κ,A.
■
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Protocol Π`BMRBMR
COMMON INPUT: A boolean circuit C f with fan-out-one gates representing the function f . Let
AND,XOR and SPLIT be the sets of AND, XOR and splitter gates, respectively. For a gate g ∈ SPLIT,
let the input wire be {w} and the output wires be {u,v}. Otherwise let {u,v} be the input wires and {w}
the output wire.
CRS: H : [n]× {0,1}× {0,1}`BMR → {0,1}n`BMR+1, a uniformly random function, and H′ defined from H by
excluding the least significant bit of the output.
The parties execute the following commands in sequence:
Preprocessing:
1. Call FPreprocessing with input C f . Each party Pi obtains the garbled version g̃ of every
gate g ∈ SPLIT∪AND, the wire masks λw for every output wire and every wire associated
with their input, and all their keys {kiw,0,k
i
w,1} for every wire w of the circuit.
Online Computation:
1. For all input wires w with input from Pi, party Pi computes Λw = ρ iw ⊕λw, where ρ iw is
Pi ’s input to C f on wire w, and λw was obtained from FPreprocessing. Then, Pi broadcasts
the external value Λw to all parties.
2. For all input wires w, each party Pi broadcasts the key kiw,Λw associated to Λw.
3. Passing through the circuit topologically, the parties can now locally compute the following
operations for each gate g.
a) If g ∈ SPLIT, set Λx =Λw for x ∈ {u,v} and then compute:














b) If g ∈AND, the parties compute:








c) If g ∈XOR, the parties compute Λw =⊕x∈IΛx and kiw,Λw =⊕x∈I kix,Λx for i ∈ [n].
4. Eventually, all parties will obtain an external value Λw for every circuit-output wire w.
Each party can then recover the actual output value from ρw =Λw ⊕λw, where λw was
obtained in the preprocessing stage.
Figure 5.14: Online phase of the constant-round MPC protocol.
5.4.5 The Online Phase
We present the online phase of our protocol for multi-party garbled circuits with short keys
in Figure 5.14. Given the previous description of the garbling phase, the online phase is quite
straightforward, where upon reconstructing the garbled circuit and obtaining all input keys,
the evaluation process is similar to that of [18], described in Section 2.6. As in that work, all
parties run the evaluation algorithm, which in our case involves each party computing just
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2n hash evaluations per gate. As usual, during the evaluation parties obtain external values
corresponding to a random mask of the actual values being computed. Upon completion, the
parties obtain the actual output using the output wire masks revealed from FPreprocessing. The
security of the protocol reduces to the DRSDr,h,`BMR problem, where `BMR is the key length, h is
the number of honest parties, and r is twice the output length of the function H (sampled by the
CRS).
We remark that in practice, we may want to implement the random function H in the CRS
using fixed-key AES in the ideal cipher model, as is common for garbling schemes based on
Free-XOR. In Section 5.5.2, we show that this reduces the number of AES calls from O(n2) in
previous BMR protocols to O(n2`BMR/κ).
We conclude with the following theorem
Theorem 5.4.3. Let f be an n-party functionality {0,1}nκ 7→ {0,1}κ and assume that the DRSD2r,h,`BMR
assumption (see Definition 5.5) holds, where r = n`BMR +1. Then Protocol Π`BMRBMR from Figure 5.14
UC-securely computes f in the presence of a static honest-but-curious adversary corrupting t = n−h
parties in the FPreprocessing-hybrid model.
Proof. We reduce security of the protocol to the extended double-key decisional-RSD problem
(Definition 5.7) with parameters (r,h,`), where r := n`BMR +1. By Lemma 5.2.5, this is reducible
to DRSD2r,h,`.
Let A be a PPT adversary corrupting a subset of parties A ⊂ [n] such that |A| = n− h.
We prove that there exists a PPT simulator S , with access to an ideal functionality F that
implements f , which simulates the adversary’s view. The simulator fixes the CRS as a random
2n ·2`BMR ×2n`BMR+1 matrix. A key kw for wire w is denoted as an active key if it is observed by
the adversary upon evaluating the garbled circuit. The remaining hidden key is denoted as an
inactive key. An active path is the set of all active keys that are observed throughout the garbled
circuit evaluation.
Denoting the set of honest parties by Ā, our simulator S is defined below.
THE DESCRIPTION OF THE SIMULATION:
1. INITIALIZATION. Upon receiving the adversary’s input (1κ, A, xA) and output y, S samples
a i.i.d uniformly random tapes r i for each i ∈ A, incorporates A and internally emulates an
execution of the honest parties running Π`BMRBMR with the adversary A . When we say that
S chooses a value for some corrupted party, we mean that it samples the value from that
party’s random tape r i.
2. PREPROCESSING. S obtains the adversary’s input C f which is a Boolean circuit that
computes f with a set of wires W and a set of G gates, and emulates FPreprocessing, as
follows:
• For every XOR gate g and i ∈ A the simulator samples ∆ig ∈ {0,1}`BMR .
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• For every input wire u the simulator chooses a random bit Λu ∈ {0,1} and, for every
i ∈ Ā, an active key kiu,Λu ∈ {0,1}
`BMR . Additionally, it chooses a key kiu,0 ∈ {0,1}`BMR
for every i ∈ A. Finally, and also for i ∈ A, if u is input to a XOR gate g′ it sets
kiu,1 = kiu,0 ⊕∆ig′ , otherwise it samples kiu,1 ∈ {0,1}`BMR .
The simulator continues the emulation of the garbling phase by computing an active path
of the garbled circuit that corresponds to the sequence of keys which will be observed by







i ∈ Ā in order to generate the garbled circuit.
• ACTIVE PATH GENERATION OF XOR GATES. For every XOR gate g with input a set of
wires I and an output wire w,
– S sets Λw =⊕x∈IΛx.
– Next, for i ∈ A it sets kiw,0 =
⊕
x∈I kix,0 and k
i
w,1 = kiw,0 ⊕∆ig.
– Finally, for i ∈ Ā the simulator sets kiw,Λw =
⊕
x∈I kix,Λx .
• ACTIVE PATH GENERATION OF AND GATES. For every AND gate g with input wires
I = {u,v} and an output wire w, S samples a randomΛw ∈ {0,1} and honestly generates
the entry in row (Λu,Λv), where Λu (resp. Λv) is the external value associated to the









⊕ (Λw,k1w,Λw , . . . ,knw,Λw ).
The remaining three rows are sampled uniformly at random from {0,1}n`BMR+1.
• ACTIVE PATH GENERATION OF SPLITTER GATES. For every splitter gate g with an
input wire I = {w} and output wires O = {u,v}, S sets Λx =Λw for every x ∈ O and
honestly generates the entry in row Λw, where Λw is the external value associated to










⊕ (k1u,Λu , . . . ,knu,Λu ,k
1
v,Λv , . . . ,k
n
v,Λv ).
The remaining row is sampled uniformly at random from {0,1}2n`BMR .
• SETTING THE TRANSLATION TABLE. For every output wire w ∈W returning the ith
bit of y, the simulator sets λw =Λw⊕ yi. For all input wires w ∈W ′′ that are associated
with the ith bit of xA (the adversary’s input), the simulator sets λw =Λw ⊕ xA,i. The
simulator forwards the adversary the λw value for every output wire w ∈ W and
every circuit-input wire w ∈W ′′ associated with a corrupted party. It completes the
emulation of FPreprocessing by adding the complete garbled circuit to the view of each
corrupted party.
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3. ONLINE COMPUTATION. In the online computation the simulator adds to the view of every
corrupted party the external values {Λw}w∈W ′ that are associated with the honest parties’
input wires W ′. The simulator adds the honest parties’ input keys {kiw,Λw }i∈Ā,w∈W ′ to the
view of each corrupted party.
This concludes the description of the simulation. Note that the difference between the sim-
ulated and the real executions is regarding the way the garbled circuit is generated. More
concretely, the simulated garbled gates include a single row that is properly produced, whereas





(1κ, z) denote the output
distribution of the adversary A and honest parties in a real execution using Π`BMRBMR with adversary
A . Moreover, let IDEALF ,S ,Z (1κ, z) denote the output distribution of S and the honest parties
in an ideal execution.
We prove that the ideal and real executions are indistinguishable.







• {IDEALF ,S ,Z (1κ, z)}κ∈N,z∈{0,1}∗
Proof: We begin by defining a slightly modified simulated execution HYB, where the generation
of the garbled circuit is modified so that upon receiving the parties’ inputs {ρ i}i∈[n] the simulator
S̃ first evaluates the circuit C f , computing the actual bit ρw to be transferred via wire w for
all w ∈ W, where W is the set of wires of C f . It then chooses wire mask shares and wire keys
as in the description of functionality FPreprocessing from Figure 5.7. Finally, S̃ fixes the active
key for each wire w ∈W to be (k1w,ρw⊕λw , . . . ,knw,ρw⊕λw ). The rest of this hybrid is identical to the






(1κ, z) denote the output distribution of the adversary A and honest parties
in this game. It is simple to verify that the adversary’s views in HYB and IDEAL are identical,
as in both cases the garbling of each gate includes just a single row that is correctly garbled and
the external value associated with each wire w is independent of `BMRw.
Our proof of the lemma follows by a reduction to the Extended Double-Key RSD hardness
assumption (cf. Definition 5.7). Assume by contradiction the existence of an environment Z , an









(1κ, z))= 1]∣∣≥ 1
p(κ)
for infinitely many κ’s where the probability is taken over the randomness of Z as well as the
randomness for choosing the Λ values and the keys. Then we construct a PPT distinguisher D for
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and five random elements, for some subset Ā of [n] of size h (that corresponds to the set of honest
parties) with probability at least 1p(κ)·|C| via a sequence of hybrid games {HYBi}i∈[|C|], where
C = SPLIT∪AND. In more details, we define hybrid HYBi as a hybrid execution with a simulator
S i that garbles the circuit as follows. The first i gates in the topological order are garbled as in
the simulation whereas the remaining |C|− i gates are garbled as in the real execution. Note
that HYB0 is distributed as hybrid HYB and that HYB|C| is distributed as HYB. Therefore, if
HYB and HYB are distinguishable with probability 1p(κ) then there exists τ ∈ [|C|] such that
hybrids HYBτ−1 and HYBτ are distinguishable with probability at least 1p(κ)·|C| . Next, we formally
describe our reduction to the Extended Double-Key RSD hardness assumption. Upon receiving
a tuple (H,H̃0,H̃′0,H̃1,H̃
′
1) that is distributed according to the first or the second distribution, a
subset Ā of [n] that denotes the set of honest parties, an index τ and the environment’s input z,
distinguisher D internally invokes Z and simulator S . In more detail:
• D internally invokes Z that fixes the honest parties’ inputs ρ.
• D emulates the communication with the adversary (controlled by Z ) in the initialization,
preprocessing and garbling steps as in the simulation with S .
• For each wire u, let ρu ∈ {0,1} be the actual value on wire u. Note that these values, as well
as the output of the computation y, can be determined since D knows the actual input of
all parties to the circuit.
• For each wire u in the circuit and i ∈ A, D chooses a pair of keys kiu,0,kiu,1 ∈ {0,1}`BMR ,
whereas for all i ∈ Ā it samples a random key kiu,Λu ∈ {0,1}
`BMR . D further fixes the external
value Λu =λu ⊕ρu.
• D then garbles the circuit as follows.
– For every g j ∈ AND with input wires u and v and output wire w, D continues as
follows.
If j < τ then D garbles g j exactly as in the simulation with S̃ .









⊕ (c,k1w,Λw , . . . ,knw,Λw )
where c =Λw.
Next, D samples an inactive key ki
w,Λ̄w
for all i ∈ Ā and fixes the remaining three rows
as follows.
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⊕ (c,k1w,c, . . . ,knw,c), where c = Λ̄u · Λ̄v ⊕Λw ⊕ρw.
Finally, if j > τ then D garbles g j exactly as in hybrid HYB. For that, D needs to know
both active and inactive keys. It therefore chooses the inactive keys that are associated
with the input and output wires of this gate for i ∈ Ā, in order to be able to complete
the garbling. Recall that the circuit is with fan-out 1. Therefore the distinguisher can
choose the inactive key for the input wire of this gate (as it was not used as an input
wire to gate gτ).
– For every g j ∈ SPLIT with input wire w and output wires u,v, D completes the garbling
as follows.
If j < τ then D garbles g j exactly as in the simulation with S̃ .









⊕ (k1u,Λu , . . . ,knv,Λv ).


















If j > τ then D garbles g j as in hybrid HYB using a similar process as for the case of
an AND gate.
• This concludes the description of the reduction. Note that the set XOR need not be part of
these hybrids since we do not send any garbling information for this set of gates. D hands
the adversary the complete description of the garbled circuit and concludes the execution
as in the simulation with S̃ .
• D outputs whatever Z does.
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Note first that if (H̃0,H̃′0,H̃1,H̃
′
1) are truly uniform then the view generated by D is distributed as
in HYBτ. This is because only the active path is created as in the real execution, whereas the
remaining rows are sampled uniformly at random from the appropriate domain. On the other















then this emulates game HYBτ−1, since each tuple element emulates an evaluation of the hash
values for the honest parties on the secret keys.

This concludes the proof of Theorem 5.4.3. ■
5.5 Complexity Analysis and Implementation Results
We now compare the complexity of the most relevant aspects of our approach to the state-of-
the-art prior results in semi-honest MPC protocols with dishonest majority. To demonstrate the
practicality of our approach, we also present implementation results for the online evaluation
phase of our BMR-based protocol.
5.5.1 Threshold Variants of Full-Threshold Protocols
Since the standard GMW and BMR-based protocols allow for up to n−1 corruptions, we also
show how to modify previous protocols to support some threshold t, and compare our protocols
with these variants. The method is very simple (and similar to the use of committees in our
protocols), but does not seem to have been explicitly mentioned in previous literature. To evaluate
a circuit C, all parties first secret-share their inputs to an arbitrarily chosen committee P ′, of
size t+1. Committee P ′ runs the full-threshold protocol for a modified circuit C′, which takes all
the shares as input, and first XORs them together so that it computes the same function as C.
The committee P ′ then sends the output to all parties in P . The complexity of the threshold-t
variant of a full-threshold protocol, Π, is then essentially the same as running Π between t+1
parties instead of n.
5.5.2 Instantiating the CRS
Our protocols require a CRS, which is a randomly sampled function, H. One way of implementing
this would be generate the function in a setup phase (e.g. with coin-tossing) and store it as
a lookup table. However, when the table grows large this will have a prohibitive impact on
performance, as there will likely be many cache misses when reading from H at random locations.
A more efficient alternative is to implement H using fixed-key AES, which offers fast performance
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on modern CPUs with AES hardware instructions. This gives security in the ideal cipher model,
where fixed-key AES is modelled as a random permutation.5
Depending on which of our two protocols is used, this method works as follows:
• For GMW, H is a 1-bit output hash function, so we can simply truncate the AES output.
• For our BMR-style protocol, we need to expand the input to n·`+1 bits. Let B = d(n·`+1)/128e
be the number of AES blocks needed to generate one hash output. The parties first fix a
random key s ← {0,1}128 and then define:
H(i,b,k)= (AESs(i‖b‖k‖0), . . . ,AESs(i‖b‖k‖B−1)),
where the last block is truncated so that the total output length is n ·`BMR +1 bits.
The cost of a single call to H is that of B AES operations.
5.5.3 Concrete Hardness of RSD and Our Choice of Parameters
In this section we give an overview of how we select the key length ` in our protocols according to
n,h, r, so that the corresponding RSDr,h,` instance is hard enough. For a more detailed survey of
known attacks and the techniques involved, check the full version [69] of the paper this chapter
is based on. As discussed in Section 5.2.4, RSD is similar to the (standard) syndrome decoding
problem, where each component of the error vector is 0 or 1 with some constant probability, which
is equivalent to the problem of learning parity with noise (LPN).
The most efficient attacks on RSD are Information Set Decoding (ISD), introduced by Prange
in 1962 [112], Wagner’s Generalised Birthday Attack (GBA) [127], and the Linearization Attack
(LA) by Bellare et al. [22] and Saarinen [120]. We stress that the goal of our analysis is to find
a reasonable estimation of the complexity of these attacks; giving a complete description of all
possible decoding techniques and a precise evaluation of their cost is out of the scope of this
thesis. In our analysis we intentionally underestimate the complexity of all the attacks, resulting
in a conservative estimate of the security of our protocols.
When considering the hardness of RSD instances we need to distinguish the case where the
solution to the problem is unique and the case of multiple solutions. In the first case, which always
occurs for our BMR-style protocols, GBA essentially reduces to the classical birthday attack and
the most efficient attack is ISD. Classical information set decoding algorithms do not take into
account the possibility that the solution is regular. In practice, when we estimate the cost of this
attack, we consider the cost of both a tailored regular variant of ISD, augmented with the Stern
[125] and Finiasz and Sendrier [56] techniques, and the more recent non-regular variant due to
5This actually only provides security up to the birthday bound, i.e. as long as the adversary makes no more than
264 queries to AESs. In practice, however, since ` is small there will typically be far fewer than 264 possible inputs, so
we do not need to be concerned with the birthday bound.
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n 20 50 80 100 200 400
h 10 11 16 10 20 25 40 16 24 32 56 20 30 40 60 60 100 80 120
` Pra 19 18 13 21 13 11 8 32 12 10 8 14 11 9 8 8 8 8 8
` 32 29 18 > 32 27 16 8 > 32 30 17 8 > 32 25 15 8 14 8 11 8
Table 5.1: Min key-length for BMR-style MPC with 128 bits of security for different n and h when
r = 2`n+2
h 15 20 30 40 50 80
r 300 1500 300 3000 300 2000 400 3000 450 1000 420 2500
` 14 26 11 32 8 16 7 15 6 8 4 8
Table 5.2: Min key-length for GMW-style MPC with 128 bits of security for different n and h
# parties n (honest) 20 (6) 50 (15) 60 (20) 80 (30) 150 (40) 200 (50) 400 (120)
(`OT, r) (31,300) (14,300) (11,300) (8,300) (7,400) (6,450) (1,80)
GMW (t = n−1) 25.46 164.15 237.18 423.44 1497.5 2666.6 10693.2
GMW (t = n−h) 14.07 84.42 109.88 170.85 818.07 1517.55 5271.56
Ours 12.89 37 40.38 50.01 169.36 261.6 403.63
Table 5.3: Amortized communication cost (in kbit) of producing a single triple in GMW. We
consider [51] for 1-out-of-4 OT extension in the GMW protocols, and the protocol from Section 5.3
in our work.
Becker et al. [19], and then we take the minimum of the two. We have also analysed more recent
variants of ISD [32, 98], see [69] for more details.
In Table 5.1, we provide an estimation of the minimal key-length ` for our BMR-style protocols
to achieve more than 128 bits of security for different values of n,h and r = 2`n+2. Note that we
only consider 8≤ `≤ 32, so when in the table we have that ` should be larger than 32, it means
that ISD cost less than 2128 for that set of parameters. We also give an estimation of minimal
key-length respect to the plain ISD attack to RSD by Prange.
When an RSD instance has more than one solution – this is sometimes the case for our
GMW-style protocol – we need to consider also GBA and LA. Notice that since there are many
solutions, attacking regular SD with classical ISD is more difficult than attacking non-regular
SD and an adversary needs to run the attack repeatedly until the output is regular, increasing
the cost of the attack. To estimate the complexity of GBA and LA we take the same conservative
approach we use for ISD. Since LA is particularly effective for larger h, especially when h > r/4,
we always set up r > 2h+1.
In Table 5.2 we propose a set of of parameters for our GMW-style protocols for different values
of h (and irrespective to the total number of parties n), such that the estimated complexity of the
most efficient decoding algorithms is larger than 2128.
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Figure 5.15: Amortized communication cost (in kbit) for producing triples in GMW for n =
50,100,200,500 and deterministic committees.
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5.5.4 GMW-Style Protocol
We now compare the communication cost of our triple generation protocol with the best-known
instantiation of GMW, namely a variant based on 1-out-of-4 OT to generate triples, recently
optimized by [51] in the 2-party setting. This easily extends to the multi-party case with com-
munication complexity O(n2κ/ logκ) bits per AND gate, so we consider both full-threshold and
threshold-t (Section 5.5.1) variants. Note that our protocol from Section 5.3 has complexity O(nt`)
when using deterministic committees, with ` as in Table 5.1.
As can be seen in Table 5.3 and Figure 5.15, for a fixed number of honest parties h, the
improvement of our protocol over GMW (threshold t) becomes greater as the total number
of parties increases. Our protocol starts to beat the best-known GMW protocol for producing
multiplication triples when there are just 6 honest parties. For example, with 20 parties and 14
corruptions, the communication cost of our protocol is roughly 10% lower than threshold-14 GMW,
and only 2 times lower than the cost of standard, full threshold GMW. As the number of parties
(and honest parties) grows, our improvements become even greater, and when the number of
honest parties is more than 80, we can use 1-bit keys and improve upon the threshold variant of
GMW by more than 13 times.
In Section 5.3 we mentioned the possibility, when n and h are large enough, of using random
committees P (h) and P (1), such that except with negligible probability P (h) has at least h′ ≤ h
honest parties and P (1) has at least one honest party. In order to estimate the communication
complexity of our protocol, we consider the probability p(1) of P (1) not having a single honest
party and the probability p(h) of P (h) of having less than h′ honest parties. Let n1 = |P (1)| and











) · ( hh′− j)( n
nh
) ,
where v = nh − (n− h) < h′. We fix the parameters n,h,h′, and compute the minimum values
nh,n1 such that p(h) and p(1) are less than 2−s. Table 5.4 compares our protocol with random
committees and GMW with a single random committee of size n1, i.e. having at least one honest
party with overwhelming probability, when s = 40. Even if the communication complexity reduces
in both protocols, our approach is always at least 50% more efficient compared to GMW.
(n,h,h′) (100, 40, 30) (200, 70, 50) (500, 200, 120) (800, 300, 120) (1000, 200, 120) (5000,1200,120) (10000, 3000, 120)
(`OT, r) (8, 300) (6, 450) (1, 80) (1, 80) (1, 80) (1, 80) (1, 80)
(nh′ ,n1) (90, 39) (180, 54) (382, 51) ( 447, 57) (790, 117) (811, 100) (654, 78)
GMW 99.3 191.75 170.85 213.9 909.32 663.3 402.40
Ours 43.6 84.62 70.13 91.72 337.75 291 183.64
Table 5.4: Amortized communication cost (in kbit) of producing a single triple in GMW using
random committees.
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# parties (honest) 20 (10) 50 (20) 80 (32) 100 (40) 200 (60) 400 (120) 1000 (160)
(`BMR,`OT, r) (32,23,530) (27,13,450) (17,8,380) (15,7,400) (8,5,370) (8,1,80) (8,1,120)
[25] (Gb P ) 341.24 2200.1 5675.36 8890 35740 143320.8 897102
[25] (Gb P (1)) 98.78 835.14 2112.1 3286.7 17726.45 70654.7 634383.12
Ours (Garbling) 111.7 747.63 1750.48 2678.74 5448.36 10114.99 64474.1
[25] (|GC| P ) 10.24A 25.6A 40.96A 51.2A 102.4A 204.8A 512A
[25] (|GC| P (1)) 5.632A 15.88A 25.1A 31.23A 72.19A 143.9A 430.6A
[26] (|GC|) 12.29(A+ X ) 12.29(A+ X ) 12.29(A+ X ) 12.29(A+ X ) 12.29(A+ X ) 12.29(A+ X ) 12.29(A+ X )
Ours (|GC|) 2.56(A+S) 5.4(A+S) 5.45(A+S) 6(A+S) 6.4(A+S) 12.8(A+S) 32(A+S)
Table 5.5: Communication complexity for garbling, and size of garbled gates, in BMR-style
protocols in kbit. A = #AND gates, S = #Splitter gates, X = #XOR gates.
5.5.5 BMR-Style Protocol
5.5.5.1 Communication Complexity
To show the efficiency of our constant-round garbling protocol from Section 5.4.5, we provide
Table 5.5, which has two parts. First, it compares the amortized communication complexity
incurred for garbling an AND gate with [25]. We recall that this is the dominating cost for
BMR-style protocols using Free-XOR, and that we incur no communication for creating shares of
garbled splitter gates. Note that in the first setting of n = 20, t = 10, although our communication
costs are around 3 times lower than [25], we do not improve upon the threshold-t variant of that
protocol, described earlier. Once we get to 50 parties, though, we start to improve upon [25], with
a reduction in communication going up to 7x for 400 parties and 10x for 1000 parties.
The second half of the table shows the size of the garbled circuit in terms of the total number
of AND, XOR and splitter gates. Garbled circuit size only has a slight impact on communication
complexity, when opening the garbled circuit, which is much lower than the communication in the
rest of the garbling phase. However, if an implementation needs to store the entire garbled circuit
in memory (either for evaluation, or storage for later use) then it is also important to optimize
its size. Here we also compare with [26], which recently showed how to construct a compact
multi-party garbled circuit based on key-homomorphic PRFs. The size of their garbled circuit is
constant and grows with O(κ) per gate, with security proven in the presence of n−1 corrupted
parties. On the other hand, their construction requires much more expensive operations based
on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) or Ring-LWE assumptions, and these also lead to fairly
large keys – with a 3072-bit discrete log prime (equivalent to 128-bit security) the size of a garbled
AND gate only beats our protocol at around 400 parties. Additionally, their construction does not
support Free-XOR, and the concrete efficiency of the offline garbling phase is not clear: garbling
an AND gate requires O(n) secret-shared field multiplications, which seems likely to be much
higher than the offline cost of our protocol or [25], but their paper does not give concrete numbers.
In Figure 5.16 we show the communication complexity of garbling when n = 100,500 and for
different number of honest parties.
CONCRETE COST FORMULAS: Here we explicit how to obtain the communication complexity
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Figure 5.16: Communication complexity cost (in kbit) for garbling when n = 100 and n = 500.
results in Table 5.5 and Figure 5.16, which compare our work with the best previous passively
secure BMR protocol, namely [25]. To simplify the comparison, we exclude the communication
related to input and output wires. Given a circuit C f with X XOR gates and A AND gates, each
of them with fan-in-two and arbitrary fan-out, [25] has the following communication costs:
1. One bit multiplication and 3n bit-string multiplications per AND gate, where the strings
have length κ. A bit multiplication requires n(n−1) bit-OTs, each of which involves sending
128+2 bits if instantiated with [74] or 84 bits if instantiated with [83]. Each of the bit-string
multiplication can be computed using n−1 correlated OTs, at a cost of 128+128 bits each.
2. Each AND gate has size 4nκ bits, and each party has a share of it. If the circuit is
reconstructed by every party sending her share to P1, and then P1 broadcasting the
addition of every share, the cost of putting an AND gate together is 8n(n−1)κ bits.
This gives a total cost of (130+768+8κ) ·n · (n−1) · A = 1922 ·n · (n−1) · A bits for the [74]
instantiation and (67+768+8κ) ·n · (n−1) · A = 1876 ·n · (n−1) · A when using [51] instead. In our
work, the costs are:
1. One bit multiplication and 3n bit/string multiplications per AND gate, where the strings
have length `. When implemented with our improved GMW protocol with deterministic
committees, these cost (n−h+1)(n−1)(`OT+`OTκ/r+1) bits and n(n−1)`BMR(`OT+`OTκ/r+1)
bits, respectively.
2. Each AND gate has size 4 · (n`+1) bits. Each Splitter gate has size 4n` bits.
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Figure 5.17: Online time for evaluating various circuits with n = 30,50,100,300. The corre-
sponding numbers of honest parties are h = 14,21,38,105, respectively. Times for [25] are for a
full-threshold implementation.
5.5.5.2 Garbling Implementation
Note: The following implementation work was not carried out by the author, but by Assi Barak,
Moriya Farbstein and Lior Koskas from the software team at Bar-Ilan University. It appears here
for completeness and a better understanding of the previous results in this chapter.
In Figure 5.17, we present running times for evaluating the garbled circuit in our protocol
and compare with times for [25] running on the same machine.
The implementation runs on a single machine,6 to allow testing just the local computation
in the online phase (note that there is very little interaction in the online phase). We took as
benchmarks the AES circuit (6800 AND gates, 31796 Splitters), the SHA-256 circuit (90825
AND gates, 132586 Splitters), a binary multiplier for 32-bit numbers (5926 AND gates, 6994
Splitters) and a randomly generated circuit with 100000 AND gates and 99510 Splitters (as used
6Intel Xeon E5-2650 v3 2.3GHz / 25M Cache, 10 Cores, 64GB RAM.
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in [26], for comparison). The CRS H was implemented with fixed-key AES in counter mode using
AES-NI instructions, which is a random function under the assumption that AES behaves like
a random permutation (see Section 5.5.2). We also tried precomputing every output of H and
storing this as a lookup-table, but in practice this did not perform well as the table size was
usually much larger than the CPU cache. Recall that the standard BMR online phase requires
each party to perform O(n2) AES operations per AND gate, whereas our online phase reduces
this to O(n2`BMR/κ), with some extra cost for evaluating splitter gates. The results show that for
the random circuit our protocol starts to pay off from around 50 parties, when the corruption
threshold is between 20–40%, reaching a 3.3x improvement for n = 300,h = 105. On the other
hand, for AES, which has a relatively large proportion of splitter gates, the crossover point is
closer to 150 parties, and the greatest improvement factor is 1.3x over [25] for n = 300,h = 105.
This shows that the performance improvements of our garbled circuit-based protocol very much
depend on the specific circuit being evaluated, but further improvements may be possible by
modifying secure computation compilers to produce circuits more suitable for our protocol. It
also seems likely that implementing our GMW-based protocol would show much more significant










CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
After several real-world deployments and proposals of Multi-Party Computation [29–31], this
research area is now ready to scale up and explore scenarios where networks are slower or more
parties take part in the computation. Whereas those might seem as differentiated directions,
most probably if tens, hundreds or even thousands of parties are to perform MPC in the real
world, they will have to do so through a WAN and network latency will then be an issue.
With few exceptions [26, 33], concrete efficiency for large numbers of parties does not seem
to have attracted a lot of interest by the community yet. This is likely to change due to both
the latest improvements and a growing number of scenarios which inherently involve data from
many sources [7, 31]. With regards to these scenarios, in work not included in this thesis [68]
we extended the recent TinyKeys technique presented in Chapter 5 to provide active security.
This new result builds on the TinyOT family of protocols (see [58, 104, 129] or Section 4.7), for
which we improve the communication complexity by producing shorter message-authentication
codes. For future works based in TinyKeys, several interesting questions remain open. Perhaps
most remarkably, it has to be shown how to efficiently extend BMR-style protocols with short
keys, as the one described in Section 5.4, to be secure against active adversaries. Other areas
of interest include adaptive adversaries and further cryptanalysis of the Regular Syndrome
Decoding problem in order to improve the currently conservative parameters.
Regarding MPC over slow networks without necessarily as many parties, constant-round
protocols provide a promising solution. Specially for deep boolean circuits, it has been empirically
verified in the passive multi-party setting (for BMR-style protocols [25]) and in the active, two-
party one [128] that garbled circuits outperform other approaches. Nevertheless, as progress on
BMR-style protocols goes along, more experiments in different scenarios will be necessary in
order to keep comparing with the presently more active line of research in secret-sharing based
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MPC. At the moment, we know that secret-sharing based protocols win for lower-depth circuits
and more than two parties when the adversary is passive [25]. Running these kind of comparisons
might highlight different strengths and lead to the discovery of new, unexpected bottlenecks
which are clearer in the two-party setting. Knowledge of strong and weak points might at the
same time lead to hybrid secret-sharing/garbled circuits solutions where different parts of the
computation are obtained using either one tool or the other. Whereas these techniques have
been explored in more depth in the two-party setting [50], there is currently only one work [81]
exploiting the different strengths of each approach in the multi-party setting.
On more theoretical grounds, an important step for BMR-style protocols during the length of
this PhD was finding the right way to define the garbling functionality, as it can be noticed by
the difference between the ones appearing in Chapters 3 and 4. Finding abstractions which both
simplify the community’s work when writing proofs and are general enough to cover present and
future works is always an interesting task. The functionalities provided in Chapter 4 have already
proved useful to other authors as explicitly mentioned in [27, 67]. Notably, those two works are
of a very different nature: [27] deals with concrete efficiency improvements for BMR, while [67]
constructs the first round-optimal actively secure MPC protocol under standard assumptions.
In the same vein, future BMR-based works could use help from a rigorous definition of the
‘vector double encryption’ concept, introduced in Chapter 2 informally and for the first time in the
literature. A similar notion exists in the two party setting [91], but its extension to more parties
is not straightforward even within already existing results. Such formalization would lead to a
more general garbling functionality than the one provided in Chapter 4, together with a proof
reducing to any ’vector double encryption’ scheme instead of circular 2-correlation robust PRFs.
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